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Abstract 
This thesis aimed to investigate self-other processes in social cognition.  
Contrary to the traditional approach of focusing on self-other processes within 
the confines of a single domain, this thesis highlights the prominent role of these 
processes across different socio-cognitive domains.  Three main empirical 
questions form the basis of the research reported here.  The first is concerned 
with the extent to which self-other representations are shared across three 
different socio-cognitive abilities: the control of imitation, theory of mind, and 
visual perspective taking.  The second relates to the neural underpinnings of 
self-other representations, in particular, the role of the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ) during socio-cognitive processing.  The third question examines the role of 
culture as a modulatory factor of self-other processes.  
The findings from Experiment 1, 3 and 4 showed a relationship between the 
control of imitation and visual perspective taking.  This relationship seems to 
rely on the online control of co-activated self-other representations, which at the 
neural level are mediated by the TPJ (bilaterally).  
In Experiment 2 it was found that individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia are 
impaired in the control of imitation but their performance on visual perspective 
taking and theory of mind is comparable with non-synaesthetes.  It is 
hypothesised that atypical self-other processes in mirror-touch synaesthesia 
might be confined to situations in which representations of the ‘other’ should be 
inhibited, but not when they should be enhanced.    
Experiment 5 showed that acculturation strategies adopted by migrants 
modulate their imitative behaviour towards a member of the heritage vs. a 
member of the host culture.   
The diverse nature of the studies reported in this thesis shows the complexity of 
self-other processes in social cognition.  Taken together, these findings 
demonstrate how adopting a wider approach to the investigation of self-other 
processes contributes towards a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying socio-cognitive abilities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This Chapter provides an overview of the research that has motivated the investigation 
of self-other processes in social cognition and outlines the three main objectives of this 
thesis. These include 1) to investigate if there is a relationship between the different 
socio-cognitive domains of imitation/ imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking and 
theory of mind; and whether such a relationship, should it exist, relies on common self-
other processes, 2) to explore the role of the temporoparietal junction – previously 
identified as a key brain region in socio-cognitive processing – in social abilities that rely 
on self-other representations, and 3) to examine the influence of culture – specifically 
acculturation strategies and self-construal styles – in social cognition.  
 
1.1 Mental Representations of Self and Others  
The question of how humans form mental representations of themselves 
and other individuals has long intrigued theorists and empirical researchers 
alike.  From a philosophical stance, in order to become aware of the physical 
integrity of the self, the presence of another human being is required.  The 
knowledge acquired through observation of the other can then be applied to the 
image of the self (Gasparyan 2014).  For psychologists, the concepts of self and 
other are intrinsically linked and evoked either implicitly or explicitly in all 
forms of psychosocial processes.  Most recently, a proliferating body of research 
within the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience is beginning to shed 
light on the neural mechanisms underpinning self-other representations.  
From a developmental perspective, the empirical concern has been 
mostly on representations of the self and the emergence of self-awareness.  
Parting from the view that knowledge of the self originates from perception 
rather than mental representations, (Neisser 1991) identifies two aspects of self 
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perception, the ecological self and the interpersonal self.  The former concerns 
the relationship of the self with the environment whereas the latter derives from 
information produced by social interactions.  At around 18-20 months infants 
show the ability for self-recognition, as shown by experiments using the mark 
test {Amsterdam 1972).  In these experiments a rouge mark is surreptitiously 
placed on the infant’s face before they are placed facing a mirror.  They 
successfully pass the task if they touch the mark on their face rather than their 
mirror reflection. 
What about mental representations of others?  Evidence from 
developmental studies supports the philosophical view that before an individual 
becomes aware of the physical integrity of the self, the presence of another 
individual is required.  For example, (Pipp, Fischer, & Jennings, 1987) found 
that before the age of 18 months, infants’ knowledge of physical features of the 
mother precedes equivalent knowledge of the self.  Similarly, (Herold & Akhtar, 
2014) tested featural self knowledge of 2 ½ year olds and found that infants 
were better able to identify body parts of a doll, of similar size to them, than 
their own body parts. 
Over the last few decades research interest in mental representations of 
the self and other have been encompassed under the broader category of social 
cognition.  Social cognition refers to the individual’s cognitive processes in 
relation to their social world.  Two principal aspects characterise social 
cognition research: the investigation of the individual’s mental processes, 
including encoding and storage of social information, and the examination of 
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how the individual mind is influenced by social interaction (Marsh & Onof, 
2008).  Self-other representations are at the core of both aspects.  However, 
because mental representations of self and others are intrinsically linked to 
specific socio-cognitive processes (e.g., attribution of mental states, adopting the 
visual perspective of another or imitating the behaviour of others), there is a 
paucity of research on the mechanisms involved in self-other representations 
across different socio-cognitive domains.   
1.2  Self-Other Overlap and Self-Other Distinction  
Self-other overlap refers to a situation in which an observer adopts a state 
similar to that of another person via activation of the observer’s representation 
of what it is like to experience that state (Preston & Hofelich, 2012).  At the 
neural level, the observation of another’s state can activate neural regions in the 
observer that are also activated when the observer experiences the state himself.  
The discovery of a population of neurons in the prefrontal cortex (area F5) in 
monkeys (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), 
which fire during both action observation and execution – known as mirror 
neurons – have inspired a vast amount of cognitive neuroscience research 
investigating the presence of equivalent mirror neuron regions in humans.  
Evidence of neural regions involved in both action observation and execution in 
the human brain has been previously reported (e.g., Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 
2007; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavasi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; 
Iacoboni 1999b)).  Although both the existence and specialized function of a 
mirror neuron system in humans have been challenged (see Heyes, 2010) for a 
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review), some researchers consider mirror neuron studies in humans as 
evidence of self-other overlap, specifically in the socio-cognitive domains of 
imitation and empathy (e.g., Iacoboni 2009; Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 
2003).  In the context of imitation, self-other overlap has also been referred to as 
a ‘direct matching’ between action observation and execution (Buccino, 
Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004; Jackson & Decety, 2004).  In neuroimaging studies 
this translates as activation of the same neural regions during action execution 
(self representation) and observation of the same action performed by another 
individual (representations of the other).  These regions include the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) and the rostral inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (e.g., Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2008; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006), for a meta-analysis of extended 
mirror neuron areas involved in imitation see (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 
2010)).   
In the context of empathy (an individual’s ability to share the feelings of 
others, e.g., Eisenberg 2000; Wispé 1986), self-other overlap occurs when the 
observation of an individual’s affective state activates neural regions in the 
observer that are also activated when the observer directly experiences the same 
affective state.  For example, studies of empathy for pain show consistent 
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the anterior insula (AI) 
when participants experience painful stimuli (or are asked to imagine painful 
situations) and observe others experiencing the same painful events (e.g., 
Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004 – see also meta-analysis 
by Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011).  
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 Although robust evidence from social cognitive neuroscience research 
supports the view of overlapping self-other representations in the context of 
imitation and empathy, the relationship between mental representations of the 
self and others is not that simple or straightforward.  Real life social interactions 
are richer and involve more complex processes than a mere self-other overlap.  
Indeed, human beings do not tend to go about their daily lives continuously 
imitating or experiencing the emotional feelings of others.  Therefore, a certain 
degree of self-other distinction (the process of separating representations of the 
self and of the other) is essential for successful social interactions.  This 
requirement is evident, for example, during the control of imitation1.  In order to 
inhibit the tendency to imitate an interaction partner, an individual must 
enhance self-representations (i.e. representations of their own motor intention) 
while suppressing representations of the motor intentions of the other.  
Similarly, in the context of empathy, an absolute self-other overlap could lead to 
feelings of personal distress in the observer, which in turn could prevent an 
appropriate response to the person in need.  Therefore, regulatory processes 
involving self-other distinction are necessary to prevent confusion between the 
emotional states of the self and the other.  This process of self-other distinction 
is considered critical within a functional model of empathy (Decety & Jackson, 
2006).  Many factors have been identified as modulators of empathic responses 
ranging from situational: the intensity of the displayed emotion (Avenanti, 
Minio-Paluello, Minio Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006; Saarela et al., 2007), 
dispositional: individual differences in behavioural trait measures (Singer et al., 
                                                
1 The terms control of imitation and imitation inhibition are used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis.  
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2004), motivational: perceived fairness (by the empathiser) of the person 
suffering pain (Singer et al., 2006).  Studies of imitation have also identified a 
number of motivational factors that modulate the extent to which individuals 
imitate their interaction partner.  For example, participants are more likely to 
imitate an interaction partner if they share a common goal and cooperation is 
required, but not when they are competing against each other (LaFrance, 1985).  
Also, narcissists are more likely to imitate their interaction partner, particularly if 
they are judged to have a superior social status (Ashton-James & Levordashka, 
2013) - see also (Carr et al., 2013).  Furthermore, a recent neuroimaging study 
has reported differential neural activation when participants imitate a member 
of their own racial group compared to imitating someone from a different race 
(Losin, Iacoboni, Martin, Cross, & Dapretto, 2012).  Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that self-other distinction processes are required for both imitation and 
empathy. 
Social psychologists and, more recently, social cognitive neuroscientists 
have paid considerable attention to another important social domain with 
relevance to representation of the self and other, that of cognitive perspective 
taking or theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  Theory of mind is an 
umbrella term referring to the ability to attribute mental states to self and others.  
Some social psychologists contend that this ability requires merging of self and 
others (e.g., Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996), which in turn can enhance 
the quality of social interactions by reducing stereotype, in-group favouritism 
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and prejudice (Galinsky & Ku, 2004).  
Furthermore, self-other overlap has also been associated with fostering social 
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bonds (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and promoting prosocial behaviour 
(Batson 2014).  At the neural level, a network of regions have been consistently 
found to activate during the attribution of mental states to both self and others, 
mostly comprising the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus (e.g., Adolphs 2003a, 
2009; Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003).   
Similarly to imitation and empathy, self-other distinction is also required 
in theory of mind.  Although some researchers believe that when adopting 
another person’s perspective, individuals tend to use their own perspective as a 
starting point (self-other overlap), and then gradually adapt their views and 
make the necessary adjustments to accommodate differences between their own 
and other’s perspectives (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004).  Failing 
to do so can result in egocentric bias (Apperly et al., 2010; Epley et al., 2004), 
significantly affecting the quality of interactions.  
Developmental studies of theory of mind have shown that the ability to 
represent the mental states of others and keep them separate from those of the 
self appears to require sophisticated faculties.  Most 3-year-olds assume that 
others see the world the way they do, whereas from 4-5 years of age, children 
have little difficulty in correctly attributing a false belief to others (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001; Ziv & Frye, 2003).  The apprehension that the way the 
world is represented in another’s mind may be different to the situations in the 
real world and to representations held by the self (Perner 1991) appears to be 
functionally related to the development of inhibitory control (Carlson & Moses, 
Chapter 1 
 20 
2001; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995).  Yet, although even young children are able 
to understand that the content of other minds can be different from that of their 
own, it is well documented in the theory of mind literature that typically 
developing adults do not always make use of this ability and often exhibit an 
egocentric bias by attributing their own mental states to others (e.g., Apperly et 
al., 2010; Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley et al., 2004; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, 
& Nye, 1996).  This suggests that beyond the ability to master inhibitory control, 
successful social exchanges are also influenced by the degree of interaction 
between self and other representations.   
In summary, the literature discussed thus far implies that both self-other 
overlap and self-other distinction processes are required across different socio-
cognitive domains.  In order to successfully navigate their social environment, 
individuals must regulate the extent to which mental representations of 
themselves and others are kept separate or allowed to interact, depending on 
situational, dispositional, or motivational demands.  Usually social cognition 
researchers are interested in a particular domain (e.g., imitation, theory of mind, 
empathy or perspective taking) and tend to consider self-other processes within 
the confines of that domain.  However, the fact that regulatory processes are 
needed to control the extent to which self-other representations overlap or are 
kept separate suggests that common, underlying mechanisms of self-other 
processes may be shared by different socio-cognitive abilities.  Contrary to the 
traditional approach of focusing on self-other processes within the confinement 
of a single domain, the aim of this thesis is to highlight the prominent role of 
self-other processes across different socio-cognitive domains.  It will do so by: 1) 
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investigating self-other representations across different social abilities, this in 
turn is expected to shed light on the interrelatedness of these different domains, 
2) exploring the role of the TPJ – a neural region consistently found to activate 
during self-other processes – across the social abilities under investigation, and 
3) examine the role of culture as a potential modulatory factor of self-other 
processes.  The remainder of this chapter will present some of the most relevant 
findings and theories relating to the objectives of this thesis.  
1.3 Interrelatedness of Socio-Cognitive Abilities: From Imitation to 
Theory of Mind 
Because researchers tend to focus on a specific area within their chosen 
field, sometimes it is easy to overlook how the specific domain under 
investigation relates to findings from another domain.  This has certainly been 
the case with social cognition research.  However, there have been a few 
attempts to address the issue of interrelatedness of socio-cognitive abilities, 
which have led to the development of two contrasting theoretical accounts, as 
discussed below.  The research described in Chapter 2 aims to investigate the 
relationship between different socio-cognitive domains (imitation/ imitation-
inhibition, visual perspective taking and theory of mind) by adopting two 
different approaches.  The first attempts to directly test the two contrasting 
theories described below (Experiment 1) and the second compares performance 
of individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia, who are thought to have impaired 
self-other representations, and non-synaesthete controls (Experiment 2) in the 
three social domains under investigation.  
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1.3.1 Two Contrasting Theoretical Approaches 
The discovery of the mirror neuron system (MNS) has led many 
researchers to speculate that the MNS forms the basis of social cognition, from 
action understanding to attribution of mental and affective states to others 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004).  Under the MNS theory, the observation of an action triggers 
motor representations in the observer, enabling the reproduction of the 
observed action (imitation).  This in turn results in the attribution of mental 
states to the other associated with performance of that action (theory of mind).  
Therefore, the MNS acts as a bridge between the self and others (Gallese et al., 
2004).  Advocates of the MNS theory refer to findings from studies of imitation 
and empathy as evidence in support of this view.  For example, they often cite 
neuroimaging studies showing that the rostral IPL, IFG and the adjacent parts of 
the premotor cortex activate during both action observation and execution 
(Caspers et al., 2010; Iacoboni 1999a; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) and 
that consistent activations of the AI and ACC are observed when participants 
experience pain and when they observe another individual experiencing pain 
(e.g., Lamm et al., 2011).  Supporters of the MNS theory also link the MNS to 
the simulation hypothesis of theory of mind (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
According to this hypothesis (e.g., Gordon 1986), individuals use the content of 
their own minds as a simulation of other minds to understand and make 
inferences about the mental states of others1.  However, as the evidence 
                                                
1 The simulation account differs from the theory-theory approach (Gopnik 1993; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992), which states that theory of mind abilities rely on a set of concepts (beliefs, 
intentions, desires) and central principles about how these concepts interact (e.g., people 
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discussed above suggests, there is more to social cognition abilities than self-
other overlap, or simulation of our own mental representations to understand 
and predict others’ behaviour.  Furthermore, although the MNS theory is based 
on the assumption of a relationship between different social abilities – imitation, 
empathy and theory of mind – as yet, evidence from studies directly comparing 
such a range of socio-cognitive abilities within the same experimental setup is 
lacking.  A notable exception is the work carried out by Brass and colleagues 
(e.g., Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009; 
Spengler, Yves von Cramon, & Brass, 2010).  However, rather than supporting 
the MNS hypothesis, findings from these studies offer an alternative account to 
the MNS theory as a potential explanation of the mechanisms underlying 
processes involved in imitation and mental state attribution.  
Contrary to the MNS account, (Brass et al., 2009) suggest that processes 
mediating self-other distinction, rather than self-other overlap, play a key role in 
supporting socio-cognitive abilities like theory of mind.  A crucial consequence 
of this approach is that theory of mind is related to the inhibition of imitation, 
rather than to imitation per se.  When inhibiting the tendency to imitate the 
behaviour of another person, the observer must distinguish their own action 
                                                                                                                                       
behave in accordance with certain principles that meet their beliefs).  Therefore, the main 
assumption of this account is that behaviour is derived from a causal ‘theory’ of the interaction 
processes that occurs between these concepts and principles, which combined with appropriate 
initial information about the other, are used to infer and predict their behaviour.  The debate 
between theory-theory vs. simulation theory dominated theory of mind research for a long time 
and although initially they have been viewed as mutually exclusive, recently there has been a 
shift in the debate.  Some researchers who have considered the strong points of each account 
have argued for a hybrid approach to understanding mental state attribution (Carruthers & 
Smith, 1996; Nichols & Stich, 2003).  Whereas, others argue that it is time for social cognition 
research to move away from this debate.  As new findings emerge, mostly through neuroscience 
methods, it is likely that they would motivate the development of new approaches comprising a 
better understanding of cognitive and neural processes involved in socio-cognitive abilities, thus 
making the theory-theory vs. simulation theory debate redundant(Apperly 2008). 
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intentions from those of the observed person (Brass, Derrfuss, & Cramon, 2005), 
thereby enhancing self-representations while inhibiting representations of the 
other.  Similarly, self-other distinction is also required when making inferences 
about the mental states of another person, although this time, self-
representations must be inhibited while representations of the other must be 
enhanced in order to avoid egocentric bias (Apperly et al., 2010; Epley et al., 
2004).  Therefore, this theory suggests that the control of shared representations 
of self and other is at the core of socio-cognitive processes such as theory of 
mind and the inhibition of imitation. Evidence in support of the ‘self-other 
control1’ theory comes from neuroimaging and neuropsychology studies.  
The neural mechanisms involved in imitation inhibition have been 
investigated with fMRI (e.g., Bien, Roebroeck, Goebel, & Sack, 2009; Brass, 
Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Spengler et al., 2009).  Although different 
versions of imitation-inhibition tasks have been used, the paradigms usually 
require participants to perform a predefined finger movement (e.g., lifting or 
tapping the index finger) while observing the same (congruent) or a different 
(incongruent) finger movement (e.g., lifting or tapping) being performed on a 
computer screen.  These studies have found stronger activation in the MPFC and 
the TPJ during incongruent trials – in which the inhibition of imitation is 
required – compared to congruent trials.  These two brain areas are part of a 
wider network of regions thought to be involved in theory of mind (e.g., 
Adolphs 2003a, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2003). 
                                                
1 Brass et al., (2009) referred to the control of shared representations to describe their proposed 
theory.  Throughout this thesis the term ‘self-other control’ will be used as it seems to capture 
the essence of Brass and colleagues’ theory. 
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In support of the self-other control theory, which suggests a functional 
and anatomical overlap between the inhibition of imitation and theory of mind, 
(Brass et al., 2009) draw from extant literature and evidence from two recent 
studies (Spengler et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010).  Brass et al., (2009) 
compared the results of two previous fMRI studies of imitation-inhibition (Brass 
et al., 2005; Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001) with two meta-analyses, each 
focusing on neural regions involved in social cognition (MPFC and TPJ). The 
results revealed an overlap of activation between imitation inhibition, theory of 
mind and agency processing in MPFC and TPJ.  Aware of the limitations of 
cross-sectional comparisons inherent in meta-analyses, (Spengler et al., 2009) 
carried out a within-subjects study with healthy, young adults who performed a 
range of tasks including imitation-inhibition, theory of mind, self-referential 
judgements, and agency.  They found common activation during imitation-
inhibition, theory of mind and self-referential processing in the MPFC and 
overlapping activation in the TPJ during imitation-inhibition, theory of mind and 
agency processing.  A second study (Spengler et al., 2010) investigated whether 
imitation-inhibition deficits were correlated with impairments in perspective 
taking, empathy scores and theory of mind in patients with either frontal or TPJ 
lesions.  The results revealed a significant correlation between imitation-
inhibition and theory of mind in the frontal lesion group and controls, although 
in controls the correlation was smaller than in the patient group.  The data from 
the TPJ lesion group on these two measures did not reveal any significant 
correlation.  However, in the latter group, a significant correlation was found 
between performance on the imitation-inhibition task and visual perspective 
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taking, whereas no such correlations were found in the frontal lesion group or 
controls.  Finally, patients with lesions in the TPJ showing a higher interference 
effect in the imitation-inhibition task also achieved low scores on the empathy 
scale; whereas no significant correlation between these measures were found 
for either the frontal lesion patients or the control group.  Spengler and 
colleagues interpreted these findings as further supporting evidence in favour of 
the ‘self-other control’ theory.  
Put together, the above empirical findings provide evidence of a 
correlation between imitation inhibition and socio-cognitive abilities such as 
perspective taking and theory of mind.  However, causation cannot be inferred 
from these findings.  A more direct testing of the ‘self-other control’ hypothesis 
advanced by Brass et al., (2009) would require the manipulation of imitation-
inhibition to measure its effect on perspective taking and theory of mind 
performance.  Given the relevance of this hypothesis for advancing current 
knowledge and understanding of the functional mechanisms involved in theory 
of mind reasoning, it is reasonable to argue that more empirical evidence is 
needed to disentangle the relationship between imitation-inhibition and the 
range of social cognitive abilities that are often included within the theory of 
mind domain.  Experiment 1 from Chapter 2 aimed to directly test the MNS 
theory vs. the self-other control hypothesis by employing a training paradigm to 
enhance either self-other overlap (imitation training) or self-other distinction 
(imitation-inhibition training) and then testing participants’ theory of mind and 
perspective-taking abilities.  If the MNS theory is correct and there is a direct 
link between imitation and theory of mind, then imitation training is expected to 
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result in better performance in the theory of mind and perspective taking tasks 
compared to imitation-inhibition training (and an additional control condition in 
which participants received domain-general inhibition training).  Conversely, if 
imitation-inhibition training leads to improved theory of mind and perspective 
taking performance (compared to the other types of training), then this would 
provide evidence in favour of the self-other control hypothesis.  Finally, a lack 
of an effect on tests of perspective taking and theory of mind by either type of 
imitative training would suggest that imitation, perspective taking and theory of 
mind are distinct socio-cognitive processes.  
A different approach to investigating the interrelatedness of socio-
cognitive abilities is adopted in Experiment 2 (Chapter 2), by assessing the 
performance of a group of individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia, a 
condition in which self-other processes are thought to be impaired, on a range 
of social cognition tasks.  The section below describes the relevance of this 
approach for addressing the first aim of this thesis. 
 
1.3.2 When Self-Other Representations Go Awry:  
The Case of Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia 
Synaesthesia (derived from the Greek syn meaning ‘together’ and 
aisthesis meaning ‘of the senses’) is a rare condition in which an otherwise 
normal person experiences sensations in one modality when a second modality 
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is stimulated1.  For example, some synaesthetes might see colours when they 
listen to music (known as music-colour synaesthesia; (Ward & Mattingley, 
2006), while in others, the experiences of colour could be elicited by numbers, 
letters or words, in either their written (grapheme-colour synaesthesia) or their 
spoken form (phoneme-colour synaesthesia) (e.g., Simner, Glover, & Mowat, 
2006).  Recently, a different form of synaesthesia has been documented and is 
referred to as vision-touch or mirror-touch synaesthesia (e.g., Banissy & Ward, 
2007, 2013; Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Holle, Banissy, 
Wright, Bowling, & Ward, 2011).  For individuals with this form of synaesthesia, 
observing touch to another person elicits tactile sensations on the equivalent 
part of their own body.  This condition has only recently been documented, but 
since the first single case study was reported (Blakemore et al., 2005), 
researchers have become increasingly interested in this condition (e.g., Aimola 
Davies & White, 2013; Banissy & Ward, 2007, 2013; Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, 
Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009; Goller, Richards, Novak, & Ward, 2013; Holle et 
al., 2011; Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013).  The prevalence rate of mirror-
touch synaesthesia is 1.6%, making it one of the most common forms of 
synaesthesia (Banissy et al., 2009).  A neurocognitive model of mirror-touch 
synaesthesia has been proposed in which the ‘who’ mechanism, responsible for 
self-other distinction during visual encoding of the perceived touch, appears to 
be impaired (Banissy et al., 2009).  Such impairment is likely to manifest by a 
                                                
1 This description of synaesthesia is only useful as a shorthand definition. Describing 
synaesthesia in purely sensory-perceptual terms does not fully capture the nature of this 
condition. There is growing evidence that synaesthetic experiences appear to be triggered by 
high-order cognitive constructs such as those involved in language comprehension and 
production (Simner 2012). 
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tendency to over-incorporate mental representations of the other into the self, 
thereby blurring self-other boundaries (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy, Walsh, 
& Muggleton, 2011).  This characterisation of mirror-touch synaesthesia makes 
a compelling case for studying the interrelatedness of socio-cognitive abilities 
relying on the control of self-other representations in individuals who 
experience this form of synaesthesia.   
Three defining features have been identified when characterising 
Synaesthesia.  First, the experiences are elicited by perceptual or conceptual 
stimuli that would not normally evoke such experiences in most members of the 
population.  Second, experiences occur automatically.  Third, the experience 
resembles that of a conscious event (Ward & Mattingley, 2006).  Therefore, in 
order to establish the authenticity of mirror-touch synaesthesia, these defining 
features should be taken into account.  Simply put, mirror-touch synaesthesia 
requires the conscious experience of a tactile sensation, occurring automatically 
following observation of touch to another person (Banissy et al., 2009).   
Different methods have been used to validate the authenticity of mirror-
touch synaesthesia1.  The most common one involves participants watching 
videos of human and objects being touched and then asked to report about their 
synaesthetic experience of touch including ratings of the intensity (e.g., 
Blakemore et al., 2005) and location of such experience (e.g., Banissy & Ward, 
2007; Banissy et al., 2009).   Banissy and Ward (2007) developed a visuo-tactile 
                                                
1 Although not discussed here, Aimola Davies & White, (2013) used the rubber hand illusion 
paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) with mirror-touch synaesthesia and found the usual rubber 
hand illusion effect (touch sensation elicited by observing the prosthetic hand being touched) in 
the absence of actual touch.  Therefore, the authors consider this paradigm as an appropriate 
method of validating the authenticity of mirror-touch synaesthesia.   
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congruity paradigm to explore the automaticity of the synaesthetic experience – 
see Figure 1.1.  Participants were presented with videos of either another person 
being touched on the cheeks/ hands, or an object (a lamp) being touched, while 
the experimenter delivers touch (or no touch in the control condition) to the 
participant’s cheeks or hands (either left, right, both or no touch).  Participants 
were asked to report the location of the actual touch while ignoring the 
observed touch.  For synaesthetes, the observed touch to another person (but 
not the object) elicited the expected tactile sensation, which was either in the 
same spatial location as the actual touch (congruent) or in a different spatial 
location (incongruent).  Furthermore, responses of the mirror-touch synaesthetes 
were faster than controls when the spatial location of the observed touch 
(right/left) was congruent with the actual touch relative to the incongruent 
spatial location.  They also made more errors than controls.  For example, if the 
actual touch was on the left cheek but the observed (synaesthetic) touch was on 
the right cheek, synaesthetes would report both cheeks or right cheek as the 
location of touch (see Figure 1).  The difference in the reported location was 
dependent on the synaesthesia subtype.  For some synaesthetes observing touch 
on the left cheek evoked the synaesthetic sensation on their left cheek 
(anatomical correspondence subtype), however for others the synaesthetic 
sensation was reported on the right cheek (as if looking at a mirror, a specular 




Figure 1.1 Illustration of the paradigm used by (Banissy & Ward 2007). 
Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Neuroscience, 
Copyright © 2007 
 
Due to the recency of research interest in this type of synaesthesia, there 
are only a handful of studies investigating the impact of mirror-touch 
synaesthesia on social cognition.  However, mirror-touch synaesthetes have 
been found to show enhanced emotion recognition (Banissy et al., 2011; 
Banissy et al., (2011) and score higher than controls on measures of empathy 
(Banissy & Ward, 2007).  Both of these findings lend support to the inclusion of 
the other into representations of the self account (Banissy et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, a recent study (Maister et al., 2013) found that observing touch to 
others not only elicits the expected tactile sensations in individuals with mirror-
touch synaesthesia, but it also induces changes in mental representations of the 
self.  Meister and colleagues found that mirror-touch synaesthetes’ ratings of a 
morphed photograph containing varying degrees of the participant’s own face 
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and an unfamiliar face, was modified after viewing videos of another person 
been touched.  Specifically, synaesthetes rated the morphed faces as more 
similar to the self than they did before they watched the videos, which elicited a 
mirror-touch experience.  In order to extend these findings, Experiment 2 
(Chapter 2) aims to further investigate if self-other representations are impaired 
in individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia by comparing their performance 
to non-synaesthete controls on a range of social cognition tasks requiring the 
control of self-other representations (control of imitation, visual perspective 
taking, theory of mind).  It is expected that the findings from this experiment will 
contribute not only to a further characterisation of this condition, but also to a 
better understanding of the interrelatedness of these three different socio-
cognitive domains.  
1.4 The Role of the Temporoparietal Junction in Social Cognition 
The second main empirical question of this thesis relates to the neural 
underpinnings of self-other representations, in particular, the role of the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) during socio-cognitive processing.  This brain 
area was targeted because of the overwhelming amount of neuroimaging 
literature reporting TPJ involvement in social processing.   
The label TPJ is commonly used to describe the region of the cerebral 
cortex lying at the boundary of the posterior superior temporal sulcus, the 
inferior parietal lobule and the lateral occipital cortex (Corbetta, Patel, & 
Shulman, 2008) – see Figure 1.2.  Although it is an abstract label, which does 
not represent any specific anatomical structure, the TPJ has increasingly become 
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the object of attention in the cognitive and social neuroscience literature.  
Neuroimaging studies have reported activation of TPJ in a variety of 
experimental paradigms ranging from attention (see review by Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002), memory (Anticevic, Repovs, Shulman, & Barch, 2010; Todd, 
Fougnie, & Marois, 2005; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008), language (Kobayashi, Glover, 
& Temple, 2008; Price 2012) and social cognition (Frith & Frith, 2012; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  To date, however, 
there is no consensus on the functional role of the TPJ.  For example, a search in 
Google Scholar using the term ‘function of temporoparietal junction’ generates 
more than 7000 entries.  This illustrates the popularity and diversity of studies – 
and ensuing myriad of interpretations of functional accounts – of this brain 
region. 
The two most frequent accounts of TPJ function are found within the 
domains of attention and social cognition.  Although previous work questioned 
the specificity of function within each of these domains (Kubit & Jack, 2013; 
Mitchell 2008; Saxe 2006; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & 
Saxe, 2009), recently, new theoretical approaches have emerged attempting to 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings (Carter & Huettel, 2013; 
Corbetta et al., 2008).  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the entirety 
of functional accounts of TPJ in the cognitive domain.  Instead, the experiments 
presented in Chapter 4 aim to provide further supporting evidence for the role of 





Figure 1.2. The TPJ is represented with a black and yellow outline and includes 
portions of the angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and superior temporal gyrus 
and/or sulcus.  This outline has been adapted from Carter & Huettel, (2013), 
who used reverse inference maps from http://neurosynth.org.  
 
1.4.1 The TPJ and its role in social cognition 
The TPJ is considered a key node within the ‘social brain’1 (Frith & Frith, 
2010).  Several lines of research suggest a socio-cognitive role for the TPJ 
centred on the processing of representations of the self or another individual.  
With respect to self-other processing, TPJ activation has been reported during 
low-level tasks such as agency discrimination (David et al., 2006; Farrer & Frith, 
2002), visual perspective taking (Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & 
Ladurner, 2006) and the control of imitative responses (Spengler et al., 2009), 
and in high level socio-cognitive processes such as mental state attribution 
(Kestemont et al., 2014; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), empathy (Völlm et al., 2006), 
                                                
1 The term social brain has been extensively used to refer to a network of brain regions that have 
been found to consistently activate during attribution of mental states to either the self or 
another individual.  These include medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, 
precuneus and TPJ, and perhaps less commonly identified, superior temporal sulcus, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and amygdala (e.g., Adolphs 2003a, 2009; Blakemore et al., 2004; Frith & Frith, 
2003).   
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and moral reasoning (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007).  The range of 
tasks producing reliable TPJ activation suggests that activity in this area is in 
response to a basic function, shared by all of the above processes.  Candidate 
processes include the distinction between self and other representations (Decety 
& Sommerville, 2003), the control of self-other representations (i.e. biasing 
processing towards the self or other, Spengler et al., 2009), and the 
representation of transient mental states of others (e.g., beliefs, perspectives, and 
goals, Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  
Most of what is known to date about TPJ involvement in social cognition 
comes from neuroimaging (PET and fMRI) studies.  A handful of studies of 
patients with TPJ lesion are also consistent with neuroimaging data and provide 
support for the role of TPJ in the attribution of false belief to others (Samson, 
Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004), the control of imitation, visual and 
cognitive perspective taking abilities (Spengler et al., 2010).  Non-invasive brain 
stimulation methods provide an important addition to neuroimaging as they 
allow the modulation of cortical excitability in focal areas of the brain.  
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of TPJ has been shown to impair 
performance on measures of false belief and faux pas (Costa, Torriero, Oliveri, 
& Caltagirone, 2008), moral judgements (Jeurissen, Sack, Roebroeck, Russ, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2014; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 
2010), attribution of intentionality (Giardina, Caltagirone, & Oliveri, 2011) and 
the control of imitation (Sowden & Catmur, 2013).   Transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) is another non-invasive brain stimulation method that 
although frequently and effectively used to investigate motor and cognitive 
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functions (see Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor (2012) for a recent review), it has 
rarely been used in the social cognition domain (a few exceptions include a 
study of deception (Karim et al., 2010) and another of unfairness (Knoch et al., 
2008).  TDCS was employed in Experiments 4 and 5 to investigate the 
functional role of TPJ in self-other representations in the control of imitation, 
visual perspective taking and theory of mind.  The methodological principles of 
tDCS will be further described in Chapter 3.  
 
1.5 The Role of Culture in Social Cognition 
The third aim of this thesis concerns culture as a modulatory factor in 
socio-cognitive processes.  The term culture is an abstract label that is used in 
many different ways in everyday language to describe and explain a broad 
range of activities and behaviour adopted by a group of people.  There is not 
one accepted definition of culture, although there are probably as many 
definitions as there are major influential scholars in the fields of social 
psychology, philosophy and anthropology.  However, most, if not all, of these 
definitions have one aspect in common that encompasses the essence of 
culture.  It is inherently a social phenomenon that relies on shared information 
between individuals.  According to Matsumoto & Juang, (2012), as an adaptive 
response to the environment, culture helps to select behaviours, attitudes, 
values and opinions that help individuals maximise resources to meet their 
survival needs.  These two aspects characterising culture, namely the sharing of 
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information between individuals and the adaptation of attitudes, values and 
behaviour underlie the third empirical question this thesis aims to address.  
Two different lines of research from cultural psychology are relevant to 
mechanisms of self-other representations.  The first one refers to the set of 
cultural attitudes migrants may hold towards their native and host culture: 
integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization (Berry, Kim, Power, 
Young, & Bujaki, 1989), see also (Hutnik 1991)1.  According to Berry’s model of 
acculturation (Berry 2005), integration is achieved when individuals value both 
maintenance of the heritage culture and identity but also seek contact with, and 
take part in, the larger society within the host culture.  Assimilation refers to a 
preference for the host culture at the expense of the heritage culture.  Separation 
is associated with a preference for the heritage compared to the host culture.  
Finally, marginalization occurs in the presence of little or no interest in either 
the heritage or the host culture.  Experiment 5 (Chapter 5) will explore if 
adopting different cultural attitudes modulate the imitative behaviour of 
migrants towards a member of the host or the heritage culture.  By investigating 
cultural attitudes, a well-established concept from cultural psychology, in the 
context of empirical social cognition research, this study will bring together two 
separate fields of inquiry that have not been previously linked.   
The second line of research from cultural psychology, relevant to self-
other processes in social cognition, relates to how individuals see themselves in 
relation to others – also known as self-construal styles (SCS).  Those with 
                                                
1 Hutnik (1991) refers to the four acculturation attitudes as assimilation, dissociation, 
acculturation and marginality. 
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‘independent’ self-construals have a sense of the self as autonomous beings, 
separate from interpersonal context.  They tend to value uniqueness, self-
promotion and assertiveness.  A contrasting view of the self is present in 
individuals with ‘interdependent’ self-construals, who tend to value cooperation 
and group cohesiveness.  They have a sense of self as intertwined with the 
other, particularly close others, to such extent that meeting another’s goals and 
desires are a requirement to achieving their own goals and desires (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).  Since the publication of Markus and Kitayama’s influential 
paper, there has been a surge in cross-cultural studies exploring the influences 
of self-construal in various areas of research across social, cognitive, and 
developmental psychology.  Moreover, recent years have seen the emergence of 
the field of cultural neuroscience (Chiao 2009; Han & Northoff, 2008; Kitayama 
& Park, 2010), which takes an interdisciplinary approach by combining theories 
of social and cognitive psychology with neuroimaging.  
One of the earliest cultural neuroscience studies used fMRI to compare 
Chinese and Western participants while performing a self-referential task (Zhu, 
Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007).  Participants were required to make trait judgements 
about themselves, their mother, or a famous person.  The authors found 
differential brain activation for the self vs. unrelated other contrast in the MPFC 
and ACC for both Chinese and Westerners.  However, Chinese participants (and 
not Westerners) showed overlapping activation of the MPFC during self and 
mother judgements.  The authors did not use a self-construal measure in this 
study; instead they used culture as a proxy for this measure and attributed their 
findings to the interdependent self-construal style often found among Chinese 
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individuals, claiming that the concept of the self in this typically interdependent 
culture expands to include the mother.  
Social psychologists have also investigated the effect of self-construal on 
automatic imitation (also known as nonconscious mimicry).  In a set of 
experiments, van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 
(2003) found that participants who were primed with words eliciting 
interdependent self-construal (e.g., together, group, cooperate) imitated the 
gestures of a confederate more than participants who were either primed with 
words eliciting independent self-construal (e.g., unique, alone, individual) or a 
control group who received no priming.  When the experimenters tested 
Japanese (typically interdependent) and American (typically independent) 
participants, their previous results were confirmed as Japanese participants 
imitated more than their American counterparts.  For similar findings see 
(Hogeveen & Obhi, 2010).  The researchers claim that interdependent self-
construal affords assimilation of the other to the self.  In van Baaren and 
colleagues’ study, Japanese participants imitated the Japanese confederate just 
as much as they imitated the American confederate, suggesting no in-group bias 
to the degree of overlap of self-other representations.  However, this pattern of 
results does not seem to replicate across other domains in social cognition. 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, pp. 229) point out  “ … interdependent selves do 
not attend to the needs, desires, and goals of all others.  Attention to others is 
not indiscriminate; it is highly selective and will be most characteristic of 
relationships with ‘in-group’ members.”  In support of this premise, (Xu, Zuo, 
Wang, & Han, 2009) reported an in-group racial bias in empathy for pain for 
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both Chinese and American participants.  Importantly, such bias was not 
evident during self-report ratings of empathy but was only noticeable at the 
neural level, with increased BOLD signals in the ACC when subjects viewed 
facial stimuli representative of in-group members experiencing pain compared 
to out-group faces.  In sum, the data from the above studies reveal the 
complexity of the processes underlying self-other representations in social 
cognition.  Self-construal styles appear to modulate social interactions to adapt 
human behaviour in a socially effective manner.  In the context of empathy, it 
appears that self-other distinction is modulated according to the significance of 
the relationship with the other, then cognitive processes intervene to adjust this 
distinction and respond in a more socially appropriate manner as suggested by 
the lack of in-group bias in the self-reported measures.  The effects of self-




Three main empirical questions are addressed in this thesis.  The first 
aims to explore the interrelatedness of socio-cognitive abilities by investigating 
if common self–other processes are shared between different social domains 
(imitation/ imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking and theory of mind).  
Two different approaches will address this question in Chapter 2.  The first one 
(Experiment 1) employs a behavioural training paradigm to test, a) if there is a 
relationship between imitation/ imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking 
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and theory of mind, and b) whether such relationship, if it exists, is based upon 
self-other overlap (as advocated by the MNS theory) or self-other distinction (as 
advanced by the self-other control hypothesis).  The second approach will 
compare the performance of individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia and 
non-synaesthete controls (Experiment 2) on the same socio-cognitive domains 
mentioned above.  The second question addressed in this thesis concerns the 
function of the TPJ, a key node in the ‘social brain’ (Frith & Frith, 2010), in self-
other processes that underlie the socio-cognitive abilities under investigation.  
To this aim, Experiments 3 and 4 will employ a tDCS paradigm to modulate 
cortical excitability of the right TPJ (Experiment 3) on healthy adults prior to 
testing their performance in the three relevant domains.  Experiment 4 is 
informed by the findings from Experiment 3, to explore if the effects found are 
localised to the right hemisphere or not, by delivering anodal tDCS to both right 
and left TPJ and a control occipital area to a new group of participants prior to 
assessing their performance on social cognition tests.  To address the third 
empirical question, Chapter 5 will explore whether culture plays a modulatory 
role in social cognition.  Two specific aspects of culture are particularly relevant 
to self-other processes.  These includes cultural attitudes that migrants choose to 
adopt when living in a different culture (Experiment 5) and how individuals 
from different cultures perceive themselves in relation to others, known as self-
construal style (Experiments 5 and 6).  
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Chapter 2: Self – Other Representations:  
From Imitation to Theory of mind 
 
The experiments described in this chapter aimed to investigate the relationship 
between three different socio-cognitive skills: imitation/imitation-inhibition, 
visual perspective taking and theory of mind.  They do so by employing two 
different approaches.  Experiment 1 contrasted the MNS and the self-other 
control theories (described in Chapter 1) using a behavioural training paradigm 
to manipulate the control of self-other representations in a between-subjects 
design.  Following the training, participants’ performance on the control of 
imitation, visual perspective taking and theory of mind is assessed on the basis 
of the type of training they received.  A different approach was adopted in 
Experiment 2, which sought to investigate if individuals with mirror-touch 
synaesthesia show atypical behaviour (compared to non-synaesthetes) on 
measures of social cognition requiring the control of self-other representations.  
The findings from both experiments are discussed in relation to the self-other 
control theory.  Additionally, the findings from Experiment 2 are also discussed 
in terms of their contribution towards a better understanding and 
characterisation of mirror-touch synaesthesia.  
 
2.1 Experiment 1: Training Social Cognition 
The role of automatic, unconscious imitation (also known as mimicry; 
(e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003) in 
social interactions has been the subject of extensive research in social 
psychology.  For example, it has been demonstrated that imitative behaviour 
increases rapport (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), trust (Bailenson & Yee, 2005), 
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altruistic behaviour (Van baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & Knippenberg, 2004), 
and feelings of closeness (Stel & Vonk, 2010).  Such positive impact of imitative 
behaviour has led some researchers to consider imitation as a ‘social glue’ that 
facilitates positive social interactions (Lakin et al., 2003).  Interestingly, some of 
the early attempts to conceptualize imitation linked it to our ability to 
understand other people’s minds.  For example, Adam Smith (1759) (Smith 
2010) claimed that “reflexive” imitation occurs after one takes the perspective of 
others and realizes what they must feel.  But is this a correct assumption - does 
the act of imitating make the imitator better at taking the perspective of others?  
Social interactions can be very complex and while in some circumstances, 
imitating others can have beneficial effects, as a general rule, persistent 
imitation is not socially appropriate and, at times, the intention to imitate an 
interacting partner has to be suppressed.  But what effect does the inhibition of 
imitation have on our ability to understand the mental states of others?  
2.1.1 Two Contrasting Theories 
Two theoretical approaches suggest contrasting answers to the above 
questions.  The first, advanced by various researchers (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), suggests that imitation, and its neural 
substrate the mirror neuron system (MNS; Catmur et al., 2007; Heiser, Iacoboni, 
Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003), is at the core of higher-order socio-
cognitive functions.  Under this hypothesis, action observation triggers motor 
representations that enable the reproduction of the observed action (imitation).  
This in turn results in the attribution – to the other – of mental states associated 
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with performance of that action (theory of mind).  On this account, it would be 
expected that a training paradigm promoting the activation of corresponding 
motor representations by observing another person’s action (imitation training) 
would enhance the ability to represent the mental states of others. 
A recent, alternative theoretical framework suggests that theory of mind is 
related not to imitation, but to the inhibition of imitation (Brass et al., 2009).  
When inhibiting the tendency to imitate another person’s behaviour, the 
observer must distinguish between their own action intentions and those of the 
observed person (Brass et al., 2005), and perform the action they intended 
rather than the action performed by the other.  Similarly, the process of 
distinguishing mental states pertaining to the self from those of another 
individual is argued to be necessary for theory of mind, even though frequently 
the ‘control problem’ in theory of mind is the opposite of that encountered in 
imitation inhibition; self-representations must be inhibited and representations 
of the other must be enhanced.  Thus, Brass and colleagues’ self-other control 
account suggests that both theory of mind and imitation inhibition share 
common underlying processes pertaining to the control of self-other 
representations.  Crucially, in contrast to the MNS theory of social cognition, 
this theory predicts that training in imitation inhibition (rather than imitation) 
will result in an improvement in theory of mind ability. 
Experiment 1 aims to test whether imitation or imitation-inhibition 
training results in improved theory of mind and / or perspective taking ability.  If 
the MNS hypothesis is correct and there is a direct link between imitation and 
 Chapter 2 
 45 
theory of mind, then the imitation training group is expected to perform better in 
the theory of mind and perspective-taking tasks than the other groups.  
Conversely, if the imitation-inhibition training group outperforms the other 
groups, then this study would provide evidence in favour of the self-other 
control hypothesis, suggesting that the control of shared representations might 
be the ‘missing link’ between the functions of the MNS and theory of mind 
abilities.  Finally, a lack of an effect on tests of perspective taking and theory of 
mind by either type of imitative training would suggest that imitation, 
perspective taking and theory of mind are distinct socio-cognitive processes. 
2.1.2 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-three adults (29 females, age range 19-50 years, M = 26.7, SD = 
6.6), recruited from the local psychology department subject pool, participated 
in this study for a small monetary reward.  Prior to conducting this experiment, 
ethical approval was sought and granted by Birkbeck’s Ethics Committee.  All 
participants were healthy individuals with no history of medical or 
developmental conditions.  They were randomly assigned to the imitation (N 
=19), imitation-inhibition (N = 17), or inhibitory control (N = 17) groups.  
Groups did not differ in terms of age (F(2,52) = .221,  p =.80), gender (χ2 (2, N = 
53)= 2.72; p = .26), or handedness (F(2,52) = .228, p =.80).  
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Procedure 
All participants attended two sessions on consecutive days.  On the first 
day they received training, and on the second day they completed the imitation-
inhibition, Strange Stories, and Director tasks. 
Imitation and Imitation-inhibition training  
Participants in these two groups performed a task based on that 
developed by (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000).  The stimuli 
consisted of short videos showing either an index or middle finger performing a 
lifting movement (Figure 2.1).  The imitation group was asked to perform the 
action they observed on the screen.  When the index finger of the stimulus hand 
lifted, participants were required to lift their own index finger.  Similarly, when 
the middle finger lifted, participants were required to lift their middle finger.  
The imitation-inhibition group were instructed that when they saw an index 
finger lift they should lift their middle finger, and when they saw a middle finger 
lift they should lift their index finger.  The stimulus hand was rotated around the 
sagittal and transverse planes with respect to the participant’s hand (Figure 2.1), 
which rested on the computer keyboard.  As response movements were spatially 
orthogonal to stimulus movements, imitation could be isolated from spatial 
compatibility.  
Inhibitory control training  
A third group received training in a Stroop-like task, the temporal and 
spatial features of which were matched with those of the imitation and 
imitation-inhibition training procedures (Figure 2.1c).  A red and a green sticker 
were placed on the knuckle (where the finger joins the hand) of the participant’s 
right index and middle fingers.  Placement of the red and green stickers on the 
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participant’s fingers was counterbalanced on each block on a within-subjects 
basis.  On each trial, the stimulus fingers remained static and either a red or 
green circle appeared between the fingers.  Participants were instructed to lift 
their ‘red finger’ (the finger with a red sticker) when a green circle appeared, 
and to lift their ‘green finger’ when a red circle appeared.  For all training 
conditions (and the imitation-inhibition task – see below) the interstimulus 
interval varied randomly from 800ms to 2400ms.  Training consisted of 6 blocks 




Figure 2.1. Panels a and b are examples of the stimuli used for imitation, 
imitation-inhibition training, and for the imitation-inhibition task. The numbers 
are irrelevant in the training conditions and participants are instructed to ignore 
them.  However, in the imitation-inhibition task participants were instructed to 
follow the number on the screen and lift their index finger upon appearance of a 
1, and their middle finger upon appearance of a 2.  Thus, panel a shows an 
example of an incongruent trial and panel b illustrates a congruent trial. 
Both images on panel c are examples of the stimuli used for inhibitory control 
training.  The bottom part of panel c shows the placement of the colour stickers 
in the participant’s hands, which was counterbalanced on each block on a 
within-subjects basis. The dashed arrows indicate the correct finger movement 
upon appearance of either the green or red circles on the screen. 
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Tests of Social Cognition 
Control of imitation task  
All participants were presented with the same finger movement videos 
used for imitation and imitation-inhibition training, but this time participants 
were asked to lift their index finger upon appearance of a 1, and their middle 
finger upon appearance of a 2.  At the same time as the appearance of the 
number cue, there was a lifting movement of the index or middle finger of the 
stimulus hand.  Although the observed movements were formally task-
irrelevant, the relationship between the observed movement and the movement 
required by the number defined two trial types.  On congruent trials, the 
required finger movement was the same as the observed movement (Figure 
2.1b); whereas on incongruent trials, the required finger movement was 
different from the observed movement (Figure 2.1a).  Thus, on incongruent trials 
participants were required to inhibit an imitative response and perform the pre-
instructed movement.  Twenty trials in each of the four combinations of 
observed and executed finger movements were presented in a random order.  
The interstimulus interval varied randomly from 800ms to 2400ms.  The main 
objective of this task was to validate the training paradigm.  Therefore, it was 
expected that participants in the imitation-inhibition group (and those in the 
inhibitory control condition) would perform significantly better than the 
imitation group in this task, both in terms of faster RTs during incongruent trials 
and smaller imitation effect – see Results section.    
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Visual Perspective Taking (Director task) 
Modelled on Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, (2000), this task required 
participants to take into account the point of view of a character, introduced as 
‘the director’.  The visual stimuli consisted of a 4x4 grid (‘shelves’) as depicted 
in Figure 2.2.  Five slots were occluded from the view of the director, who stood 
on the other side of the shelves.  Participants listened to auditory instructions 
from the director who asked them to move specified objects in a particular 
direction.  On experimental trials, there was a conflict between the participant’s 
and the director’s perspective.  For example, if the participant was presented 
with the array shown in Figure 2.2a, and was asked to “move the small apple 
left”, they should ignore the smallest apple they can see, the ‘competitor object’, 
(because the director cannot see this apple), and instead move the next smallest 
apple, which is visible to the director.  There were two control conditions: C1 
and C2.  In C1, the director instructed participants to move an object placed in 
one of the clear slots (e.g., “move the chocolate down”.  In C2, an irrelevant 
object replaced the ‘competitor’ item from the experimental condition but the 
instruction remained the same (see Figure 2b).  Accuracy of the selection and 
movement of the target object and RTs were recorded.  Eye movement data 
were also recorded using an Eyegaze Edge™ System eye tracker (sampling rate 
60 Hz).  The eye tracking measure consisted of the number of 100ms fixations 
on the ‘competitor’ object (the object the director could not see) in the 
experimental condition, relative to the irrelevant object placed on the same slot 
in the C2 condition. This measurement is thought to be an index of the extent to 
which participants considered (incorrectly) the ‘competitor’ as the appropriate 
object to move (Wu & Keysar, 2007). 





Figure 2.2. Visual Perspective-taking Task. Panel A shows an example of an 
experimental trial and Panel B shows an example of one of the control 
conditions (C2).  
 
Theory of Mind (Strange Stories task)  
Participants were presented with a total of 32 stories of four different 
types (mental, physical, animal and natural) based on those developed by 
(Happé 1994).  There were 8 stories of each type, matched for the number of 
words across story type.  After reading each story, participants were presented 
with a comprehension question, followed by 3 possible answers.  RT and 
accuracy were recorded.  Only the mental stories required the correct 
attribution of mental states for successful performance on this task – see Table 
2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Example of the story types from the Strange Stories task.  Correct answers are highlighted in bold. 
Mental Helen waited all year for Christmas because she knew at Christmas she could ask her parents for a rabbit.  Helen wanted a rabbit more 
than anything in the world.  At last Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her.  She felt sure it 
would contain a little rabbit in a cage.  But when she opened it, with all the family standing round, she found her present was just a boring 
old set of encyclopaedias, which Helen did not want at all!  Still, when Helen's parents asked her how she liked her Christmas present, she 
said, "It's lovely, thank you.  It's just what I wanted". 
Q:  Why did she say this? 
1. Because she didn’t want to be told off by her parents 
2. Because she wanted to trick her parent© 
3. Because she didn’t want to be rude to her parents 
Physical A burglar is about to break into a jewellers' shop.  He skilfully picks the lock on the shop door.  Carefully, he steps over the electronic 
detector beam.  If he breaks this beam it will set off the alarm.  Quietly he opens the door of the store-room and sees the gems glittering.  
As he reaches out, however, he steps on something soft.  He hears a screech and something small and furry runs out past him, towards the 
shop door.  Immediately the alarm sounds. 
Q:  Why did the alarm go off? 
1. Because he disturbed a mouse and it set the alarm off 
2. Because he trod on a mouse and it ran through the alarm beam 
3. Because the mouse made him step into the beam by mistake 
Natural The little village of Littlehurst is close to the river Worrow.  A year ago, a wall was built all the way round the edge of the village.  The river 
floods its banks in April every year and, in the past, water would flow into many houses and cause lots of damage.  For three weeks now 
the rain has been pouring down.  However, this year, all the houses in Littlehurst are perfectly dry inside. 
Q:  Why were all the houses dry? 
1. Because the water from the river can’t get into the houses 
2. Because the wall stopped the water getting into the village 
3. Because there was a new wall around the village 
Animal Some types of birds, like geese and swallows, only like very warm weather.  When it is winter in England, it is still very warm in other 
countries that are further south.  Last autumn, flocks of swallows could be seen flying in huge groups in the same direction away from 
England.  At the beginning of summer, these swallows flew back to England. 
Q:  What were the swallows doing? 
1. They were always flying to the place that was warm 
2. They were flying south 
3. They were flying away from England 
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2.1.3 Results and Discussion 
Where sphericity assumptions were not met, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected values are reported.  Bonferroni corrections were used for post hoc 
multiple comparisons. 
Training   
Response times were faster in the imitation training group (M = 461; 
S.E.M. = 13.73) than the imitation-inhibition (M = 640; S.E.M. = 46.97; p= .003) 
and the inhibitory control (M = 637; S.E.M. = 41.93; p = .003) groups; F(2,52) = 
8.39; p < .001.  In terms of accuracy, the imitation group made significantly 
fewer errors (M = 15.74; S.E.M. = 2.57) than the inhibitory control group (M= 
39.35, S.E.M.  = 9.8; p=. 033); F(2,52) = 3.51; p < .037, but no other contrasts 
were significant (ps > .38).  
 
Control of imitation task 
Prior to the statistical analysis, extreme RT scores identified by the 1.5 x 
inter-quartile range rule (IQR, Tukey, 1977) were removed from each 
participant’s dataset.  The RT and accuracy data were analysed using ANOVA 
with Group as the between-subjects factor (imitation vs. imitation-inhibition vs. 
inhibitory control) and Trial Type as the within-subjects factor (congruent vs. 
incongruent).  
RTs.  Figure 2.3a shows RTs from the control of imitation task.  
Responses on congruent trials were executed faster than those on incongruent 
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trials, F(1,50) = 114.59; p < .001; η2p= .70.  The main effect of group was also 
significant, F(2,50) = 4.04; p = .024; η2p = .14.  Pairwise comparisons showed 
that this effect was driven by the overall difference in performance between the 
imitation and the inhibitory control group (p = .035).  The Group × Trial Type 
interaction was significant, F(2,50) = 16.62; p < .001; η2p= .40, indicating a 
larger RT difference between congruent and incongruent trials in the imitation 
group (M = 109 ms, S.E.M. = 13.36) than in the imitation-inhibition (M = 51 ms, 
S.E.M. = 7.04; p = .005) and inhibitory control (M = 30 ms, S.E.M. = 8.09; p = 
.001).  The interaction effect could be due to a) stronger imitation inhibition, or 
b) a weaker tendency to imitate in the two inhibition groups than in the 
imitation training group.  To distinguish these possibilities, RTs on incongruent 
trials were analysed including congruent trials as a covariate (and thereby 
accounting for the variance due to the tendency to imitate).  This analysis 
revealed a significant effect of group F(2,49) = 15.43; p <.001; η2p= .39.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that the imitation group took longer to inhibit an 
imitative response than both the imitation-inhibition (p = .001) and the 
inhibitory control groups (p < .001), suggesting that RT differences in congruent 
and incongruent trials were caused by an increased ability to inhibit the 
tendency to imitate in the imitation-inhibition and the inhibitory control groups.  
Supporting this interpretation, when congruent and incongruent trials were 
analysed separately, a significant main effect of group was only observed on 
incongruent trials (F(2,50) = 7.54; p =.001; η2p= .23), Pairwise comparisons: 
imitation vs. imitation-inhibition, p = .015; imitation vs. inhibitory control, p = 
.002; imitation-inhibition vs. inhibitory control n.s.   
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Accuracy.  Error data are displayed in Figure 2.3b. Overall, participants 
made more errors in the incongruent (M = 2.60, S.E.M. = .38) than in the 
congruent trials (M = .89, S.E.M. = .24), F(1,50) = 21.16, p < .001; η2p= .29.  
The inhibitory control group made significantly more errors than the imitation (p 
< .001) and the imitation-inhibition (p = .001) groups, F(2,50) = 13.24; p < 
.001; η2p= .34.  A correlation analysis revealed that there was no speed-
accuracy trade-off during incongruent trials in the inhibitory control group (r 
(17) = -.224, p = .39) – see also Figure 2.3C. The Group × Trial Type 
interaction was not significant (p = .12), indicating that training type did not 
affect accuracy on this task. 
 
     A      B 
Figure 2.3. Mean RT (A) and number of errors (B) on the control of imitation 
task for each group. The error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 *** (p ≤ .001). 
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Figure 2.3 C. Scatterplot of RT and number of errors during incongruent trials in 
the Inhibitory Control group showing that there was no speed-accuracy trade 
off. 
The observed pattern of performance on the RT measure of this task 
confirms the efficacy of the training paradigm in the control of self-other 
representations.  Imitation training resulted in enhanced self-other overlap, 
therefore, participants in this group found it harder to inhibit the tendency to 
imitate.  On the other hand, imitation-inhibition training led to increased self-
other distinction, which in turn facilitated performance on this task as shown by 
a reduced tendency to imitate.  Similar effects were also found after inhibitory 
control training, suggesting that perhaps the effects in the imitation-inhibition 
training group might not be specific to imitation but that they are closely linked 
to domain-general inhibitory processes.  The inhibitory control condition was 
carefully designed in order to match as closely as possible the imitation-
inhibition training condition.  The only difference between the two types of 
training was the absence of a finger lifting action during the inhibitory control 
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condition, which was replaced by the appearance of a red or a green dot.  It is 
possible that the similarity in performance between the two groups could be 
related to the closely matched design.  This could be further investigated by 
replacing the inhibitory control condition with another more conventional 
inhibition task such as the Stroop or a go-no-go task.  A second, and perhaps 
more likely explanation could be that the inhibitory control training afforded 
participants in this group, the level of inhibition required for self-other 
distinction in the control of imitation task.   
Director Task  
The accuracy and RT data were analysed using ANOVA with Group as a 
between-subject factor and Trial Type (exp vs. C1 vs. C2) as the within-subjects 
factor.  
RTs. Participants responded faster to the C1 trials than to the 
experimental (p <.001) or the C2 trials (p <.001), F(1.72, 86.36) =35.70; p < 
.001; η2p= .42.  No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > 
.10). 
Accuracy.  The accuracy data are shown in Figure 2.4A.  Overall, 
performance was worse on experimental trials (M = .56, S.E.M. = .04) than on 
control trials: C1 (M = .92, S.E.M. = .01), C2 (M = .90, S.E.M = .01), 
F(1.02,51.43) = 66.61; p = .014; η2p= .11; confirming the previously reported 
difficulty in taking the director’s perspective observed using this task (e.g., 
Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).  The Group × Trial Type interaction 
was significant, F(2.05, 51.43) = 3.45; p = .03; η2 p = .12, indicating that the 
pattern of performance across experimental and control trials differed between 
the groups.  Post-hoc analysis showed that on experimental trials the imitation-
 Chapter 2 
 57 
inhibition group performed significantly better than the imitation (p = .01) and 
the inhibitory control (p = .03) groups.  Thus, participants in the imitation-
inhibition group were better able to separate their perspective from the 
director’s perspective.  
Eye-tracking data. Figure 2.4B shows the eye-tracking data for the 
Director task.  These data were analysed using ANOVA with group as the 
between-subject factor and trial type: (exp vs. C2) as a within-subject factor. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F(1,50) =93.95; p < .001; 
η2p= .65. Overall, participants fixated more on the competitor object in the 
experimental trials (M =18.5, S.E.M. = 1.49) than on the irrelevant object (M = 
5.7, S.E.M. = .53) placed in the same slot in Control trials, again suggesting a 
difficulty in adopting the director’s perspective.  The main effect of group was 
also significant, F (2,50) = 10.23; p < .001; η2p= .29).  Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this effect was driven by the fact that the imitation-
inhibition group (M =8.02, S.E.M. = 1.3) had fewer fixations than the inhibitory 
control group (M =16.32, S.E.M. = 1.3); p < .001.  
The Group × Trial Type interaction was also significant, F(2,50) =7.02; p 
= .02; η2p= .22.  Simple effects analysis revealed that the imitation-inhibition 
group (M = 10.88, S.E.M = 2.30) were better able to separate their perspective 
from the director’s perspective than either the imitation (M = 20.16, S.E.M = 
2.18; p = .016) or the inhibitory control (M = 24.41, S.E.M = 2.30; p < .001) 
groups, again indicating that imitation-inhibition training resulted in an 
improved ability to take the perspective of the director. 
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     A      B 
Figure 2.4. Accuracy and eye-tracking data from each training group on the 
Perspective-taking task. The eye-tracking measure consisted of the number of 
100ms fixations on the competitor object (the object the director could not see) 
in the experimental condition and the irrelevant object replacing the competitor 
in the control (C2) condition.  The error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. ** (p ≤ .01), * (p < .05)  
Strange Stories  
A preliminary analysis of the three types of control stories revealed no 
significant differences; therefore the data were combined and compared to the 
mental stories.  Accuracy and RT data were analysed using ANOVA with Group 
as the between subject factor and Story Type (mental vs. control) as the within-
subject factor.  
RTs.  Across groups, RTs were faster in the mental stories (M = 7.54 s, 
S.E.M. = .04) than in the control stories (M = 8.39 s, S.E.M. = .04), F(1,50) = 
6.43; p = .014; η2p= .11.  The main effect of Group and the Group × Story Type 
interaction were not significant (p > .30).  
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Accuracy.  Overall, the proportion of correct responses on the mental 
stories (M = .84; S.E.M. = .02) was higher than on the control stories (M = .71; 
S.E.M. = .02), F(1,50) = 47.20; p < .001; η2p = .49.  Neither the main effect of 
Group nor the Group × Story Type interaction were significant (ps >.20). The 
lack of a significant interaction in both the RT and accuracy analyses shows that 
there was no significant effect of training on this theory of mind task.  
  These results indicate that training to control self-other representations 
in one socio-cognitive domain, inhibition of the tendency to imitate the actions 
of others, enhances the control of self-other representations within a different 
socio-cognitive domain, the ability to adopt the perspective of others.  This 
improvement in perspective-taking ability was specific to imitation-inhibition 
training; it was not seen after either imitation training or training in general 
inhibitory control.   
MNS VS. SELF-OTHER CONTROL 
No evidence was found in support of the MNS hypothesis that suggests a 
direct relationship between imitation and theory of mind.  Participants who had 
been trained to imitate were no better than the imitation-inhibition or inhibitory 
control training groups on either the Strange Stories or Director tasks.  In 
contrast, this study provides some support for the self-other control hypothesis, 
which proposes that both imitation inhibition and theory of mind depend on 
processes that distinguish self from other (Brass et al., 2009).  Although 
imitation-inhibition training did not result in improved performance in the 
Strange Stories task, which measures theory of mind abilities, an improvement 
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was observed in the Director task, which requires third-person perspective 
taking.  The role of self-other distinction in the control of imitative responses 
(Brass et al., 2005) and the association of imitation-inhibition with socio-
cognitive abilities such as perspective taking (Spengler et al., 2009; Spengler et 
al., 2010) has been suggested by previous studies on the basis of correlational 
evidence.  However, this is the first study to provide experimental evidence by 
showing that imitation-inhibition training improves perspective-taking ability.  
The lack of a transfer effect from imitation-inhibition training to the 
Strange Stories task appears at first, to contradict the self-other control theory.  
However, a crucial difference between the theory of mind and the perspective-
taking tasks used in this study is that, although the former requires mental state 
attribution to the protagonist, successful performance is not dependent on the 
ability to distinguish self from other; whereas self-other distinction is crucial for 
the latter.  For example, to understand a story from the Strange Stories task, 
participants must separate the facts presented to them from the relevant mental 
states they attribute to the character.  This self vs. other distinction process takes 
place ‘online’.  However, when subsequently presented with a question about 
the protagonist’s mental state (i.e. ‘offline’), participants can answer correctly by 
‘stepping into the mental shoes’ of the character; they do not need to represent 
simultaneously their own mental states and those of the character.   On the 
other hand, in the Director task, participants need to take into account what 
they can see vs. what the Director can see on a trial-by-trial basis (online) in 
order to choose the correct object (and move it to the correct location).  This 
difference between the ‘online’ processing required in the perspective- taking 
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task and the ‘offline’ measure used in the theory of mind task could explain why 
participants in the imitation-inhibition training group outperformed the other 
groups in the Director task, but not in the Strange Stories task.  However, it 
remains a possibility that the theory of mind task used in this study is not 
sensitive enough to ascertain differential effects of training.  Accuracy on 
mentalising trials in the Strange Stories task was very high; on average 
participants made approximately only one error.  It is possible that a ceiling 
effect impeded a differential effect of training being observed on this task.  
Further experiments with alternative theory of mind tasks will be essential to 
determine if processes pertaining to self-other representations are shared within 
the control of imitation, perspective taking and theory of mind. 
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2.2 Experiment 2: When Self-Other Representations Go Awry: The 
Case of Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia 
Adopting a different approach, Experiment 2 also sought to investigate the 
relationship between imitation/ imitation-inhibition, perspective taking and 
theory of mind in a group of individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia – a 
condition that has been related to atypical self-other representations – (Banissy 
& Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009).  
For mirror-touch synaesthetes, observing touch to another person elicits 
tactile sensations on the equivalent part of their own body.  In the original study 
by (Blakemore et al., 2005), the authors describe the case of synaesthete C.  
Apart from her synaesthetic experiences, C is a healthy female adult leading a 
normal everyday life.  She reports experiencing touch on her own body when 
observing another person being touched, but not when observing inanimate 
objects being touched.  Blakemore and colleagues used fMRI to investigate the 
neural systems underlying C’s synaesthetic experience compared to 12 non-
synaesthetic control subjects.  They found that compared to controls, C showed 
hyperactivity within a number of regions including primary somatosensory 
cortex, left premotor cortex and the anterior insula bilaterally when watching 
videos of humans being touched.  Based on this evidence, the authors suggest 
that mirror-touch synaesthesia can be explained by increased activity in the 
tactile mirror system, which activates above a threshold for conscious 
perception of touch.  However, although Blakemore et al.’s study shows 
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correlational evidence of hyperactivity of somatosensory mirroring mechanisms 
in mirror-touch synaesthesia, the cause of such hyperactivity is not yet known.   
One recent account (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009) 
suggests that impaired self-other representations, specifically self-other 
monitoring, could contribute to a disinhibition of normal somatosensory 
mirroring mechanisms in individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia.  Relevant 
to this view, a study of non-synaesthetic individuals (Serino, Giovagnoli, & 
Làdavas, 2009) shows that observing another person being touched enhances 
the perception of touch on the self, when the other is perceived as similar or 
belonging to the observer’s ethnic or political group.  Furthermore, a recent 
study (Maister et al., 2013) found that observing touch to others not only elicits 
overt tactile sensations in individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia, but it also 
induces changes in mental representations of the self.  Maister and colleagues 
used an experimental paradigm based on the ‘enfacement illusion’, in which 
participants are shown a series of morphed images made up of varying 
proportions of an unfamiliar face and the participant’s face.  Participants are 
then required to report the extent to which the morphed stimulus face looks like 
the self.  Following this, they are presented with videos of another person being 
touched, which occurs in synchrony and location-congruent with the touch 
delivered to the participant’s face.  The synchrony between observed and felt 
touch results in participants rating the morphed face as more similar to the self 
than prior to observing the touch video.  In mirror-touch synaesthetes, such 
blurring of self and other identity was seen in the absence of felt touch.  In 
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particular, the images that participants had initially rated as containing equal 
quantities of self and other became more likely to be recognised as the self after 
viewing the other being touched, thus implying that merely observing touch to 
others elicits a change in mental representations, whereby the boundaries 
between self and other become blurred.  This study represents a change of 
direction in mirror-touch synaesthesia research by shifting the emphasis from 
increased activation in somatosensory mirroring mechanism to potential causes 
leading to such pattern of activation, such as impaired self-other 
representations.  However, further research is needed in support of this claim.  
Experiment 2 aimed to expand on the findings from Experiment 1 by 
using the same measures of the control of imitation and visual perspective 
taking employed in the first experiment – plus a different theory of mind task–, 
but this time participants were individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia and 
non-synaesthetic controls.  Examining self-other processing in individuals with 
atypical representation of the self and others provides an insight into the ways in 
which the control of these representations typically functions.  The findings are 
discussed in relation to a) the self-other control theory and b) their contribution 
to our understanding of this condition.  
Findings of a comparable performance on the control of imitation and 
visual perspective taking within each group would support the view of a link 
between these two socio-cognitive abilities, as suggested by the results from 
Experiment 1.  Findings of differential group performance would provide further 
evidence in support for the hypothesis of atypical self-other representations in 
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mirror-touch synaesthesia (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009).  Finally, 
Experiment 2 also addresses the issue of task sensitivity arising from Experiment 
1 by employing a different measure of theory of mind, designed as an 
ecologically valid assessment of mental state attributions approximating real-life 
social interactions.  
2.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixteen mirror-touch synaesthetes (10 female, 6 male; age M = 32, SD = 
12.2 years) and 16 non-synaesthetic control participants (12 female, 4 male; age 
M = 32.6, SD = 11.2 years) participated in this study for a small monetary 
reward.  Thirteen mirror-touch synaesthetes were recruited from an existing 
database (held by Dr Michael Banissy at Goldsmiths College, University of 
London) and had previously been screened in order to authenticate their 
synaesthetic experience.  The remaining 3 mirror-touch synaesthetes were first 
selected through self-report via a web-based questionnaire investigating 
different types of synaesthesia.  Those who answered ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ 
to the statement ‘I sometimes feel touch when I see other people being touched’ 
on a 5-point Likert scale (N = 30), were subsequently contacted to complete 
two further screening tests.  The first was a web-based paradigm devised by 
(Holle et al., 2011).  For this part of the screening, participants watched a series 
of videos showing people and objects being either touched or approached by a 
finger.  Then participants were asked to report their experiences of touch for 
each video.  Those who reported feelings of touch in two or more of the 68 
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videos were then invited to a second screening test consisting of a visual-tactile 
congruity paradigm designed to provide further evidence for mirror-touch 
synaesthesia (Banissy & Ward, 2007) – also described in the Introduction 
Chapter.  Only those reporting synaesthetic tactile experiences (N=3, 10% of 
the original self-report questionnaire) in the second screening test were invited 
to take part in the study.  The study received full ethical approval from 
Birkbeck’s Ethics Committee. 
Non-synaesthetic control participants were recruited from the self-report 
web-based screening questionnaire.  Only those respondents answering 
negatively to the statement ‘I sometimes feel touch when I see other people 
being touched’ were invited to participate in the experiment.  The groups did 
not differ in terms of age (F(1,30) <1, p = .94), gender (χ2 (1, N = 32= .58, p = 
.45) or IQ (measured with the Ravens Progressive Matrices; F(1,30) <1, p = .73).  
Except one participant from the mirror-touch synaesthesia group, all participants 
were right-handed.  In order to exclude handedness as a confounding variable 
in the control of inhibition task, the data from the left-handed participant were 
not included in the analysis of this task.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the control of imitation and visual perspective-
taking tasks described in Experiment 1.  The stimuli in the visual perspective-
taking task were modified in order to make the objects and the figure of the 
director more lifelike (see Figure 2.5 below).  
  






Figure 2.5. Modified (more realistic) stimuli for the perspective-taking task. 
Panel A shows an example of the stimuli used for an experimental trial (e.g., the 
director instructs participants to move the ‘large candle up’) and a C1 trial (e.g., 
‘move the camera up’). Panel B shows an example the second control condition 
(C2) where the largest candle (i.e. the competitor) is replaced by an irrelevant 
object (a chair) but the director’s instruction is the same as in the experimental 
condition (i.e. ‘move the large candle up’).  
 
Another variation from the design of Experiment 1 was the introduction 
of a different theory of mind task, the movie for the assessment of social 
cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006).  Dziobek et al. (2006) showed that the 
MASC is a reliable and highly sensitive instrument for the evaluation of complex 
mental state recognition in both normal participants and individuals with autism 
spectrum disorders.  The MASC is a computer-based task designed as an 
ecologically valid assessment of theory of mind ability.  Participants are 
required to watch a 15-minute film and to make inferences about the mental 
states of the characters.  The film shows four people interacting as they get 
together on a Saturday evening.  The video is paused at various points and 
participants answer a multiple-choice question about the last scene.  There are 
two types of questions: theory of mind (e.g., “what is Betty thinking?” or “why is 
Cliff saying this?”) and control questions (e.g., “what was the weather like that 
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evening?” or “what kind of pasta sauce are the characters preparing?”).  To 
answer the theory of mind questions correctly, participants are required to make 
mental inferences through visual and auditory input approximating real-life 
social interactions.  The MASC also allows the distinction of three different types 
of errors (complete lack of, insufficient, or excessive/over-interpretative mental 
state reasoning) – See Figure 2.6 below.  
The order of the three tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  
After completion of the three tasks, participants were administered the Ravens 
Progressive Matrices (standard version).  The testing session lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. 
 
 Figure 2.6. Example of a theory of mind (ToM) question from a scene in the 
MASC.  
Betty (second from right) enters the room and joins the other three characters.  
She sees fresh flowers on the table and assumes that Cliff (left) brought them for 
Sandra, but it was in fact Michael who did.  Betty complements Cliff on his 
choice of flowers for Sandra and Cliff replies: “not me, chocolates are more my 
thing.” Then participants are asked: “why is Cliff saying this?”  
a) he wants them to know that he would bring chocolates (insufficient ToM) 
b) he is too modest to take credit for something he did not do (excessive ToM) 
c) he did not bring anything for Sandra (lack of ToM) 
d) he wants to diffuse the awkwardness of the situation (correct) 
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2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Control of imitation task 
Additional to the excluded data from the left-handed mirror-touch 
synaesthete – as mentioned above –, the data from another participant from the 
same group were excluded due to extremely long overall RTs falling outside 1.5 
x IQR (Tukey 1977).  The RT and accuracy data from the remaining participants 
(mirror-touch synaesthetes N = 14, controls N = 16) were analysed using 
ANOVA with Group as the between-subjects factor (mirror-touch synaesthetes 
vs. controls) and Trial Type as the within-subject factor (congruent vs. 
incongruent).  
RTs.  Figure 2.7a shows RTs from the control of imitation task.  There was 
a main effect of Trial Type F(1,28) = 109.12; p < .001; η2p= .80; indicating that 
overall, participants responded faster on congruent than on incongruent trials.  
The main effect of Group was also significance F(1,28) = 6.77; p = .015; η2p= 
.20. Overall, the mirror-touch synaesthetes (M=551.03 ms, S.E.M. = 15) were 
slower at responding to both types of trials than controls (M=497.60 ms, S.E.M. 
= 14).  The Group × Trial Type interaction was also significant, F(1,28) = 4.26; p 
= .048; η2 p = .13.  Simple effects analysis shows that this interaction was driven 
by the mirror-touch synaesthetes taking longer when responding to incongruent 
trials (M=587.28 ms, S.E.M. = 14.67) than the controls (M=521.89 ms, S.E.M. = 
13.92); F(1,28) = 10.59; p = .003; η2 p = .27; whereas the group comparison for 
congruent trials was not significant (p = .08).  A further post hoc analysis was 
performed to confirm if the poorer performance of mirror-touch synaesthesia 
during incongruent trials was due to a greater difficulty to inhibit imitation by 
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analysing the incongruent trials and entering the RT of congruent trials as a 
covariate.  This analysis revealed that the group difference remained significant 
(F(1,27) = 9.11; p = .005; η2 p = .25), thus indicating that mirror-touch 
synaesthetes found it harder to inhibit the tendency to imitate than did the 
participants from the control group.  
Accuracy.  Error data are displayed in Figure 2.7b.  Overall, participants 
made more errors in the incongruent (M = 6.1%, S.E.M. = 1%) than in the 
congruent trials (M = 1.5%, S.E.M. = .3%), F(1,28) = 19.48, p < .001; η2 p = .41.  
The mirror-touch synaesthetes made significantly more errors than the controls, 
F(1,28) = 6.10; p =.020; η2 p = .18.  The Group × Trial Type interaction was also 
significant F(1,28) = 4.44; p =.044; η2 p = .14.  Simple effects analysis revealed 
that again, the mirror-touch synaesthetes made significantly more errors in the 
incongruent trials (M=8.4%, S.E.M. = 1.4%) than controls (M=3.8%, S.E.M. = 
1.4%); F(1,28) = 5.59, p = .025, η2 p = .17.  Furthermore, this effect remains 
significant even after controlling for covariance in the congruent trials, F(1,27) = 
5.39; p =.028; η2 p = .17.  These results confirm the greater difficulty 
experienced by the mirror-touch synaesthetes when required to control self-
other representations.  Taken together, the RT and accuracy data from the 
imitation-inhibition task provide further support for the faulty self-other 
representations account in mirror-touch synaesthesia (Banissy & Ward, 2013).  
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   A       B 
Figure 2.7. Mean RT (A) and percentage of errors (B) on the control of imitation 
task for each group. The error bars represent standard error of the mean. MTS = 
mirror-touch synaesthesia. * (p < .05) 
 
 
Director task  
Due to faulty equipment the data from 4 participants in the mirror-touch 
synaesthesia group were not recorded.  The accuracy and RT data from the 
remaining participants (mirror-touch synaesthetes N = 12; controls N = 16) are 
reported here.  Since no significant differences were found between the C1 and 
C2 control trials, the data were collapsed and analysed as a single control trial.  
An ANOVA was performed with Group as a between-subject factor and Trial 
Type (Exp vs. Control) as the within-subjects factor.  
RTs.  Participants responded faster to the control trials (M=2.9 s, S.E.M. = 
.08 s) than to the experimental trials (M=3.1s, S.E.M. = .12 s), F(1, 26) =11.04; p 
< .003; η2 p = .30.  No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps 
> .74). 
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Accuracy.  There was a significant main effect of Trial Type F(1,26) = 
36.37; p < .001; η2 p = .58.  Overall, performance was poorer on experimental 
trials (M = 52%, S.E.M. = 7.6%) than on control trials in which participants 
performed at ceiling: (M = 96%, S.E.M. = 1.3%).  No other main effects or 
interactions were significant (all ps > .70).  Notably, performance on 
experimental trials by the synaesthetes (M = 52%, S.E.M. = 11.5%) was the 
same as controls (M = 52%, S.E.M. = 10%), suggesting that perspective-taking 
abilities are not impaired in individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia.  
However, since the performance by both groups was not particularly high, these 
findings require future replications.  
The MASC 
Two separate analyses were performed on the MASC data. The first 
analysis included the accuracy rate for theory of mind and control questions 
and the second sought to investigate if there were group differences in the type 
of errors participants made.  The first analysis revealed that overall, participants’ 
accuracy was higher for control questions (M = 87.7%, S.E.M. = 1.1%) than for 
questions requiring mental state attribution (M = 80.1%, S.E.M. = 1.5%), F(1,30) 
= 34.06; p < .001; η2p= .53.  Neither the main effect of Group, nor the Group × 
Question Type interaction were significant, (ps > .66).  
The analysis of error data revealed a significant main effect of Error Type, 
F(2,60) = 29.37; p < .001; η2p= .49, pairwise comparisons showed that overall, 
participants made more excessive theory of mind errors (M = 4.66, S.E.M. = .37) 
than errors reflecting either insufficient theory of mind (M = 2.84, S.E.M. = .38; 
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p = .003) or lack of theory of mind ability (M = 1.44, S.E.M. = .21; p < .001).  
No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .21).  Since 
performance on the crucial experimental condition (theory of mind questions) 
was high on both groups, these results imply that mirror-touch synaesthetes’ 
ability to attribute mental states to other individuals is not impaired. 
Are self-other representations atypical in mirror-touch synaesthesia?  
The results from the control of imitation task in Experiment 2 suggest that 
the ability to control self-other representations in mirror-touch synaesthetes is 
impaired, as implied by the longer reaction times and larger number of errors in 
incongruent trials compared to controls.  In order to succeed in this task, 
participants must supress the tendency to imitate the observed action from the 
stimulus hand on the screen (i.e. inhibit ‘other’ representations) and instead 
perform their intended actions as per task instruction, (i.e. enhance ‘self’ 
representations).  Although interference from representing the other was 
observed during incongruent trials in both groups, the mirror-touch synaesthetes 
were significantly more affected and therefore, less able to inhibit mental 
representations of the other than non-syneasthete controls.  This finding is in 
line with those recently reported by (Maister et al., 2013), discussed earlier, and 
provide further support for the hypothesis of atypical self-other representations 
in mirror-touch synaesthesia (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009).  An 
alternative interpretation to this finding would suggest that the finger tapping 
movement of the stimulus hand elicits a tactile experience on the synaesthete 
group, thereby interfering with their performance on this task.  However, it 
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should be noted that participants are required to respond to the finger lifting 
movement, not to the tapping, and when the stimulus finger is tapping, or in the 
down position, it rests on a blue background devoid of any objects. Therefore, 
there is no tactile experience during lifting or tapping by the stimulus finger.  
Furthermore, previous studies have shown that while the mirror-touch 
synaesthesia experience is elicited by touch to a real face, observing touch to a 
photo of a face, objects or even a dummy face fail to elicit the same tactile 
experience (Holle et al, 2011).  Therefore, it is unlikely that the magnitude of 
the effects observed in the control of imitation task (RT: p = .003; accuracy: p = 
.025) is caused by the stimulus evoking a synaesthesia experience.  
Nevertheless, future studies could verify this by taking self-report measures of 
tactile experiences in synaesthetes when performing this task. 
The control of self-other representations is also required in the visual 
perspective-taking task used in this study.  However, in contrast with the control 
of imitation task, successful performance in the Director task requires 
participants to inhibit self-representations (by ignoring the objects visible to 
themselves) and enhance representations of the ‘other’ (by only choosing the 
objects visible to the director).  Perhaps this difference in self-other control 
demands between the two tasks could explain the absence of a group effect in 
the Director task.  Performance of the mirror-touch synaesthetes was identical 
(52%) to that of the non-synaesthete controls on the experimental trials, where 
the two perspectives were in conflict.  It is possible that impairment of self-other 
processes in mirror-touch synaesthesia is specific to situations in which 
representations of the other should be inhibited (e.g., the control of imitation 
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task) but not when they should be enhanced (e.g., perspective taking).  This 
interpretation provides an interesting avenue for future research.   
Nevertheless, a null finding in the Director task should be interpreted 
with caution as performance of both groups was not very high.  Unlike previous 
studies using this task (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010), the 
experimental design employed here has the additional complexity of a left/ right 
switch from the participant’s point of view when moving the object to the 
correct location (from the director’s perspective).  It is possible, that this change 
to the design could have resulted in a processing cost to participants, by 
(unintentionally) encouraging the allocation of more attentional resources to the 
left/right switches than to choosing the correct object during the experimental 
trials.  The current data provide partial support for this: overall, participants 
make more object-selection mistakes, by choosing the ‘competitor‘ object (the 
one the director could not see), significantly more often during left/right trials 
(47%) than during up/down trials (42%; p <.001)1.  However, since 42% of 
errors were made during up/down trials, devoid of directional conflict between 
the director and participant’s perspective, the processing cost from left/right 
switches does not fully account for the overall poor performance on this task.   
In sum, the current results suggest that visual perspective taking abilities 
of mirror-touch synaesthetes are not impaired, however, future replications are 
needed to support this interpretation. In light of the overall low performance on 
this task by both synaesthetes and controls, replicating these findings with 
                                                
1 The remaining errors in Experimental trials were due to participants choosing irrelevant 
objects, other than the competitor.  Neither the main effect of Group, nor the Group × 
Movement Instructions (left/right vs. up/down) interaction were significant, ps > .38. 
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different measures of perspective taking would contribute towards a better 
understanding of self-other processes in this condition.  
Theory of mind in mirror-touch synaesthesia  
Although no differential effects between the synaesthetes and controls 
were found in the theory of mind task either, the pattern of results for the MASC 
was the opposite of that seen for the Director task.  While in the latter 
performance was relatively poor for both groups, in the former accuracy 
performance was high, but not at ceiling, in both groups (mirror-touch 
synaesthetes: M = 80%, S.E.M. = 2.1%; controls: M = 81%, S.E.M. = 2.1%), 
suggesting that the ability to attribute mental states to others is not impaired in 
individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia.  This finding is of interest to mirror-
touch synaesthesia researchers as it provides another piece of the puzzle that 
contributes to the understanding and characterisation of this rare condition.  In 
the context of the current set of experiments, this finding has further 
implications, specifically in relation to the self-other control theory proposed by 
(Brass et al., 2009).  Experiment 2 addressed the potential lack of sensitivity of 
the Strange Stories task by using a different measure, designed to elicit mental 
state inferences in a setting approximating real-life social interactions, and yet 
again no evidence of a relationship between the control of imitation and theory 
of mind was found.   
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2.3  General Discussion 
The experiments reported here intended to investigate whether socio-
cognitive abilities such as the control of imitation, perspective taking and theory 
of mind share common underlying mechanisms for the control of self-other 
representations as advanced by Brass et al. (2009).  Experiment 1 specifically 
addressed this experimental question by contrasting the MNS theory vs. the self-
other control hypothesis using a behavioural training paradigm to manipulate 
the control of self-other representations.  
The results from this experiment suggest a link between the control of 
imitation and perspective taking.  However, these two socio-cognitive abilities 
do not appear to be related to the attribution of mental states to others, as also 
shown by the results from Experiment 2.  Such discrepancy could lie in the 
requirement for the control of online self-other representations, common to both 
the control of imitation and to perspective taking but not to the attribution of 
mental states to others. 
While these findings provide some support for the self-other control 
theory, it should be noted that neither the imitation nor imitation inhibition 
theories are likely to be sufficient to account for theory of mind in its entirety.  
Indeed, the self-other control theory explicitly states that imitation inhibition is 
related only to a sub-process within a wider theory of mind ability, the control 
of shared representations relating to self and the other.  In contrast, it is often 
implied that the imitation / MNS theory provides a sufficient account of theory 
of mind competence.  For example, it has been claimed that the MNS provides 
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a mechanism by which humans may  “directly understand the meaning of the 
actions and emotions of others by internally replicating (‘simulating’) them 
without any explicit reflective mediation” (Gallese et al., 2004, pp. 396), and 
may explain how “we assign goals, intentions, or beliefs to the inhabitants of 
our social world” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, pp. 493).  However, many 
authors have provided theoretical and empirical objections to this view based 
both on empirical work with typical individuals (e.g., Saxe 2005; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), and with individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007; Southgate, Gergely, & Csibra, 
2009; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010). 
A different approach to the experimental question concerning a 
relationship between the control of imitation, perspective taking and theory of 
mind was adopted in Experiment 2, which sought to investigate if individuals 
with mirror-touch synaesthesia display impairment in the control of self-other 
representations during performance of these three socio-cognitive abilities. The 
poor performance observed in the mirror-touch synaesthetes in the control of 
imitation task provides further evidence for the hypothesis of atypical self-other 
representations in individuals with this condition (Banissy & Ward, 2013; 
Banissy et al., 2009).  However, no difference in performance was observed 
between the synaesthetes and controls in the visual perspective-taking task.  
Although both tasks require the control of self-other representations, the control 
demands are different for each task.  The control of imitation requires enhancing 
‘self’ and inhibiting ‘other’, whereas perspective taking requires enhancing 
‘other’ and inhibiting ‘self’.  Could the similar performance between 
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synaesthetes and controls in perspective taking indicate that self-other 
representation impairments of mirror-touch synaesthetes are limited to 
inhibition of the other?  Future research could explore the answer to this 
question, perhaps by using different measures of perspective taking.   
No differential effects between mirror-touch synaesthetes and controls 
were found on the theory of mind task.  Performance of both groups was very 
high in this measure.  Such good performance of the synaesthetes in this task 
suggests that their ability to attribute mental states to others is not impaired.  
Furthermore, the contrasting performance between theory of mind and the 
control of imitation provide further support for the view that they are distinct 
socio-cognitive abilities.  The relatively poor performance by both groups on the 
perspective taking measure calls for future research in this social cognition 
domain before any firm conclusions could be drawn about the relationship 
between perspective taking and theory of mind. 
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Chapter 3: Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS): 
A Methodological Overview 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the methodological principles of 
transcranial direct current stimulation.  The first section briefly summarises the 
origins of this method.  This is followed by a discussion of the physiological 
mechanisms thought to underlie the aftereffects observed with tDCS and the 
parameters that could affect its efficacy.  Finally, due to increasing research 
interest in this non-invasive technique, the safety considerations within 
experimental settings are discussed.   
 
3.1 Introduction  
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a non-invasive method 
that is increasingly being used to modulate cortical excitability and behaviour in 
a range of experimental conditions and clinical settings.  Although it is only in 
the last few decades that researchers have started to employ tDCS to modulate 
human cerebral cortical functioning by inducing focal changes of cortical 
excitability (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001a, 2000; Priori 2003), the idea of electrical 
stimulation goes as far back as the first century AD.  
 
3.1.1 The Origins of Direct Current Stimulation 
In 43 to 48 AD, Scribonius Largus, the physician of Roman emperor 
Claudius, observed that placing a live torpedo fish (electric eel) – delivering a 
strong direct electric current – over the scalp of a patient suffering with 
Chapter 3 
 81 
headache, elicited a sudden transient stupor with pain relief (Kellaway 1946; 
Priori 2003).  The systematic study of the torpedo electric fish by John Walsh 
between 1772 and 1775 (Piccolino & Bresadola, 2002) stimulated the work of 
the Italian scientists Galvani and Volta who established the existence of 
bioelectric potential (Geddes & Hoff, 1971; Priori, 2003).  The discovery of 
galvanic currents (Direct Current, DC) led to its prompt application in clinical 
medicine, in particular mental disorders.  In 1804, Giovanni Aldini, Galvani’s 
nephew, reported the successful treatment of melancholia by applying galvanic 
currents over the patient’s head.  Aldini tested galvanic currents on himself 
before doing so with his patients.  He reported side effects such as prolonged 
insomnia and unpleasant sensation lasting few days.  Nevertheless, he still 
believed in the efficacy of galvanic scalp current to treat mental disorders 
(Priori, 2003).  For the following two centuries many more researchers 
continued to use galvanic current for the treatment of mental disorders with 
mixed results.  The inconsistent findings and sometimes failure to see any 
positive effects resulted in a gradual abandonment of DC stimulation, 
particularly after the discovery of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT, Cerletti & 
Bini, 1940) and the development of drugs to treat mental disorders.  ECT 
signified a breakthrough in the treatment of mental illness due to the marked 
improvements observed in these patients (Mukherjee, Sackeim, & Schnur, 
1994).  However, there are fundamental differences between ECT and DC.  ECT 
induces convulsive activity, whereas, DC stimulation does not induce seizures, 
instead, more subtle physiological changes take place by modulation of 
spontaneous neuronal activity (Terzuolo & Bullock, 1956).  Unlike DC 
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stimulation, ECT requires the use of anaesthesia.  Furthermore, ECT causes 
memory disturbance or loss of consciousness (e.g., Rose, Fleischmann, Wykes, 
Leese, & Bindman, 2003), whereas no such effects have been found with DC 
stimulation.  In the 1950s and 1960s most DC stimulation experiments were 
carried out in animals, and the results from these studies have contributed to 
current knowledge of the impact of DC stimulation in humans.  A resurgence of 
DC stimulation (now better know as tDCS) has taken place over the last decade 
or so as researchers are beginning to understand the physiological basis and 
safety aspects of this brain stimulation method.  
3.2 Physiological Basis of tDCS  
Unlike transcranial electric stimulation (TES) or transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), tDCS does not induce neuronal action potentials because the 
static fields in this range do not yield the rapid depolarization needed to 
generate them (Nitsche et al., 2008).  The application of tDCS involves 
delivering a weak electric current to the brain by placing two surface electrodes, 
one positively charged (anodal) and one negatively charged (cathodal) – See 
Figure 1 –, polarising the cortical area directly beneath and, therefore, 
modifying spontaneous neuronal excitability by depolarisation or 
hyperpolarisation of the resting membrane potential (Nitsche, Boggio, Fregni, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2009; Purpura & McMurtry, 1965).  The current flows from the 
anodal to the cathodal electrode.  It is widely assumed that the anodal electrode 
causes depolarization, increasing the probability of an action potential 
(excitatory effect), whereas the cathodal electrode causes hyperpolarization, 
thereby reducing the chances of action potentials (inhibitory effect).  This effect 
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is usually referred to as anodal excitatory, cathodal inhibitory (AeCi) – (Fregni et 
al., 2006; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, 2011; Stagg et al., 2009).  The evidence in 
support of this assumption comes mostly from studies investigating the effects of 
motor function.  However, other motor studies (e.g., Priori, Berardelli, Rona, 
Accornero, & Manfredi, 1998a), but particularly studies in the cognitive domain 
have failed to replicate these polarity (AiCe) effects - (see Jacobson et al., 2012 
for a review).  In their meta-analytical review, Jacobson and colleagues found 
homogeneity of the generally assumed polarity effects (AeCi) among motor 
studies but heterogeneity in cognitive studies.  The conclusion of this meta-
analysis based upon the behavioural effects of stimulation suggest that during 
cognitive tasks the anodal electrode elicits excitation, while it is often the case 
that the cathodal electrode fails to produce inhibitory effects, at least as 





Figure 3.1.  Example of electrode placement in an experimental setting (A) and 
schematic representation of tDCS (B).  Two 35 cm2 saline-soaked sponge electrodes are 
fixed to the participant’s scalp.  A weak (1mA – 2mA) constant electrical current 
generated by the tDCS stimulator (not shown) is applied over a few minutes (either 
online, i.e. while participants perform the experimental task as shown in panel A; or 
offline, i.e. prior to task performance).  The electrical current flows from the anodal (+) 
to the cathodal (-) electrode through the superficial cortical areas leading to 
polarization.   
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It is worth pointing out that Jacobson and colleagues’ conclusions are 
based on performance data and do not necessarily reveal a lack of polarity 
effects on cortical excitability; as they suggest (see also (Antal et al., 2004), 
cathodal tDCS might enhance performance in a certain cognitive task by 
decreasing neuronal competition.    
In their meta-analytical review, Jacobson and colleagues offer several 
potential interpretations of the lack of cathodal tDCS effects in cognitive studies.  
Parting from the premise that effects of brain stimulation are determined by the 
initial state of neuronal activation (Silvanto, Muggleton, & Walsh, 2008), 
Jacobson and colleagues posit that the initial state of cognitive regions is not 
passive prior to tDCS, these areas are likely to be activated by several situational 
and motivational factors.  Therefore, tDCS is applied over an already activated 
region and as a result, anodal stimulation increases further neuronal firing, 
which contributes to the enhancement or facilitation of the cognitive 
performance.  Conversely, the cathodal electrode is unable to generate 
measurable inhibitory effects when the initial state of neuronal activation is 
already high.  In contrast, the initial state of the motor cortex is less active than 
cognitive regions.  Therefore, stimulation effects (both anodal and cathodal) 
operate under less competition and are fully expressed.  Another explanation 
proposed by Jacobson et al. (2012) to the lack of cathodal (inhibitory) effects in 
cognitive studies, is the differences in the dependent variables used.  For 
example, most tDCS studies of the motor cortex use changes in motor evoked 
potentials (MEP), which is a passive measure involving only the stimulated 
motor region, whereas cognitive effects of tDCS use a variety of measures such 
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as RT, accuracy, and sometimes fMRI data.  All of these measures can generate 
external ‘noise’, which could affect the stimulation effects.  
Furthermore, while cortical motor projections are almost always 
contralateral, bilateral activity is commonly found in cognitive functions.  
Therefore, it is possible that cathodal tDCS fails to induce inhibition of the 
cognitive function under investigation due to contralateral compensation effects 
(Jacobson et al., 2012).  Although these observations seem plausible, future 
research could provide empirical support for these assumptions.  For example, 
the level of activation of the cognitive regions under investigation could be 
assessed by using fMRI, both before and during tDCS, and changes in BOLD 
signals during the two conditions could verify the validity of the ‘initial state 
activation’ account.  
Animal studies using tDCS have also reported contradictory findings with 
respect to the AeCi polarity effects.  For example, (Creutzfeldt, Fromm, & Kapp, 
1962) found that in the cat motor cortex, neurons in deep cortical layers were 
de-activated by anodal and activated by cathodal stimulation.  The researchers 
attributed this finding to the spatial orientation of these neurons, which could 
have caused a reversed direction of the current flow compared to the dominant 
type of neurons in which the AeCi effects were found.  Furthermore, the type of 
neurons modulated by tDCS seems to be related to the strength of stimulation, 
weaker stimulation (e.g., 30-80 µA/mm2) modulates predominantly non-
pyramidal cells, whereas stronger levels of stimulation (e.g., 100-400 µA/mm2) 
seem to be required to modulate excitability of pyramidal neurons (Purpura & 
McMurtry, 1965).  
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This non-invasive brain stimulation technique has received considerable 
attention since its successful re-introduction in the study of the human motor 
functions (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori, Berardelli, Rona, Accornero, & 
Manfredi, 1998b) and cognitive functions such as working memory (e.g.,Fregni 
et al., 2005); executive functions (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007) and language (e.g., 
Monti et al., 2013).  It is also increasingly been used in clinical settings for the 
treatment of depression (e.g., Boggio et al., 2008; Dell'osso et al., 2013; Nitsche 
et al., 2009) and other neurological conditions (see review by Fregni & Pascual-
Leone, 2007).  The behavioural effects of single tDCS sessions are relatively 
short-lived. Previous studies have shown that, for humans, 13 minutes of offline 
anodal tDCS at 1 mA results in a sustained increase in cortical excitability for up 
to 90 minutes after stimulation, followed by a linear decrease to baseline levels 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2001a).  However, there is recent evidence that the duration 
of these behavioural effects could last several weeks following repeated sessions 
both in healthy individuals (Reis et al., 2009) and in patients (Boggio et al., 
2008).   
Although the mechanisms underlying these changes are not fully 
understood, early tDCS studies with animals have revealed that the duration of 
aftereffects are dependent on protein synthesis (Gartside 1968) and 
accompanied by changes in intracellular cAMP and calcium (Ca2+) levels 
(Hattori 1990; Islam 1995).  Therefore, the aftereffects elicited by tDCS have 
been associated with the phenomena of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-
term depression (LTD) (e.g., Nitsche et al., 2008).  The phenomenon of LTP 
(Anderson & Lomo, 1966; Bliss & Gardner-Medwin, 1973) has its foundation on 
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the Hebbian principle that “neurons that fire together, wire together” and is 
considered one of the underlying mechanisms of synaptic plasticity.  LTP is a 
long-lasting synaptic enhancement resulting from strong NMDA (N-methyl-D-
aspartate) receptors and requiring postsynaptic Ca2+ entry and activation of 
glutamate receptors (Bear & Malenka, 1994).  LTP has been considered the 
likely candidate for memory formation in the brain as it allows for modulation 
of synaptic strength that stabilizes for long periods of time (Anderson & Lomo, 
1966; Bliss & Gardner-Medwin, 1973).  LTD is the antithesis of LTP (Linden & 
Connor, 1993).  “Neurons that fire out of sync lose their link” – synapses whose 
activity fails to correlate with that of the postsynaptic cell are weakened and 
then eliminated (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007, pp. 718).  
Human studies using pharmacological intervention support the evidence 
from animal studies showing that modulation of cortical excitability elicited by 
tDCS depends on membrane polarisation, thus modulating the conductance of 
sodium and calcium channels.  For example, (Nitsche et al., 2003) found that 
sodium channel blocker carbamazepine and calcium channel antagonist 
Flunarizine selectively eliminate the excitability enhancement associated with 
anodal tDCS during and after stimulation.  Furthermore, the NMDA receptor 
antagonist dextrometorphan have been found to block aftereffects for both 
anodal and cathodal stimulation (Liebetanz, Nitsche, Tergau, & Paulus, 2002; 
Nitsche et al., 2003), but the partial NMDA receptor-agonist D-cycloserine 
lengthens the aftereffects (Nitsche et al., 2004).   
Chapter 3 
 88 
3.3 Parameters Affecting the Efficacy of tDCS 
A number of factors can determine the efficacy of tDCS.  For example 
recent studies have identified current density, length of stimulation, electrode 
positioning, electrode size and experimental setup (offline vs. online) among the 
factors to consider for achieving optimal efficacy.   
3.3.1 Current Density 
The current density is the quotient of current strength and electrode size.  
Studies with animals have shown that current density determines the efficacy of 
tDCS for inducing acute modifications of membrane polarity (Bindman, Lippold, 
Redfearn, 1964; Purpura & McMurtry, 1965).  Studies with humans have also 
found that larger current densities result in stronger tDCS effects.  For example, 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2000) applied tDCS over the motor cortex using a range of 
current density (0.2 mA, 0.4 mA, 0.6 mA, 0.8mA, 1mA) and stimulation 
duration (1-5 minutes), MEP measures showed increased stimulation aftereffects 
with increases of both current density and length of stimulation.  Similarly, in a 
tDCS study of cognitive function, Iyer et al. (2005) used current densities of 
0.4mA and 0.8 mA to stimulate the prefrontal cortex and found no significant 
stimulation effects on any of the measures (attention, self-emotion recognition, 
verbal fluency) in the 0.4mA condition; however, an improvement in verbal 
fluency was detected with the higher current density of 0.8mA.     
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3.3.2 Length of Stimulation 
In line with the findings from (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000) that longer 
stimulation times increase the duration of aftereffects, Nitsche & Paulus (2001) 
found significant increases of MEP amplitudes after applying tDCS of the motor 
cortex at intervals ranging from 5 to 13 minutes.  Whereas 5 to 7 minutes of 
tDCS resulted in aftereffects of less than 5 minutes, increasing stimulation to 13 
minutes led to elevations of MEP amplitudes for up to 90 minutes.  The 
relationship between length of stimulation and duration of aftereffects has also 
been replicated by Nitsche et al. (2003a).  In a more recent study, Monte-Silva 
et al. (2009), reported that 9 to 18 minutes of cathodal tDCS induces a slight 
prolongation of inhibition.  However, repeated tDCS during the aftereffects of 
the first stimulation with the same total stimulation was more efficient.  These 
results suggest an interesting avenue for future tDCS studies looking to increase 
the efficacy of stimulation. 
3.3.3 Electrode Positioning 
In order to achieve the intended stimulation effects, another important 
factor to consider is orientation of the electric field, which is generally 
determined by the electrode position and polarity (Nitsche et al., 2008).  Most 
of what is known about tDCS effects in humans and its methodological 
principles comes from studies stimulating the motor cortex.  The first tDCS 
studies of the motor cortex in humans found contrasting polarity effects. Nitsche 
& Paulus, (2000) found the commonly assumed AeCi effects, whereas Priori et 
al. (1998b) found that anodal stimulation elicited inhibitory effects.  A reason for 
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this discrepancy has been attributed to differences in electrode positioning 
(Jacobson et al., 2012; Nitsche et al., 2008). (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000) placed 
the reference electrode over the contralateral orbit, but (Priori et al., 1998b) 
placed it on the chin.  Similarly, two studies stimulating the primary visual 
cortex (Oz) found contrasting polarity effects.  Antal et al., (2004) placed the 
reference electrode over the vertex and found that cathodal stimulation 
increased the amplitude of visually evoked potentials (VEP) of the P100 
component, but anodal stimulation did not affect it.  In a separate study, 
(Accornero, Li Voti, La Riccia, & Gregori, 2007) placed the reference electrode 
on the neck and found that, although cathodal stimulation increased the VEP-
P100 amplitude – in line with the findings from Antal et al. (2004) – anodal 
stimulation reduced it.   
Concerning the placement of the reference electrode, a more recent 
study by (Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 2010) found that when increasing the 
interelectrode distance1, higher current intensity is required for achieving similar 
aftereffects.  
3.3.4  Electrode size 
One of the limitations of tDCS is its low spatial resolution.  In a typical 
tDCS setting, the size of electrodes used is 5 cm x 7 cm (35 cm2).  It has been 
estimated that approximately 40-45% of the total current applied to the scalp 
passes through the cranial cavity, therefore the peak current density is found in 
                                                
1 In their study, Moliadze et al., (2010) measured the intensity and aftereffects of anodal tDCS of 
M1 using four different electrode montages, with the reference electrode placed on the: 
contralateral forehead, contralateral upper arm, ipsilateral upper arm and ipsilateral forearm.   
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the cortices directly under the electrode with a rapid decrease for distal areas 
(Lang et al., 2005a; Rush & Driscoll, 1968).  Therefore, changing the size of the 
electrodes should contribute to higher spatial resolution.  For example, (Nitsche 
et al., 2007) demonstrated two ways of achieving higher focality of cortical 
excitability in the area beneath the stimulation electrode.  The first method was 
reducing the size of the stimulation electrode, from the conventional 35 cm2 to 
3.5 cm2, while holding current density constant (~ 0.03mA/cm2).  The second 
method consisted of increasing the size of the reference electrode from 35 cm2 
to 100 cm2, resulting in a reduction of current density from 0.03mA/cm2 to 
0.01mA/cm2 under this electrode – while the stimulation electrode was kept at 
35 cm2 and the current density at 0.03mA/cm2.  The reduction in size of the 
reference electrode was based on findings from an earlier study (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2000) showing that in humans a minimum current density of 
0.017A/cm2 was necessary to modify cortical excitability, therefore, the reduced 
current density under the large reference electrode of 0.01mA/cm2 makes it 
functionally inefficient. Making the reference electrode inefficient while 
maintaining the current density at the same level as with a larger active 
electrode, results in higher concentration of the current density under the 
stimulated region, thereby facilitating the tDCS effects.  
A new approach to tDCS has recently been developed to increase 
focality of stimulation that uses a montage of 4 x 1 small ring electrodes (<12 
mm diameter), called high-definition tDCS (HD-tDCS) (e.g., Borckardt et al., 
2012; Datta et al., 2009; Datta, Elwassif, & Bikson, 2009; Minhas et al., 2010; 
Villamar et al., 2012).  In this setup, a central (stimulation) electrode is 
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surrounded by 4 reference electrodes placed within a radius of approximately 7 
cm.  It has been reported that in 4x1 HD-tDCS the area of cortical excitability 
modulation is confined to the ring boundary and the peak of electrical field is 
under the centre electrode, in contrast to conventional tDCS, in which 
stimulation can spread to unintended cortical regions (Datta et al., 2009; Datta, 
Truong, Minhas, Parra, & Bikson, 2012).  Furthermore, a direct comparison of 
conventional and HD tDCS (10 minutes of stimulation at 2mA) showed a 
delayed peak in the intensity of stimulation (at 30 minutes) and aftereffects of 
more than 2 hours after HD-tDCS compared to conventional tDCS (Kuo et al., 
2013).  However, further comparative studies are required to provide a better 
understanding of the advantages and potential safety concerns of HD-tDCS 
compared to the conventional method. 
3.3.5 Online vs. Offline tDCS 
Another parameter that researchers usually consider in order to achieve 
the intended effects is the timing of the stimulation.  During online tDCS, 
participants receive stimulation while executing an experimental task, whereas 
in an offline setting, stimulation precedes performance of the experimental 
measures.  In a previous study, (Nitsche et al., 2003b) found that applying 
anodal tDCS during the execution of a motor learning task improved the rate of 
learning.  However, in an offline setting consisting of 10 minutes tDCS prior to 
performance of the same task, (Kuo, Paulus, & Nitsche, 2006) found no effect 
on the rate of learning.  In line with these findings, Stagg et al. (2009) compared 
the results of 10 tDCS studies stimulating M1 (8 used online and 2 used offline 
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tDCS) and found stronger effects in the online condition.  However, the limited 
number of studies overall and, particularly the low number of studies utilising 
offline stimulation suggest that further research is needed – including studies 
from outside the motor domain – in order to objectively assess the effect of 
stimulation timing.  A recent study (Pirulli, Fertonani, & Miniussi, 2013) aimed 
to do precisely that.  The researchers compared performance on a visual 
attention task during online vs. offline tDCS (of V1).  They found greater 
facilitation of task performance for the offline condition.  Further studies, 
particularly those investigating cognitive function, would contribute to 
determining the optimal timing protocol for eliciting the desired stimulation 
effects.  
3.4 Safety of tDCS  
The health and safety of participants is of paramount importance in the 
application of tDCS both in basic science experimental conditions and in 
clinical settings.  As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the re-
introduction of tDCS in humans (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000; Priori et al., 1998a), 
has led to a surge of published research using this technique.  The majority of 
these studies show that tDCS is a relatively safe, non-invasive, brain stimulation 
method.  The most severe adverse effects are limited to a few isolated reports of 
skin lesions under the electrodes (Loo et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2010; Palm et 
al., 2008).  These lesions have occurred in the context of multiple tDCS sessions 
at the upper range of stimulation parameters (2mA).  Two reviews (Brunoni et 
al., 2011; Poreisz, Boros, Antal, & Paulus, 2007) have identified itching or tingly 
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sensation under the electrode during and after tDCS as the most commonly 
reported side effect, followed by infrequent reporting of moderate fatigue, 
headache, and in rare cases, nausea and insomnia.  In addition, (Poreisz et al., 
2007) found that healthy participants report more incidences of itching 
sensation whereas patients treated with tDCS reported headaches as the most 
common adverse effect.   
A recent study used different concentrations of NaCl to determine the 
perceived comfort for participants (Dundas, Thickbroom, & Mastaglia, 2007).  
Three concentrations of NaCl were determined relative to biological levels of 
sodium in the human body as follows:  low NaCl concentration was equivalent 
to the intracellular sodium concentration of most cells (15 mM); medium NaCl 
concentration was equivalent to the sodium concentration in blood plasma 
(140 mM); and, high NaCl concentration was equivalent to sodium levels 
expelled from the kidneys (220 mM) (Dundas et al., 2007).  The researchers 
found that as the NaCl concentration increased, participant’s comfort ratings 
decreased.  Thus, Dundas and colleagues recommend that in order to reduce 
discomfort, NaCl concentrations should be kept between 15 and 140 mM.  
Regardless of the choice of electrolyte, it is recommended that impedance levels 
should be monitored during stimulation in order to achieve the target current 
and for safety reasons, many devices provide an indication of impedance during 
the stimulated period.  In some cases, the tDCS device automatically terminates 
stimulation or reduces stimulation intensity if resistance increases beyond a 
certain threshold.  
Chapter 3 
 95 
Overall tDCS is considered a safe method (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005; Merrill, 
Bikson, & Jefferys, 2005; Nitsche & Paulus, 2001b), despite the rare reports of 
undesirable side effects.  However, some researchers (e.g., Bikson et al., 2009) 
have drawn attention to potential brain tissue damage that could lead to 
cognitive impairment.  Bikson and colleagues’ concern originated from a 
previous report by Liebetanz et al. (2009) of brain lesions in rats following tDCS 
exposure with a current density of 142 A/m2 for 10 minutes or longer.  
Liebetanz and colleagues related the lesions to tissue burning.  However, as 
Nitsche & Paulus (2011) point out, the current density used by Liebetanz et al. 
(2009) is about two orders of magnitude higher than the commonly applied in 
human studies. 
The recent introduction of HD-tDCS comes with warnings regarding the 
establishment of safety parameters.  Although the relatively small number of 
studies using this approach highlight safety (additionally to focality), compared 
to conventional tDCS, as the motivations for its development (e.g., Minhas et 
al., 2011; Datta et al., 2009; Datta et al., 2009; Datta et al., 2012; Kuo et al., 
2013; Minhas et al., 2010), it is expected that increased popularity of this 
approach will contribute to the establishment of safety guidelines for future HD-
tDCS research. 
To summarise, tDCS is a non-invasive brain stimulation method that is 
increasingly being employed in the study of motor, visual and cognitive 
functions in healthy humans (Nitsche & Paulus, 2011; Nitsche et al., 2008) and 
as a therapeutic tool with clinical populations (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2012).  As a 
suitable methodology for research purposes, tDCS has witnessed a revolutionary 
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transformation since its historical beginnings and as the development of HD-
tDCS shows, that transformation is far from complete.  TDCS is inexpensive 
(compared to other brain stimulation methods such as TMS), highly portable (a 
small battery-driven electric stimulator, sponge electrodes, connecting wires 
and an electrolyte fluid are all that is needed) and easy to use, all this make it a 
very appealing experimental tool.  As new tDCS research emerges, experimental 
procedures can be supported by a better understanding of the parameters 
affecting its efficacy and the safety protocols to which experimenters should 
adhere.  
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Chapter 4: The Role of the TPJ in Social Cognition 
 
The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) has consistently been identified as a key 
brain region involved in social cognition.  Several studies suggest that the TPJ 
controls representations of the self or another individual across a variety of low-
level (agency discrimination, visual perspective taking, control of imitation), and 
high-level (mentalizing, empathy) socio-cognitive processes.  Findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the online control of self-other representations 
is a common requirement between the inhibition of imitation and visual 
perspective taking.  The experiments described in this chapter aimed to replicate 
and extend these findings by investigating whether the online control of self -
other representations could be modulated using transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) of TPJ.  In Experiment 3, participants received either 
excitatory (anodal), inhibitory (cathodal) or sham stimulation of right TPJ before 
completing the imitation-inhibition, perspective taking and theory of mind tasks.  
Experiment 4 sought to explore whether TPJ involvement in social cognition is 
found bilaterally or whether it is limited to the right hemisphere.  The results 
from these experiments are discussed in relation to the TPJ involvement in the 
online control of self-other representations in social cognition and the efficacy of 
tDCS as a methodological tool in social neuroscience research. 
 
Experiment 3: Self-Other Representations and the Right TPJ 
To date, social cognition studies using fMRI have been the source of the 
majority of current knowledge concerning the role of TPJ in this domain.  Brain 
stimulation methods such as tDCS are an important addition to fMRI, as they 
allow cortical excitability to be directly manipulated.  In non-social domains, 
anodal stimulation has proved to be a powerful tool to enhance perceptual 
(Falcone, Coffman, Clark, & Parasuraman, 2012) and motor (Nitsche et al., 
2003b) learning. In contrast, the effects of cathodal stimulation have been found 
less reliably on cognitive tasks (Jacobson et al., 2012). 
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Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that anodal stimulation of TPJ should 
lead to enhanced socio-cognitive abilities: specifically, by enhancing the ability 
to control, online, co-activated representations of the self and the other.  
Participants received either anodal, cathodal or sham stimulation – which 
produces the same sensation as active stimulation but has no effect on neuronal 
populations (Nitsche et al., 2008) – of right TPJ for 20 minutes prior to 
completing the control of imitation and visual perspective taking tasks described 
in Chapter 2.  Additionally, participants also performed a theory of mind task – 
different from the ones used in Experiments 1 and 2 – in which they were 
required to make mental and physical judgements either about themselves or a 
famous person (self-referential task).   
All three tasks used in this experiment – including the theory of mind 
measure (self-referential task) – require representations of the self and the other 
in three different domains (motor plans, visuospatial perception, mental states).  
However, although the control of imitation and visual perspective taking require 
the ability to control online (on a trial-by-trial basis) representations of the self or 
the other, this requirement is not present in the self-referential task.  Prior to 
presentation of either a mental or a physical judgment in the self-referential task, 
participants know whether they should judge if the statement describes 
themselves or another person.  An additional distinctive feature of the self-
referential task is the inclusion of mental vs. physical judgments.  The TPJ has 
been found to play a crucial role during mental but not physical attributions 
(e.g., Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003), therefore a differential effect of stimulation is expected 
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between mental and physical trials.  Accordingly, the experimental design 
employed here allows testing the following predictions: If a difference in 
performance were only found in the control of imitation and perspective taking 
tasks but not on the self-referential task – after anodal stimulation – this would 
suggest that TPJ is causally involved in the online control of self-other 
representations.  Moreover, if TPJ involvement is required for self-other 
representations in general, it is expected that anodal stimulation – compared to 
cathodal and sham – will lead to improved performance on the self-referential 
task for judgments of both ‘self’ and ‘other’.  Additionally, if, as suggested by 
previous research, TPJ selectively differentiates between mental and physical 
judgements, then it is expected that performance of the anodal group would be 
better in mental than in physical trials for both self and other.  Finally, no 
differential stimulation effects in either of the tasks would suggest that the TPJ is 
activated as a consequence of self-other processing (as shown by the fMRI 
literature) but does not play a causal role in self-other processing itself. 
4.1.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine right-handed adults (24 females, age range 18-45 years, M = 
26.5, SD = 6.7) participated in this study for a small monetary reward.  
Participants were randomly assigned to the anodal (N =17), cathodal (N = 17), 
or control ‘sham’ (N = 15) groups.  The groups were matched in terms of age 
(F(2,48) = .35, p = .70) and gender (χ2(2, N  = 49) = .16, p = .92).  All 
participants were healthy volunteers, without any known developmental or 
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neurological disorders and no contra-indications to tDCS. They were all naïve 
with respect to the experimental hypotheses and remained unaware of what 
type of stimulation they received until the end of the experiment.  
Procedure 
Prior to the testing session, all participants were provided with written 
information about the study and a description of the tDCS procedure.  The 
associated safety/risk warnings were explained and participants were asked to 
sign an informed consent form. This study received full ethical approval by the 
local Ethics Committee.   
The stimulation was induced using two saline-soaked surface sponge 
electrodes 35 cm2 in size and delivered by a battery-driven, constant current 
stimulator.  For the stimulation of the rTPJ, the anodal or cathodal (depending 
on the group assignment) electrode was placed over CP6 
(electroencephalography 10/20 system) (Herwig, Satrapi, & Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 
2003). The reference electrode was placed over the vertex, individually 
measured on each participant. A relatively weak electrical current (1mA) was 
delivered for 20 minutes.  For the sham group, the set-up was identical to the 
anodal group, but the stimulator was only turned on for 15 seconds; participants 
felt the initial itching sensation associated with tDCS but received no active 
current for the rest of the stimulation period.  Offline stimulation (i.e. stimulation 
preceding task performance) was used as previous work suggests that effects are 
more robust than online stimulation, at least for anodal stimulation (Pirulli et al., 
2013). 
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The control of imitation and perspective-taking tasks used in this 
experiment have already been described in Chapter 2, the theory of mind task is 
described below.  
The self-referential task was adapted from a previous version used by 
Lombardo and colleagues, (Lombardo et al., 2010a).  Participants were asked to 
make either mental or physical judgements about themselves or a famous 
person (Lady Gaga).  At the beginning of the task they read a brief bio of Lady 
Gaga and were told that they would be asked to rate how likely either Lady 
Gaga (other) or the participant themselves (self) were to have certain opinions, 
likes, and dislikes.  For example, an ‘other-mental’ judgement would be:  how 
likely is she to enjoy the adrenaline rush of taking risks?  Whereas, a ‘self-
physical’ judgement could be:  how likely are you to lose and gain weight very 
quickly?  Prior to each trial, the word ‘YOU’ or ‘LADY GAGA’ was presented on 
the screen for 2 seconds (font size 45pts).  Therefore, participants knew before 
the start of data (RT) collection whether the following opinion judgement would 
relate to the self or the other.  There were 20 items in each trial type (self-
mental, self-physical, other-mental, other-physical).  Participants made 
judgements on a scale of 1 – 4 (1= not at all likely, 4= very likely).  The self vs. 
other statements were counterbalanced between groups.  To encourage 
participants to engage with the task and therefore elicit ‘other’ thoughts in the 
Lady Gaga condition, they were told that their answers would be compared to 
the answers given by the artist over a number of interviews and they would 
receive an ‘accuracy score’ at the end.  This ‘score’ was randomly generated 
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and presented on the screen at the end of the task.  Reaction times for each trial 
type were recorded.  
A surprise memory test was administered immediately after completion 
of the perspective-taking task, approximately 25 minutes after the self-referential 
task.  Participants were presented with a judgement statement and asked to rate 
how confident they were that they had seen it before on a scale of 1-6 
(1=definitely not seen it, 2=probably not seen it, 3 = possibly not seen it, 4= 
possibly seen it, 5= probably seen it, 6 = definitely seen it).  For items they 
thought they had seen before (those rated from 4-6) they were further asked to 
rate how confident they were that the statement was in reference to themselves 
or to Lady Gaga (1= definitely self, 6= definitely Lady Gaga).  Twenty ‘old’ 
(previously presented) and twenty ‘new’ (matched for number of words) 
statements for each condition were presented.  
In order to standardise the memory delay between the self-referential task 
and the surprise memory test, the tasks were administered to all participants in 
the following order: control of imitation, self-referential, perspective-taking and 
memory test for self-referential task.  The entire testing session lasted 
approximately one hour.  
4.1.2. Results and Discussion 
Control of imitation task 
The RT and accuracy data were analysed using ANOVA with Type of 
Stimulation as the between-subjects factor (anodal vs. cathodal vs. sham) and 
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Trial Type as the within-subject factor (congruent vs. incongruent).  Where 
sphericity assumptions were not met, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are 
reported.  Bonferroni corrections were used for post hoc multiple comparisons. 
RT analysis.  Figure 4.1 shows the RT data for the Control of imitation 
task.  Prior to the statistical analysis, extreme RT scores identified by the 1.5 x 
inter-quartile range rule were removed from each participant’s dataset.  The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of Trial Type, F(1,46) = 46.89, p < 
.001, η2p= .51; indicating that responses on congruent trials were executed 
faster than those on incongruent trials – see Figure 4.1A.  The main effect of 
Type of Stimulation was also significant, F(2,46) = 6.14, p = .004, η2p = .21.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that this effect was driven by the difference in 
performance between the anodal and the cathodal stimulation groups (p = 
.003).  Crucially, the Type of Stimulation × Trial Type interaction was also 
significant, F(2,46) = 4.31, p = .019, η2p= .16.  Simple effects analysis showed 
that in congruent trials, participants who received anodal stimulation responded 
significantly faster (M = 430 ms, S.E.M. = 13 ms) than those who received 
cathodal stimulation (M = 484 ms, S.E.M. = 13 ms; p = .004); however, the 
anodal vs. sham stimulation contrast was not significant (p = .21). During 
incongruent trials, performance of the anodal stimulation group (M = 446 ms, 
S.E.M. = 18 ms) was significantly faster than both the cathodal (M = 537 ms, 
S.E.M. = 18 ms; p = .001) and the sham (M = 506 ms, S.E.M. = 19 ms; p = .026) 
conditions.  In order to account for the faster performance by the anodal 
stimulation group in the congruent condition, a one-way ANOVA on the 
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imitation effect (RT incongruent trials – RT congruent trials) was performed.  
This analysis confirmed that the anodal effect remained significant F(2,48)= 
4.31, p = .019.  Pairwise comparisons revealed a difference in performance 
between the anodal and the cathodal stimulation groups (p = .040), while the 
comparison between anodal and sham approached significance (p = .051) – 
see Figure 4.1B.  These results show that anodal stimulation (but not cathodal 
or sham) of right TPJ results in an increased ability to inhibit the tendency to 
imitate the stimulus hand on the screen.  This finding is consistent with previous 
studies reporting right TPJ involvement in the control of imitation (Brass et al., 





Figure 4.1. Mean RTs on congruent and incongruent trials (A) and B) imitation 
effect (RT incongruent trials – RT congruent trials) in the control of imitation task 
for each stimulation condition. The error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. *** (p < .001); ** (p < .01); * (p < .05)   
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Error analysis. Overall, participants made a small number of errors (M 
total= 6.8, S.E.M. = .95).  The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(1,46) 
= 19.07, p < 0.001, η2p= 0.29, with participants making more errors in the 
incongruent (M = 3.95, S.E.M. = 0.62) than in the congruent (M = 2.14, S.E.M. 
= 0.40) trials.  The main effect of Type of Stimulation and the Type of 
Stimulation × Trial type interaction were not significant, (p =0.84. and p =0.49, 
respectively), showing that the type of stimulation did not affect accuracy on 
this task.  
Perspective-taking task 
The accuracy and RT data were analysed using ANOVA with Type of 
Stimulation as the between-subject factor and Trial Type (experimental vs. C1 
vs. C2) as the within-subjects factor.  
Accuracy.  Figure 4.2 shows the accuracy data on the experimental trials 
of the Director task.  There was a main effect of Trial Type, F(1.02,44.96) = 
54.52, p < .001, η2p = 0.55.  Overall, performance (proportion of correct 
responses) was worse on experimental trials (M = .66, S.E.M. = .04) than on 
control trials: C1 (M = .96, S.E.M. = .01), C2 (M = .93, S.E.M = .01), confirming 
the previously reported difficulty in taking the director’s perspective observed 
using this task.  The main effect of Type of Stimulation was also significant 
F(2,44) = 4.35, p< .02, η2p = .17.  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that 
performance of the anodal group (M = .93, S.E.M. = .03) was significantly better 
than the sham group (M = .81, S.E.M. = .03, p = .03) while the comparison with 
the cathodal group showed a trend towards significance (M = .83, S.E.M. = .03, 
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p = .06).  The Type of Stimulation × Trial Type interaction was significant, 
F(1.02, 44.96) = 6.37; p = 0.003; η2p = .23.  Post-hoc analysis showed that 
while all stimulation groups performed similarly on control trials (C1: anodal= 
M = .98, S.E.M. = .02, cathodal= M = .96, S.E.M. = .02, sham= M = .96, S.E.M. 
= .02; C2: anodal= M = .94, S.E.M. = .02, cathodal= M = .92, S.E.M. = .02, 
sham= M = .94, S.E.M. = .02), on experimental trials the anodal group (M = .86, 
S.E.M. = .03) performed significantly better than both the cathodal (M = .60, 
S.E.M. = .083, p =.031) and the sham (M = .54, S.E.M. = .09, p= .006) groups.  
Thus, anodal stimulation enhanced performance by making participants better 
at separating their own perspective from that of the Director’s when the two 
perspectives were in conflict.  
 
Figure 4.2. Mean percentage of correct responses on the perspective-taking task 
task for each stimulation group. The error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. ** (p <.01); * (p <.05) 
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RT. A significant main effect of Trial Type was found, F(1.75, 77.14) 
=80.87, p < 0.001, η2p = .65.  Overall, participants responded faster to the C1 
(M = 2.62s, S.E.M. = 48.53) trials than to the experimental (M = 3.03s, S.E.M. = 
74.64, p < .001) or the C2 trials (M = 2.96s, S.E.M. = 65.58, p < .001).  Neither 
the main effect of Type of Stimulation nor the Type of Stimulation × Trial Type 
interaction were significant, (all ps > .40).  
Self-referential task 
In this task, accuracy does not form part of the analysis because of the 
subjective nature of judgment ratings.  
Figure 4.3 shows the RT data for the self-referential task.  An ANOVA 
was performed with Type of Stimulation as a between-subject factor and Target 
(self vs. other) and Trial Type (mental vs. physical) as the within-subjects factors. 
There was a main effect of Target, F(1,46) = 16.33; p < 0.001; η2p= .26.  
Overall, responses were faster for ‘self’ (M = 3.31 s, S.E.M. = .16) than for 
‘other’ trials (M = 3.56 s, S.E.M. = .17; p < .001), replicating previous findings 
with Western participants on similar versions of this task (Lombardo et al., 
2010b; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006).  The main effect of Type of 
Stimulation was also significant F (2,46)= 6.17, p = .004, η2p= .21).  Pairwise 
comparison showed that the anodal group (M = 2.72 s, S.E.M. = .28) was faster 
than the cathodal group (M = 4.13 s, S.E.M. = .28; p = .003) on self- and other-
judgments regardless of Trial Type (mental vs. physical).  No other main effects 
or interactions were significant (all ps> .24).  In order to ensure that the 
significant main effect of Type of Stimulation did not represent an effect of 
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stimulation on self-other control between trials, trials were subdivided into 
‘switch’ trials (where a ‘self’ trial is preceded by an ‘other’ trial or vice versa) 
and ‘no-switch’ trials (where the target of the judgement is the same on trial n 
and n-1).  If there was an effect of stimulation on self-other switching between 
trials on this task, one would expect this effect to be greater on switch trials than 
on no-switch trials, resulting in a Type of Stimulation × Trial Type (switch / no-
switch) interaction.  However, this interaction was not significant (p = .33).  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean RTs on each trial type of the Self-Referential task for each 
stimulation group.  
 
Surprise memory test 
The RT and accuracy data were analysed using ANOVAs with Type of 
Stimulation as a between subject factor and Target (self vs. other) and Trial Type 
(mental vs. physical) as within subject factors.  Accuracy was assessed using 
Signal Detection Theory (d’ values) (Green & Swets, 1966).   
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RT.  There was a main effect of Target, F (1,44) =5.47, p < 0.024, η2p= 
.11; overall, responses were faster for self (M = 2.5 s, S.E.M. = .09 s) than for 
other trials (M = 2.7 s, S.E.M. = .11 s).  The main effect of Type of Stimulation 
showed a trend towards significance (p = .086).  Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that this trend was driven by overall RT differences between the anodal (M = 2.4 
s, S.E.M. = .1 s) and the cathodal groups (M = 2.9 s, S.E.M. = .1 s), however, this 
comparison did not reach significance, p = .10.  No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, (all ps > .20).   
Accuracy.  Again, a main effect of Target was found F (1,44) =24.19, p < 
.001, η2p= .36.  Across all groups, participants were better able to remember 
items that were self-related (M = .81, S.E.M. = .23) than other-related (M = .74, 
S.E.M. = .25), confirming the self-reference effect found in memory research 
(e.g., Symons & Johnson, 1997).  No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all ps > .42).  
In line with the first prediction, the results from Experiment 3 that anodal 
stimulation enhances performance in both the control of imitation and 
perspective-taking suggest that within the social cognitive domain, the area of 
the right TPJ stimulated in this study is recruited in situations where online 
control of co-activated self and other representations – whether inhibiting ‘self’ 
and enhancing ‘other’ or vice versa –, is crucial for successful social interaction.  
In the self-referential task, faster responses of the anodal (compared to the 
cathodal) group on all trial types suggest that anodal stimulation of right TPJ 
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improved participants' ability to make judgements about both the self and the 
other.  This result therefore provides further support for the commonly reported 
role of TPJ in representing the self and the other.  However, the absence of an 
interaction between Type of Stimulation × Trial Type in both the self-referential 
task and the memory test suggests that stimulation of the right TPJ did not have 
an effect on distinguishing between mental and physical attributions.  This 
contradicts previous findings from fMRI studies that attribute a selective role to 
the right TPJ for distinguishing between mental and physical judgements (e.g., 
Lombardo et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). However, several fMRI studies 
have found that processing of trait judgements, for both self and others, are 
found selectively in the MPFC, (e.g., Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Spengler 
et al., 2009, see also Van Overwalle, 2009) for a meta-analytical review). 
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4.2  Experiment 4 – Self-Other Representations and (bilateral) TPJ 
 
Despite abundant evidence of TPJ involvement in socio-cognitive 
abilities, the extant literature is far from consistent when it comes to any 
lateralization of function (See Table 4.1).  For example, several neuroimaging 
studies report bilateral TPJ activation during attribution of mental states such as 
intentions or beliefs (Gallagher et al., 2000; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010; Perner, 
Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Völlm et al., 2006), while 
others (and occasionally the same studies) report greater, or exclusive, 
involvement of right TPJ (false belief: Aichhorn et al., 2009; Perner et al., 2006; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005), moral judgements (Young & 
Saxe, 2009; Young et al., 2010; Young et al., 2007), experience of agency 
(David et al., 2006), imitation inhibition (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 
2009), or left TPJ activation (theory of mind (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 
2002a); visual perspective taking (David et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001; 
Vogeley et al., 2004; Zacks, Vettel, & Michelon, 2003) – see also meta analysis 
by (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013).  Furthermore, while some 
researchers claim a predominant role for right TPJ in social interactions, 
specifically when understanding other people’s minds (e.g., Decety & Lamm, 
2007; Saxe 2010), evidence from brain lesion studies show that left TPJ is also 
necessary (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson et al., 
2004) for mental state attribution.  Similarly, neuroimaging evidence from 
studies of visual perspective-taking tasks report activation of left, but not right, 
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TPJ (Aichhorn et al., 2006; David et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley et 
al., 2004).  
The results from Experiment 3 are consistent with neuroimaging studies 
claiming that within the socio-cognitive domain, the right TPJ is involved in self-
other representations (e.g., Brass et al., 2009; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Spengler 
et al., 2009; Van Overwalle 2009).  Furthermore, these findings suggest that 
right TPJ recruitment is necessary for the online control of these representations 
when they are co-activated on a trial-by-trial basis.  Experiment 4 aimed to 
replicate and extend these findings by investigating whether this TPJ function is 
lateralized to the right hemisphere or whether it can be found bilaterally.  
Participants received anodal stimulation of either right TPJ, left TPJ, or the 
occipital cortex (control site) prior to performing three tasks measuring the three 
socio-cognitive processes under investigation.  Notably, the absence of a 
stimulation effect in the mental vs. physical judgements of the theory of mind 
task in Experiment 3 is intriguing because it contrasts with evidence from a 
substantial number of neuroimaging studies reporting TPJ recruitment during 
mental state attribution.  In this experiment, the self-referential task was 
replaced by the MASC (described in Chapter 2 – Experiment 2) as an alternative 
theory of mind measure.  The suitability of the MASC was assessed on the basis 
that it adopts traditional mentalising concepts such as false belief, irony, faux 
pas and metaphors.  Some of these concepts are also present in theory of mind 
stories, which have been found to activate TPJ.  Furthermore, a previous study 
using this task (Wolf, Dziobek, & Heekeren, 2010) reported left TPJ activation 
when contrasting scenes requiring mental inferences vs. physical inferences.  
The findings from this experiment are discussed in relation to the apparent 
disjointed evidence from neuroimaging studies.  
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Table 4.1. Example of contrasting evidence of lateralization of TPJ function in socio-cognitive abilities.!




 ! (Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012) 
– anodal tDCS of rTPJ enhanced performance 
in VPT (requiring 3PP) compared to cathodal 
and sham stimulation  
! (Aichhorn et al., 2006) – 3PP vs. 
1PP, spatial relation between objects 
(e.g., in front, behind) vs. 
comparison of object properties (e.g., 
small, tall, light). camera vs. 
comparison of scenes 
 ! (David et al., 2006) – Both first (1PP) 
and third (3PP) person perspective 
taking  (1PP vs. 3PP; 3PP vs. 1PP), 
inanimate object (camera) 
perspective vs. comparison of 2 
scenes 
 ! (Ruby & Decety, 2001) – 1PP vs. 3PP 
 ! (Vogeley et al., 2004) – only 1PP  
 ! (Zacks et al., 2003) – 1PP 
Imitation 
inhibition 
! (Spengler et al., 2010) – TPJ 
lesion patients (rTPJ N= 6, lTPJ 
N= 6, bTPJ N=1): correlation 
between VPT and imit-Inhib 
 
! (Brass et al., 2005) – incongruent vs. 
congruent trials 
 ! (Spengler et al., 2009) – overlapping activation 
in rTPJ for ToM and imit-Inhib  
 ! (Santiesteban et al., 2012) – anodal tDCS of 
rTPJ reduced automatic imitation compared to 
cathodal and sham stimulation 
 ! (Sowden & Catmur, 2013) – rTMS impaired 
control of imitation 
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Table 4.1. (Cont.) 
 
 bTPJ rTPJ lTPJ 
Experience of 
Agency 
! (Farrer & Frith, 2002) – action 
generated by other vs. self 
! (David et al., 2006) – passive 
observation of another’s action vs. 
self-generated action  
 
Theory of Mind 
(ToM) 
   





! (Gallagher et al., 2000) – ToM vs. 
non-ToM* stories and cartoons, non-
ToM stories and cartoons vs. 
jumbled sentences or cartoons 
 ! (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010) – Mental 
inferences of beliefs and preference 
both ambiguous and unambiguous 
vs. non-social inference 
 ! (Perner et al., 2006) – FB vs. 
photographs, FB vs. temporal change 
control (TCC) stories  
 ! (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) – FB vs. 
mechanical inference, human action 
vs. non-human action 
 ! (Saxe 2006) – FB vs. Photographs, 
but more activation in rTPJ than lTPJ 
during ToM 
 ! (Völlm et al., 2006) – mental 
attribution vs. physical inference 
cartoons 
! (Aichhorn et al., 2009) – FB vs. true 
beliefs (TB), FB vs. false signs (FS) 
 ! (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010) – 
Ambiguous vs. unambiguous 
inferences of belief and preference 
 ! (Saxe & Wexler, 2005) – norm-
violating mental state of a character 
from familiar vs. unfamiliar 
background, normal (congruent) 
mental state of a character from 
unfamiliar vs. familiar background 
 ! (Perner et al., 2006) – FB vs. 
photographs, FB vs. FS, FB vs. TCC  
 ! (Ruby & Decety, 2004) – other vs. 
self perspective (both emotional and 
neutral content) 
! (Aichhorn et al., 2009) – FB vs. TB, 
FB vs. Photographs, FB = FS 
 ! (Apperly et al., 2004); (Samson et 
al., 2004) – patients with damage to 
lTPJ – impaired in belief reasoning 
 ! (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 
2002b) – Stories  depicting both 
intentional and unintentional 
violation of social norms 
 ! (Fletcher et al., 1995) – 
Comprehension of both mental 
attribution and physical stories  
 ! (Perner et al., 2006) – FB = FS, FS 
vs. Photographs 
 ! (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) – Verbal 
description of theory of mind stories 
vs. to photographs 
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Table 4.1. (Cont.) 
 




 ! (Young et al., 2007) – neutral 
outcome of moral judgments: 
negative belief vs. neutral belief 
 ! (Young & Saxe, 2009) – Exp 1: 
moral vs. non-moral facts; negative 
vs. non-moral, neutral vs. non-
moral, neutral =negative outcome. 
Exp 2:  belief: neutral = negative, 
facts: moral vs. non-moral, 
outcome: neutral vs. negative  
 ! (Young et al., 2010) – TMS of rTPJ 
lead to judgment of attempted 
harm (negative belief, neutral 
outcome) as more permissible than 
TMS of control site  
 
! (Young et al., 2007) – neutral 
outcome of moral judgments: 
negative belief vs. neutral belief, 
negative outcome: negative vs. 
neutral 
! (Young & Saxe, 2009) – Exp 1: no 
lTPJ activation found. Exp 2: 




bilateral (bTPJ), right (rTPJ), left (lTPJ), VPT = Visual Perspective Taking, 1PP = 1st person perspective taking, 3PP = 3rd person perspective taking, FB= false belief, TB = true beliefs, 
FS = false signs, TMS = transcranial magnetic stimulation, rTMS = repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
- 
* In Gallagher et al 2000, a story was considered ToM if mental states inferences such as false belief or ignorance were required for its interpretation, whereas the non-ToM  
condition did not require such inferences to understand the meaning 
!
!




Forty-five right-handed adults (25 males, age range 18-39 years, M = 
23.4, SD = 4.5) were recruited to take part in this study.  They were all 
university students and as a token for their participation they received a small 
monetary reward.  Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to the 
right TPJ (N =15), left TPJ (N = 15), or the occipital cortex, Oz (N = 15) 
stimulation condition.  The groups were age- (F(2,44) = .10, p = .91) and 
gender- (χ2 (2, N = 45) = .72, p = .70) matched.  All participants were healthy 
volunteers, without any known developmental or neurological disorders and no 
contra-indications to tDCS. They were all naïve with respect to the aims of the 
study and remained unaware of what type of stimulation they received until the 
end of the experiment.  
Procedure 
The same protocol described in Experiment 3 was followed for this 
experiment.  All participants received anodal stimulation.  For the TPJ 
stimulation, the anodal electrode was placed over CP6 (right TPJ) or CP5 (left 
TPJ), according to the EEG 10/20 system.  Oz was chosen as the control site as 
no previous evidence links this occipital area with measures of social cognition.  
The reference electrode was placed over the vertex, individually measured on 
each participant.  To keep the design consistent with Experiment 3, the 
stimulation was delivered offline, at 1mA, for 20 minutes.   
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Following the stimulation, participants completed the three socio-
cognitive tasks previously described (the control of imitation, visual perspective 
taking and theory of mind – MASC) in a randomised order, counterbalanced 
across participants.  The testing session lasted approximately one hour. 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Control of imitation task 
The data from one participant in the Oz group showed extreme scores 
identified by the 1.5 x IQR rule and were removed from the analysis.  The 
remainder of the RT and accuracy data (rTPJ: N=15; lTPJ: N=15; Oz: N=14) 
were analysed using ANOVA with Stimulation Site as the between-subjects 
factor and Trial Type (congruent vs. incongruent) as the within-subject factor.   
RT analysis.  Figures 4.4 show the RT data for the control of imitation 
task.  The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Trial Type, F(1,41) = 
97.91, p < .001, η2p= .71; indicating that responses on congruent trials (M = 
444 ms; S.E.M. = 7.4ms) were executed faster than those on incongruent trials 
(M = 479 ms; S.E.M. = 7.8ms).  The main effect of Stimulation Site failed to 
reach significance, p = .098.  However, the Stimulation Site × Trial Type 
interaction was significant, F(2,41) = 5.68, p = .007, η2p= .22; simple effects 
analysis showed that RT of incongruent trials were significantly faster after 
stimulation of both rTPJ and lTPJ compared to Oz (Oz vs. rTPJ, p = .011; Oz vs. 
lTPJ p = .044); F(2,41) = 3.86, p = .029; η2p= .16) – See Figure 4.4A.  
Furthermore a one-way ANOVA on the size of imitation effect (RT incongruent 
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trials – RT congruent trials) showed a significant effect of Stimulation Site, 
F(2,41) = 5.68, p = .007, confirming the improvement in performance by both 
rTPJ and lTPJ compared to Oz (Oz vs. rTPJ, p = .044; Oz vs. lTPJ p = .008) – 
see Figure 4.4B. 
Error analysis. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(1,44) = 
23.0, p < .001, η2p= .36; with participants making more errors in the 
incongruent (M = 6.7%, S.E.M. = .8%) than in the congruent (M = 2.3%, S.E.M. 
= .4%) trials.  The main effect of Stimulation Site showed a trend towards 
significance p=.075, which was driven by the lTPJ (M = 3.4%, S.E.M. = .7%) vs 
Oz contrast (M = 5.6%, S.E.M. = .7%, p =.071).  The Stimulation Site × Trial 
Type interaction was not significant, (p =.43), indicating that site of stimulation 
did not affect accuracy of either congruent or incongruent trials.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Performance on the control of imitation task. Panel A shows Mean 
RTs for congruent and incongruent trials while Panel B shows the Mean 
imitation effect for each Stimulation Site. Error bars represent S.E.M. ** (p <.01); 
* (p <.05) 
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Perspective-taking task 
Due to faulty equipment, the data from one participant in the Oz group 
were not recorded.  The remainder of the accuracy and RT data were analysed 
using ANOVA with Stimulation Site as a between-subject factor and Trial Type 
(Experimental vs. C1 vs. C2) as the within-subjects factor.  Since no differences 
in accuracy were found between the control trials, the data from C1 and C2 
were collapsed for comparison with experimental trials.  
Accuracy.  Figure 4.5 shows accuracy of experimental trials in the 
Director task. The analysis revealed a main effect of Trial Type, F(1,41) = 15.85, 
p < 0.001, η2p = .28.  Overall, performance was better on control trials: (M = 
96%, S.E.M = 1%) than on experimental trials (M = 82%, S.E.M. = 3%).  The 
main effect of Stimulation Site was also significant F(2,41) = 8.12, p= .001, η2p = 
.28.  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that rTPJ stimulation resulted in 
improved performance compared to Oz stimulation (p = .001), while the lTPJ 
vs. Oz contrast approached significance, (p = .058).  The Stimulation Site × Trial 
Type interaction was significant, F(1,41) = 7.37; p = .002; η2p = .26.  Post-hoc 
analysis showed that while no effects of Stimulation Site were found on control 
trials (ps > .05), on experimental trials, there was an improvement following 
both rTPJ and lTPJ stimulation which was not seen after Oz stimulation (rTPJ vs. 
Oz, p < .001; lTPJ vs. Oz, p = .004); thus, participants were better able to adopt 
the Director’s perspective following stimulation of either right or left TPJ.  
RT. A significant main effect of trial type was found, F(2, 82) = 54.10,  
p < .001, η2p = .57.  Overall, participants responded faster to the C1 (M = 2.4 s, 
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S.E.M. = .031 s) trials than to the experimental (M = 2.75 s, S.E.M. = .055 s, p < 
.001) or the C2 trials (M = 2.70 s, S.E.M. =.057 s p <.001).  Neither the main 
effect of Stimulation Site (p =.10) nor the Stimulation Site × Trial Type 




Figure 4.5. Accuracy performance on the experimental trials of the Director task 
by each stimulation condition. Error bars represent S.E.M. ** (p<.01); * (p<.05) 
 
Theory of mind task (MASC) 
Two separate analyses were performed on the MASC data. The first 
analysis included the accuracy rate for theory of mind and control questions 
and the second sought to investigate if there were group differences in the type 
of errors participants made.  The first analysis revealed that overall, participants’ 
accuracy was higher for control questions (M = 89.2%, S.E.M. = 1.4%) than for 
questions requiring mental state attribution (M = 78.8%, S.E.M. = 1.1%), F(1,42) 
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= 51.69; p < .001; η2p= .55.  The main effect of Stimulation Site showed a trend 
towards significance (p = .10). Pairwise comparisons revealed this was driven 
by the overall difference in performance between the Oz group (M = 87%, 
S.E.M. = 1.7%) and the rTPJ group (M = 82%, S.E.M. = 1.7%; p =  .12).  The 
Stimulation Site × Question Type interaction was not significant (p = .43).  
The analysis of error data revealed a significant main effect of Error Type, 
F(2,84) = 25.94; p < .001; η2p= .34; pairwise comparisons showed that overall, 
participants made fewer errors reflecting a lack of theory of mind ability (M = 
1.69, S.E.M. = .21) than errors reflecting either insufficient theory of mind (M = 
3.38, S.E.M. = .29; p < .001) or excessive theory of mind (M = 4.44, S.E.M. = 
.36; p < .001).  No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > 
.27).  Thus, contrary to findings from fMRI studies of theory of mind suggesting 
TPJ involvement in the attribution of mental states to others, neither stimulation 
of rTPJ, nor of lTPJ, resulted in improved performance on this mentalising task.  
 
Is TPJ involvement in self-other representations limited to the right 
hemisphere?  
In the midst of seeming contrasting findings regarding lateralisation of 
function in the TPJ, this study sought to investigate whether involvement of this 
brain region in social cognition is limited to the right hemisphere or not.  This is 
the first study attempting to investigate a causal role of bilateral TPJ across 
different socio-cognitive abilities.  The data from Experiment 4 replicated the 
findings of right TPJ involvement in the control of imitation and visual 
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perspective taking following anodal stimulation in Experiment 3 (Santiesteban et 
al., 2012a); Hogeveen et al, under review), however, they extend such findings 
by showing that left TPJ is also recruited during performance of these two socio-
cognitive tasks.  These results are also consistent with neuropsychological 
evidence showing that performance in imitation inhibition is correlated with 
visual perspective taking in patients with lesions to either right, left or bilateral 
TPJ (Spengler et al., 2010).  However, the finding of bilateral TPJ involvement 
across these tasks is not entirely consistent with the limited evidence available 
from neuroimaging studies of imitation inhibition and visual perspective taking.  
For example, as mentioned in the introduction (see also Table 4.1; (Schurz et 
al., 2013)), fMRI studies of visual perspective taking have generally reported left 
but not right TPJ activation, whereas imitation inhibition studies have reported 
activation of right but not left TPJ.  Several factors could account for the 
seemingly contrasting findings between these fMRI studies and the results from 
Experiment 4, ranging from differences in methodologies employed, 
experimental design and choice of dependent variables included in the 
statistical analysis.   
The data obtained from fMRI studies is based on changes in the Blood 
Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) signal.  Only brain regions showing the 
strongest BOLD signals and surviving, more often than not, a conservative 
statistical threshold are reported as showing significant activity during 
performance of a given task, whereas areas that may be active at a lower 
threshold are not reported and yet, such activations could represent true effects, 
resulting in a Type II error.  Consistent with this view, Lieberman & 
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Cunningham, (2009) argue that the extreme focus on avoiding Type I errors 
(reporting false positives) in fMRI research leads to increasing Type II errors 
(missing true effects).  In the context of the present study, if both right and left 
TPJ are activated during performance of a specific task, but the activation is 
stronger in the right and survives the conservative statistical threshold, then 
activation in the left TPJ might not be considered of interest and therefore is not 
reported and vice versa.  This could explain the reported fMRI findings of both 
visual perspective taking and imitation inhibition studies.  Arguably, weaker 
activation of one hemisphere over the other would suggest lesser involvement in 
the specific cognitive process under investigation.  However, unless meta-
analysis data were available for the smaller/ unreported effects, a conclusion of 
lesser involvement of the hemisphere showing weaker activation is debatable.  
At single study level, the sensitivity of random effects analysis (inter-subject 
variability effects of regional activity) performed within a small number of 
subjects (as sample size is a constraint in fMRI studies) is low (Thirion et al., 
2007; Wei et al., 2004).  Therefore, fMRI researchers tend not to report effects 
that do not meet the statistical criteria.  Indeed, Lieberman and Cunningham 
(2009) argue that if individual studies reported smaller effects (at more lenient 
thresholds), when included in a meta-analysis, the sum of these effects across 
studies would emerge as true effects, whereas false positives (Type I errors) will 
self-erase as they will not be replicated.  Yet, since smaller effects are not 
reported, they can never be considered for future replications.   
Thirion et al., (2007) demonstrate this paradox with a sample of 78 
participants.  They observed that the analysis of 6 different groups of 13 subjects 
 Chapter 4 
 124 
would lead to different reports of activated regions under the same experimental 
conditions at a standard threshold (p < .001 uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons), whereas including the pooled data from the 78 subjects, would 
dramatically increase the reliability and sensitivity of the analysis (Thirion et 
al.,2007) – see Figure 4.6.  Considering the small number of fMRI studies for 
both the control of imitation and visual perspective taking, a combination of 
future replication of fMRI experiments, including publication of smaller effects, 
and data from brain stimulation studies such as those presented here, would 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge about lateralization of TPJ 
function.   
 
Figure 4.6.  Illustration of activity maps from Thirion et al., (2007).  a) Shows 
different activation patterns in 6 separate groups of 13 subjects each, while b) 
shows the increased sensitivity and reliability with the combined data from all 
78 subjects. Reproduced with permission from Elsevier, © 2007. 
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Another potential explanation for the discrepancy between the tDCS 
findings presented here and previous fMRI studies of visual perspective taking 
could lie in the choice of contrasts for the statistical analysis.  Usually, the key 
experimental question in fMRI studies of visual perspective taking is to identify 
brain areas that are more active when participants adopt either a first person 
perspective (1PP; 1PP vs. 3PP) or a third person perspective (3PP; 3PP vs. 1PP), 
e.g., David et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2004).  Therefore, overlapping activity 
during both 1PP + 3PP would not be reported.  It is possible that such 
overlapping unreported activation lies within right TPJ and only left TPJ 
activation survives statistical analysis of the contrasts mentioned above.  
Conversely, the present tDCS data show that stimulating both right and left TPJ 
results in enhanced control of co-activated representations of self (1PP) and 
other (3PP).  In the context of fMRI, these co-activated representations of self 
and other would most likely be found in the unreported, overlapping 1PP + 3PP 
activation. 
The TPJ is part of a network of brain regions, also including the medial 
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, superior temporal 
sulcus, and temporal poles (e.g., Adolphs 2003b, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2003; Mar 
2011) that consistently activate when participants perform tasks requiring the 
attribution of mental states, either to the self or others.  In the present study, 
however, no evidence was found of TPJ involvement, in either hemisphere, 
during mental state attribution.  This finding is consistent with those from 
Experiment 3 (Santiesteban et al., 2012a) and with the behavioural training-
paradigm employed in Experiment 1 (Santiesteban et al., 2012b) and the mirror-
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touch synaesthesia study (Experiment 2)1.  In response to a concern about the 
sensitivity of the theory of mind task used in each of the previous studies, 
Experiment 4 employed a task, designed to approximate real-life social 
interactions (MASC, also used in Experiment 2) and which has shown TPJ 
activation in a previous fMRI study (Wolf et al., 2010).  Yet, no differential 
stimulation effect was found on this task.  Unlike the imitation inhibition and 
visual perspective taking tasks, accurate performance on the theory of mind task 
(MASC) does not require online control of self-other representations.  The MASC 
requires participants to make mental state attributions to the characters in the 
film. To understand the plot, participants must separate the facts presented to 
them (e.g., the character’s utterances) from the relevant mental states they 
attribute to the character (e.g., based on the character’s facial expressions).  This 
self vs. other distinction process takes place online.  However, when 
subsequently presented with a question about the character’s mental state (i.e. 
offline), participants can answer correctly by getting into the mindset of the 
character, without needing to represent simultaneously their own mental states 
and those of the character in the film.  The online processing required in both 
the perspective-taking and the imitation-inhibition tasks contrasts with the 
offline measure used in the theory of mind task, and this difference could 
explain our failure to find a stimulation effect (of right and /or left TPJ) in the 
MASC.   
                                                
1 The two behaviour examples (Experiments 1 and 2) refer to the lack of differential 
effects on the theory of mind measure compared to the control of imitation and visual 
perspective taking tasks. 
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As mentioned earlier, (Wolf et al., 2010) did find activation of left TPJ.  
One potential explanation of this discrepancy is that fMRI data are more 
sensitive than behavioural assessment on this task.  However, it is worth noting 
that although overall performance on the mental inference questions was good 
across all three groups (right TPJ: M = 78%, S.E.M. = 6.2%; left TPJ: M = 77%, 
S.E.M. = 8.9%; Oz: M = 81%, S.E.M. = 6.4%), the room for improvement on 
these scores do not suggest that a ceiling effect prevented an effect of 
stimulation from being observed.  The MASC also has the advantage, compared 
to other theory of mind measures, of differentiating between the types of errors 
participants make, ranging from total theory of mind failure to excessive 
mentalising.  Yet, no differences in performance between stimulation groups 
were found on the error measures either.  A second potential explanation for the 
absence of a stimulation effect on this task could lie in the lack of spatial 
specificity of tDCS (Faria, Hallett, & Miranda, 2011; Nitsche et al., 2007; 
Sparing & Mottaghy, 2008), particularly when using large electrodes like the 
ones used in these experiments, thus preventing the distinction of functional 
subdivisions in the TPJ.  Therefore, it is possible that the areas of the TPJ 
stimulated in Experiment 4 are distinct from those reported in the study by Wolf 
and colleagues.  However, it could be argued that the large size electrodes used 
in this study are likely to increase the current spread across a relative large area 
of the TPJ, making it less likely that the TPJ region activated in the Wolf et al., 
study was not affected by anodal stimulation.  Nevertheless, it will be interesting 
to examine this potential explanation further, perhaps by employing a paradigm 
combining both fMRI and tDCS or by using fMRI-guided neuronavigation prior 
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to tDCS, thus ensuring precise positioning of the electrodes in the same region 
of TPJ.  Until such evidence emerges, any interpretations concerning differential 
regions within TPJ as a potential alternative explanation to our results remain 
speculative.    
 
 
4.3  General Discussion 
Experiments 3 and 4 describe the first tDCS studies to date investigating 
the role of TPJ in social cognition.  The experimental question they set out to 
address concerns the involvement of the TPJ in mechanisms of self-other 
representation within three socio-cognitive domains: the control of imitation, 
visual perspective taking and theory of mind.  Experiment 3 sought to find 
evidence of a general role of right TPJ in self-other representations across these 
social abilities, and/or a more selective role in the control of self-other 
representations when they are co-activated.  The findings show that anodal (but 
not cathodal or sham) stimulation of right TPJ significantly improves 
performance in the control of imitation and visual perspective taking domains, 
thereby providing support for the selective role of right TPJ during online control 
of self-other representations.  Interestingly, the observed effects did not 
differentiate between self vs. other representations.  That is, the effects were 
present regardless of whether such online control required enhancement of ‘self‘ 
and inhibition of ‘other’ representations (as required in the control of imitation 
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task) or enhancement of ‘other’ and inhibition of ‘self’ (as required in the visual 
perspective taking task).  However, contrary to previous fMRI studies of theory 
of mind, the data from Experiment 3 do not suggest a selective role of right TPJ 
in the attribution of mental states, since no significant differences were found 
between mental vs. physical judgments in the theory of mind measure.  Instead, 
a significant improvement was observed on RT measures for both self and other 
judgements following anodal stimulation, a finding that is consistent with the 
general role of right TPJ in self-other representations.   However, because this is 
the first study investigating the effects of tDCS of TPJ in these socio-cognitive 
abilities, the present findings would benefit from future replications and perhaps 
the employment of different measures.  
Replication of these findings was one of the aims of Experiment 4, which 
also investigated whether the effects observed in Experiment 3 were specific to 
the right hemisphere or whether they could be found bilaterally. 
The results from Experiment 4 replicated and extended those of 
Experiment 3 by showing that anodal stimulation of both right and left TPJ 
(compared to a control site) led to enhanced performance in the same measures 
of the control of imitation and visual perspective taking used in Experiment 3.  
Also in line with the data from Experiment 3, no stimulation effects were found 
in the theory of mind measure used in Experiment 4.  The findings of bilateral 
TPJ involvement in the control of imitation and visual perspective taking, and 
the lack of stimulation effect on the theory of mind measure are not consistent 
with the extant evidence from fMRI studies of these socio-cognitive abilities.  
However, the limitations of fMRI methodology and choice of contrast included 
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in the statistical analysis could go some way towards explaining these 
contradictory findings.  Taken together, the results from both experiments show 
the potential contribution of brain stimulation methods to the field of social 
cognition.  Although no currently available methodology for social cognitive 
neuroscience research is perfect, perhaps future research could benefit from a 
combination of neuroimaging and brain stimulation methods in an attempt to 
ease current imperfections. 
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Chapter 5: The Role of Culture in Self-Other Processes 
 
The experiments described in Chapters 2 and 4 show that self-other 
representations can be modulated by the specific demands of the social 
situation and that both behavioural training to control self-other representations 
and stimulation of the TPJ can enhance this modulation.  The experiments 
described in this Chapter seek to investigate if culture also plays a modulatory 
role in socio-cognitive processes relying on the control of self-other 
representations.  Specifically, Experiment 5 explores the relationship between 
migrant’s cultural attitudes and imitation, while Experiment 6 seeks to investigate 
the relationship between self-construal styles and the three socio-cognitive 
abilities under investigation (the control of imitation, perspective taking and 
theory of mind).  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Migrating to a different country has an impact on various aspects of the 
self, requiring important redefinitions and reconstruction of both personal and 
social identities.  The redefinition of these identities occurs in the context of, 
often, conflicting choices between membership in the host culture and 
attachment to values of the heritage culture (Padilla & Perez, 2003).  According 
to Barry’s model of migrant’s acculturation (Berry 2005), integration is achieved 
when individuals value both maintenance of the heritage culture and identity 
but also seek contact with, and take part in, the larger society within the host 
culture.  Assimilation refers to a preference for the host culture at the expense of 
the heritage culture.  Separation is associated with a preference for the heritage 
compared to the host culture.  Finally, marginalization occurs in the presence of 
little or no interest in either the heritage or the host culture.  This bidimensional 
model of acculturation, comprising attitudes towards both the heritage and host 
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cultures, provides a rich environment in which to study self-other processes.  
However, to date, there is a lack of empirical research combining this area of 
social psychology with social cognition.  The present study explores the 
relationship between migrant’s cultural attitudes and their imitative behaviour. 
5.1.1 The Social Function of Automatic Imitation 
The automatic imitation of gestures and behaviour of our interaction 
partners, also known as mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), is considered to 
have played a fundamental role in evolution, allowing humans to communicate 
and maintain harmonious relationships with members of their own groups 
(Lakin et al., 2003).  According to Lakin et al. (2003) such an important role in 
evolution has now evolved to facilitate positive social interactions.  Evidence 
for this claim has been found in studies showing that automatic imitation 
promotes rapport, affiliation and group harmony.  For example, people who 
engage in imitative behaviour are rated as more likeable by their interaction 
partners than those who do not imitate (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).  Similarly, 
when people are imitated they feel closer to their interaction partner and rate 
the interaction as smoother than when no imitation occurs (Stel & Vonk, 2010).  
It has also been found that the extent of language mimicry, both during face-to-
face and text-based computer-mediated communication, predicts group 
cohesiveness (Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2010).  However, individuals 
are not always motivated to affiliate and create positive rapport with every 
person with whom they may interact.  
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Motivational and situational factors play a role in modulating the extent 
to which people display imitative behaviour.  For example, individuals are 
more likely to engage in mimicry with in-group members if they share a 
common goal and cooperation is required, but not when they are competing 
against each other (LaFrance, 1985).  Similarly, in situations where building 
rapport is perceived as advantageous, individuals with a high degree of self-
monitoring, who are motivated and able to control their public appearance 
(Cheng & Chartrand, 2003), and those who wish to be liked, such as narcissists 
(Ashton-James & Levordashka, 2013), are more likely to imitate their interaction 
partner, particularly if their interaction partner is judged to have a superior 
social status to them (see also Carr et al. (2013).  Research also shows that 
individuals who are particularly motivated to be accepted by their peers, for 
example, those who are socially excluded from their group, engage in more 
imitation than those who are included in the group (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005; 
Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008).  The primary aim of Experiment 5 is to 
investigate if automatic imitation can also be modulated by a different 
motivational / situational factor such as migrants’ cultural attitudes towards 
either the host or the native culture.  
5.1.2 Self Construal Styles and Imitative Behaviour 
A second line of research from cultural psychology, relevant to self-other 
processes, relates to how individuals see themselves in relation to others – also 
known as self-construal styles (SCS).  Those with ‘independent’ self-construals 
have a sense of the self as autonomous beings, separate from interpersonal 
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context.  They tend to value uniqueness, self-promotion and assertiveness.  A 
contrasting view of the self is present in Individuals with ‘interdependent’ self-
construals, who tend to value cooperation and group cohesiveness.  They have 
a sense of self as intertwined with the other, particularly close others, to such 
extent that meeting another’s goals and desires are a requirement to achieving 
the self’s goals and desires (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
The study of automatic imitation has been extended to the context of 
cultural differences in SCS.  Previous studies have shown that people with an 
interdependent SCS engage in more imitative behaviour than those with a 
dependent SCS (van Baaren et al., 2003).  The relationship between imitation 
and SCS seems to be bidirectional.  In a set of experiments, (Ashton-James, van 
Baaren, Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007) found that being imitated 
activates an interdependent SCS, and in turn, this effect mediates prosocial 
behaviour.  The role of SCS on imitation is also explored in Experiment 5.  
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5.2 Experiment 5: Imitation Effects and Acculturation Strategies of 
Polish Migrants in the UK 
This study seeks to extend previous findings of motivational and 
situational factors modulating automatic imitative behaviour by exploring the 
effects of acculturation attitudes of Polish migrants in the UK on imitation.  This 
migrant group was chosen because since 2004, when Poland joined the 
European Union, it has become one of the largest migrant groups in the UK.  
This is confirmed by the latest UK Census (2011), which revealed that Polish is 
the second most spoken language in England and third (after Welsh) in the UK.  
The four acculturation attitudes of the Polish migrants that took part in this 
study were identified based on their answers to a cultural preference 
questionnaire.  Imitative behaviour towards the native vs. the host culture was 
measured using an adapted version of the control of imitation task described in 
Experiment 1 (see Method).  This is the first study to explore the relationship 
between acculturation strategies and automatic imitative behaviour of 
immigrants towards a member of their native vs. the host culture.  Based on the 
existing evidence from cultural psychology studies of imitation, it is expected 
that differences in acculturation strategies would modulate automatic imitation.  
Particularly, the chosen experimental design allows for the following 
predictions: a) Polish migrants reporting stronger preference for the British 
culture (assimilation strategy) would imitate a British more than a Polish 
individual, b) the opposite pattern is expected from those who report higher 
preference for the Polish culture (separation strategy) – more imitative 
behaviour towards a Polish individual, c) no differences in the imitation effect 
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The Polish group consisted of 40 healthy adults (26 females) living in the 
London area, aged between 19 and 54 years (M = 31.6, SD = 6.0).  The length 
of residence in the UK ranged between 6 months and 32 years (M = 7.6 years, 
SD = 6.2)1.  Based on responses to the cultural attitudes questionnaire (see 
below), for the second part of the data analysis Polish participants were 
assigned to one of four acculturation strategies: assimilation (high preference for 
British over Polish culture, N = 9), separation (high preference for Polish over 
British culture, N = 8), integration (high preference for both British and Polish 
cultures, N = 12) and marginalization (low preference for both British and 
Polish cultures, N =11).  In the British group there were 20 healthy adults (9 
females), aged between 21 and 58 years (M = 34.1, SD = 10.9).  The groups 
were matched for age (t(58)= 1.18, p = .24) and gender (χ2 = 2.19, p = .14).   
Materials and Procedure 
Participants watched a 4-minute video in which two female actors, one 
British, one Polish living in the UK, introduced themselves and read a brief 
current affairs article relevant to the UK and Poland respectively (see Figure 
5.1A).  Participants were encouraged by the actors to pay attention, as they 
would be required to answer questions about the article’s content after the 
                                                
1 Two Polish participants did not disclose the length of residence in the UK, therefore their data were 
excluded from the correlation analysis. 
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video.  This manipulation was introduced to ensure participants’ engagement 
and identification with either or both cultures.  The actors also provided verbal 
instructions for the control of imitation task.  There were two identical videos 
with only one difference between them, in one video the Polish actor was sitting 
on the left and the British actor on the right (‘Polish left’), and for the second 
video, the sitting position was reversed (‘British left’).  Half of the participants 
watched the ‘Polish left’ video while the other half watched the ‘British left’ 
video.  Then participants were required to perform the imitation-inhibition task.  
Control of imitation task: This was a modified version of the procedure 
used in Experiments 1-4.  The main modification was made to the onscreen 
stimulus, which now showed the lower arm and hand of either the British or 
Polish actor previously seen on the video.  Although, they could not see the 
actors’ faces, participants were able to identify the hand by the colour of the 
jumper’s sleeve, red for the Polish actor and blue for the British actor (as worn 
in the video, see Figure 5.1A).  The remainder of the procedure was kept the 
same as described in Experiment 1.  Participants were instructed to respond 
with an index or middle finger lifting action to a number cue that appeared 
between the fingers of the stimulus hand.  If the number cue was 1, they had to 
lift their index finger, if it was 2, then they had to lift their middle finger.  
Simultaneously to the appearance of the number cue, there was a lifting 
movement of the index or middle finger of the stimulus hand.  The relationship 
between the observed movement and the movement required by the number 
defined two trial types.  On congruent trials, the required finger movement was 
the same as the observed movement (Figure 5.1B); whereas on incongruent 
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trials, the required finger movement was different from the observed movement 
(Figure 5.1C).  Thus, on incongruent trials participants were required to inhibit 
an imitative response and perform the pre-instructed movement.  There were 
thirty trials in each of the four combinations of observed and executed finger 
movements (congruent British, congruent Polish, incongruent British, 
incongruent Polish), presented in a random order in two blocks of 60 trials 
each.  The Polish and British hands were presented on the same side of the 
screen as the actors were sitting in the video, for participants who watched the 
‘British left’ video, the British hand appeared on the left side of the screen and 
the Polish hand on the right.  This order was reversed for those who watched 
the ‘Polish left’ video.  The duration of the task was approximately 8 minutes. 
Following completion of this task, Polish participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire asking for information such as their age and length of 
stay in the UK and a Cultural Attitudes questionnaire.  The latter consisted of 28 
items designed to produce a preference score for British and Polish cultures, 
with half of the items relating to each culture.  Among the items included were 
preference for food, TV programs, films, support for sports team, newspapers, 
web pages, politics, friends, spouse, child naming, language, and intention to 
remain in the UK or return to Poland.  The British and Polish preference 
questions were mixed and the order of presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants (the Cronbach’s α coefficient of internal consistency for the British 
and Polish preference items were .65 and .67 respectively).  Based on the 
answers to this questionnaire, each participant received a score for British and 
Polish preference.  Using a median split, a value was obtained for high and low 
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preference in each culture, which allowed the assignment of participants to 
each of the 4 cultural attitudes group mentioned above. 
Additionally, thirty-four participants (British N=10, Polish N = 24) had 
been recruited as part of a pilot study for a different project and were also asked 
to complete the Self-Construal Scale1 (Singelis 1994).  This is a frequently used 
measure of self-construal in cross-cultural studies.  The administered version 
contained a total of 30 items (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004), 15 items each 
for independent and interdependent SCS.  An independent SCS item in this 
scale could be “I enjoy being unique and different from others in many 
respects”, whereas an interdependent SCS item would be “It is important for me 
to maintain harmony within my group”.  Each item is rated on a likert scale 
ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  Reliability of this scale 
in the current sample was between moderate and acceptable, Cronbach’s α 
independent = .59, interdependent = .75. 
  
                                                
1 To avoid confusion, throughout the text the name of the measure Self-Construal Scale is 
spelled throughout, while the term self-construal styles, referring to independent vs. 
interdependent, is used in its acronym form: SCS.   








Figure 5.1. Examples of the stimuli presented. Panel A shows a frame from the 
video that participants watched prior to performing the imitation-inhibition task. 
The British actor is wearing a blue sweater while the Polish actor is wearing a 
red sweater. Half of the participants were presented with the British actor sitting 
on the left (BL), while the other half were presented with the Polish actor sitting 
on the left (PL). Panel B shows an example of a congruent trial performed by 
the British actor and Panel C shows an example of an incongruent trial 
performed by the Polish actor from the imitation-inhibition task for participants 
who watched the BL video. 
 
5.2.2  Results and Discussion 
Prior to the statistical analysis, extreme RT scores identified by the 1.5 x 
inter-quartile range rule (IQR, (Tukey 1977a)) were removed from each 
participant’s dataset.  The RT analysis excluded incorrect responses (6% of the 
data).  RT and accuracy data were analysed with a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, 
Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and Hand Identity (British vs. Polish) 
were the within-subject factors and Group (British vs. Polish) the between-
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subject factors.  Where sphericity assumptions were not met, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected values are reported. Bonferroni corrections were used for post 
hoc multiple comparisons. No effect of side of presentation was found, all ps 
>.11. 
 
RT Analysis.  A main effect of Congruency was found, F(1,58) = 22.97; p 
< .001, η2p = .28.  Overall, responses were faster for congruent trials (M = 529 
ms, SEM. = 7.42) than for incongruent trials (M = 544 ms, SEM. = 8.04).  The 
main effect of Hand Identity was also significant, F(1,58) = 6.03; p = .017, η2p = 
.09.  Responses were faster when the stimulus hand was believed to be that of 
the British actor (M = 532 ms, SEM. = 7.73) than the Polish actor (M = 540 ms, 
SEM. = 7.76).  However, the main effect of Group was not significant (F < 1, p 
= ns), in fact, Mean RTs were identical for both Groups (British [M = 536 ms, 
SEM. = 12.37], Polish [M = 536 ms, SEM. = 8.75]).  The Congruency × Hand 
Identity interaction was significant, F(1,58) = 5.54; p = .022, η2p = .09.  Simple 
effects analysis revealed a larger imitation effect (RT incongruent – RT 
congruent trials) for the hand of the British actor (M = 13 ms, SEM. = 3.69) 
compared to the hand of the Polish actor (M = 2.2 ms, SEM. = 4.29); F(1,58) = 
13.42; p = .001, η2p = . 19).  The 3-way interaction of Congruency × Hand 
Identity × Group was also significant, F(1,58) = 5.40; p = .024, η2p = .19.  
Simple effects analysis showed that this interaction was driven by the British 
group showing a significantly greater automatic imitation effect (RT Incongruent 
– RT congruent) when the stimulus hand was British (M = 24.19 ms, SEM. = 6. 
65) but not when it was Polish (M = 1.71 ms, SEM = 6.21), F(1,58) = 8.21; p = 
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.006, η2p = .12), whereas the same contrast in the Polish group was not 
significant (British hand: M = 17.06, SEM = 4.71, Polish hand: M = 16.92, SEM 
= 4.39;  p = .98) – See Figure 5.2.  This result indicates that while association of 
the stimulus hand with the British actor facilitates an in-group imitation bias for 
the British participants, the equivalent association failed to elicit the in-group 
bias in their Polish counterparts. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Group × Hand Identity interaction.  The blue line represents the 
imitation effect (RT incongruent – RT congruent trials) for the British hand and 
the red line represents the imitation effect for the Polish hand. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
Error Analysis.  Equivalent analyses of the error data showed that the 
main effect of Congruency failed to reach significance (p = .07), with a trend 
towards more errors on incongruent (M = .06%, SEM. = .012) than on 
congruent (M = .04%, SEM. = .009) trials.  No other main effects or interactions 
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were significant (all ps > .47), confirming the absence of speed-accuracy trade-
offs.  
Cultural Attitudes.  To aid further exploration of the lack of in-group 
imitation bias in the Polish group, an additional analysis was performed on the 
imitation effect (RT incongruent – RT congruent trials) for both the British and 
the Polish hand with a 2 × 4 ANOVA with Imitation Effect (British hand vs. 
Polish hand) as the within-subjects factor and Acculturation Strategy 
(assimilation, separation, integration, marginalization) as the between-subjects 
factor for both RT and accuracy. 
 
The main effect of imitation failed to reach significance, p = .99.  
Although the main effect of Acculturation Strategy was significant, F(3,36)= 
3.15, p = .037, η2p = .21, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the only 
contrast approaching significance (p =.08) was the integration (M = 33.4 ms, 
SEM. = 6.42) vs. the assimilation (M = 7.9 ms, SEM. = 7.41) strategies.  Notably, 
the Imitation Effect × Acculturation Strategy interaction was also significant, 
F(3,36) = 4.63, p = .008, η2p = .28.  This interaction is illustrated in Figure 5.3.  
Simple effects analysis confirmed that while the assimilation group showed a 
significantly reduced imitation effect when the stimulus hand was that of the 
Polish actor (M = -7.8 ms, SEM. = 8.91) compared to the hand of the British 
actor (M = 23.5 ms, SEM. = 9.65); F(1,36) = 7.78; p =.008, η2p = .18), the 
inverse was true for the separation group (British actor’s hand: [M = -3.2 ms, 
SEM. = 10.23], Polish actor’s hand: [M = 23.5 ms, SEM. = 9.45]; F(1,36) = 5.06; 
p =.031, η2p = .12).  The same contrasts for the integration and marginalization 
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groups failed to reach significance, both ps>. 05.  Simple effects analysis also 
revealed more variability in the data when the stimulus hand was Polish than 
when it was British.  Accordingly, the following contrasts reached significance 
in the Polish hand condition: assimilation vs. separation (p = .021), assimilation 
vs. integration (p = < .001) and integration vs. marginalization, (p = .015); 
whereas in the British hand condition the only contrast that reached 
significance was separation vs. integration, (p = .02) with a trend towards 
significance in the assimilation vs. separation (p =.066).  Crucially, as illustrated 
in Figure 5.3, all groups show a pattern of imitation towards the British or Polish 
hand that fits in with the styles of cultural adaptation of the quadripolar model 
described by Berry et al. (1989) and Hutnik (1991).   
 
 
Figure 5.3. Imitation effects for the British and Polish hand in each of the 
Acculturation Strategy groups. Light bars indicate the imitation effect for the 
British hand and dark bars indicate the imitation effect for the Polish hand. Error 
bars represent S.E.M.   
 Chapter 5 
 145 
Self-Construal Scale.  A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with SCS 
(independent vs. interdependent scores) as the within-subjects factor and Group 
(British vs. Polish) as the between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of SCS, F(1,34) = 13.52, p = .001, η2p = .29.  Overall, 
scores for the independent scale (M = 5.06, SEM = .10) were higher than for the 
interdependent scale (M = 4.45, SEM = .13).  Neither the main effect of Group 
(p = .15) nor the Group × SCS interaction (p = .29) were significant.      
 
Correlations.  Since the Polish data did not meet the normality 
assumption, a Spearman’s Rho was used for correlation analyses.  The first of 
these analyses revealed that the interdependence scores were positively related 
to preference scores for Polish culture, rs = .48, p = .018, and negatively 
correlated to the length of time spent in the UK, rs = -.50, p = .014.  Moreover, 
after controlling for the imitation effect when the stimulus was the hand of the 
Polish actor, a partial correlation analysis confirmed that the size of the 
imitation effect when the stimulus was the hand of the British actor was related 
to preference scores for British culture, r(37) = .327, p = .042; and similarly, 
when controlling for the imitation effect when the stimulus hand was that of the 
British actor, the size of the imitation effect when participants viewed the hand 
of the Polish actor was related to the preference scores for Polish culture, r(37) 
= .508, p = .001. Finally, no significant correlations were found between SCS 
scores and imitation effects (all ps > .25).  Therefore, these data provide no 
evidence of a relationship between SCS and automatic imitation. 
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The first finding of interest from these data is that while the British 
participants show an in-group imitation bias towards the hand of the British 
actor, the equivalent in-group bias is not present in the Polish group.  The fact 
that there were twice as many Polish as British participants in this sample, rules 
out the lack of statistical power as a plausible explanation for the absence of an 
in-group bias in the Polish group.  Furthermore, this finding replicates those of 
Mondillon, Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet (2007) in which they report that 
French Caucasians imitate the facial expressions of another French Caucasian 
more than those of a Chinese person; however, Chinese participants living in 
France imitated the facial expressions of the Chinese person just as much as the 
French Caucasian’s.  Mondillon and colleagues interpret the lack of in-group 
bias in the Chinese participants in terms of their motivations to understand the 
emotional expressions of the host culture.  The experimental design of this 
study allows expansion of Mondillon et al’s findings, as the present results 
indicate that differences in acculturation strategies are the most likely 
explanation for the absence of an in-group imitation bias in the Polish 
participants.   
Consistent with the predictions, Polish migrants adopting the 
assimilation strategy show a larger imitation effect towards the British compared 
to the Polish actor; conversely, those with a separation strategy imitate the 
Polish more than the British actor.  Also as predicted, no in-group imitation bias 
was found in either the integration or marginalization strategy groups.  As far as 
we are aware, this is the first study to investigate and demonstrate that 
acculturation strategies can modulate automatic imitation of immigrants 
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towards an individual from either the native or the host culture.  Although the 
data do not allow to tease apart the precise cognitive mechanisms responsible 
for such modulation, these findings are not entirely surprising if one takes into 
account the increasing research evidence, some of which is discussed in the 
introduction, showing that motivational and situational factors can determine 
the extent to which we imitate other people’s actions.  When migrating to a 
different culture, individuals can choose how to adapt to their new 
environment.  Some will be motivated to learn and absorb the customs and 
practices of the host culture and in order to do so, they will seek and maintain 
contact with members of the new community in which they choose to settle. 
Migrants with this assimilation strategy would be motivated to affiliate and 
integrate with members of the host culture.  For example, the assimilative Polish 
immigrant in the UK would perceive a British rather than a Polish individual as 
a member of the in-group, or rather the group with which he/she prefers to 
affiliate.  Conversely, those who adopt a separation strategy would favour the 
Polish culture they left behind and instead would prefer to affiliate with fellow 
Polish immigrants in the UK.  In both cases, automatic imitation could foster 
positive relationships, functioning as the ‘social glue’ (Lakin et al., 2003) to 
provide a harmonious environment within the preferred group of affiliation.  
This assumption is compatible with the present results showing that preference 
scores for British culture are correlated with the extent to which participants 
automatically imitate the hand believed to be British rather than Polish, and that 
preference for Polish culture is related to imitation of the Polish actor’s hand.  
As for the integration and marginalization strategies, as described by Berry et 
 Chapter 5 
 148 
al., (1989) and Hutnik (1991), individuals with these acculturation attitudes are 
capable of either integrating and assimilating with both the native and host 
cultures (integration) or show little or no prominent interest for either 
(marginalization).  Interestingly, these data also fit in with these models of 
acculturation - no evidence of a difference in automatic imitation of the British 
or Polish hands was found in these groups, and the magnitude of the imitation 
effect – as seen in Figure 5.3 – resembles the description of these acculturation 
strategies in that integrators showed a high level of automatic imitation of both 
hands while those with a marginalized view showed little imitation of either 
hand.  
In sum, these findings show that the acculturation strategies that Polish 
migrants adopt when living in the UK modulate the extent to which they allow 
self-other representations to overlap or to separate.  In the context of imitation, 
such control of self-other representations is determined by the migrants’ 
motivational attitudes towards the host or the heritage culture, which are 
reflected on their automatic imitative behaviour towards members of the host 
vs. the heritage culture.  Nevertheless, causation cannot be derived from 
correlations and further research will be needed to unravel the precise cognitive 
processes underlying the relationship between acculturation strategies and 
automatic imitation.  
A secondary finding of interest is the set of results from the SCS.  
Although Polish culture is usually considered more interdependent (Cialdini, 
Wosinska, Barrett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999), (Reykowski 1998) than 
Western cultures such as the UK, in the present sample no evidence of 
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differences between independent and interdependent scores was found 
between the two cultural groups.  However, this finding is consistent with 
research suggesting that economically motivated or voluntary migrants tend to 
have a more independent self-construal orientation (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, 
Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006), (Chen, Wagner, Kelley, Powers, & 
Heatherton, 2013).  Therefore, it is plausible that this sample of Polish migrants 
a) already possessed a more independent SCS, which led them to voluntarily 
migrate in the first place, or b) their mindsets became more independent as a 
consequence of migrating to a more independent culture.  Although the former 
explanation is highly plausible, evidence for the latter was found in the present 
study.  A negative correlation was found between interdependent scores and 
length of time spent in the UK, suggesting that the longer Polish migrants 
remain in the UK, the more independent their mindset becomes. Also of interest 
was the positive correlation found between interdependent scores and Polish 
preference scores, suggesting perhaps that the Polish participants associate their 
native culture with a more interdependent view of the self.  
Finally, no evidence was found to suggest that interdependent self-
construal style is associated with increased mimicry (van Baaren et al., 2003), 
(Ashton-James et al., 2007).  This could be due to: a) overall, these participants 
favoured an independent vs. an interdependent self-construal style, therefore, it 
is plausible that the data lacked statistical power to show such relationship, or 
b) the acculturation strategies that individuals choose to adopt when migrating 
to a new culture could play a stronger modulatory role in imitation than self-
construal styles.  Future cross-cultural research into the factors that modulate 
automatic imitation could provide answers to these hypothetical explanations.  
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5.3  Experiment 6: Culture and Social Cognition 
In addition to its relationship with automatic imitative behaviour, the 
effects of independent vs. interdependent SCS have also been studied in the 
context of visual perspective taking.  Wu & Keysar, (2007) used a real life 
version of the Director task, described in Experiment 1, with American and 
Chinese participants.  They found that Americans, a culture that favours the 
independent SCS, were significantly worse in adopting the Director’s 
perspective compared to the Chinese, a culture that favours the interdependent 
SCS.  The poor performance of the American participants compared to their 
Chinese counterparts was evident in accuracy, RT and eye-tracking measures 
during experimental trials.  Wu and Keysar interpreted these results in relation 
to the differences in SCS between the two cultures.  They argue that for 
interdependent cultures, the self is defined in relation to others, therefore 
focusing attention on other’s actions, knowledge and needs is more important to 
them than it is for individuals with an independent view of the self (Wu & 
Keysar, 2007).  
In recent years, a new interdisciplinary approach combining theories 
from cultural psychology and neuroscience research has given rise to cultural 
neuroscience.  This emerging field of research aims to explore the relationship 
between culture, cognitive processes and the brain (Kitayama & Park, 2010).  In 
one, frequently cited, Cultural Neuroscience study, Zhu et al. (2007) used a self-
referential task in which Chinese and Western (North Americans and Europeans) 
participants had to judge the appropriateness of trait attributes to describe 
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themselves, their mother or a culture-relevant famous person.  They found 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation for self-judgements (contrast self vs. 
other) in all participants.  However, while Chinese participants also showed 
increased activation in the MPFC when making mother-judgements (contrast 
mother vs. other), Western participants did not show the same pattern of 
activation, instead, the same contrast showed increased activation in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in this cultural group.  Furthermore, the self vs. 
mother contrast showed no difference in activation of MPFC in Chinese but it 
did in the Americans.  The authors interpreted these findings in relation to 
differences in SCS between the two cultures and argued that different processing 
styles of information related to the self and close others observed by social 
psychologists are also found at neural level.  Therefore, the interpersonal 
connectedness emphasised by the Chinese culture results in an overlap of 
neural representations of the self and a close other such as mother, whereas the 
emphasis on independent SCS in Western cultures leads to measurable neural 
differences in the representation of the self and others – including close others 
such as mother – (Zhu et al., 2007).  
Noticeably, the majority of cultural psychology and cultural 
neuroscience studies relating to SCS have predominantly focused on 
comparisons between Americans (with a small number of studies including 
European participants) and East Asians (Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans).  
Therefore, it is not known if these findings replicate in other cultures that might 
or might not show such remarkable differences in processing styles concerning 
self and others.  For example, do all Western cultures emphasise independent 
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SCS? Or are there other cultures, besides East Asians, that show such markedly 
different SCS when compared to Western cultures?  Are SCS limited to the 
independent vs. interdependent dichotomy?  Do these differences, if they exist, 
lead to measurable differences in performance of social cognition abilities 
requiring self-other representations? 
Experiment 6 compared performance of individuals from two seemingly 
different cultures, UK and Cuba, on the three measures of social cognition 
employed in Experiments 1-4: the control of imitation, visual perspective taking 
and theory of mind tests.  The self-referential paradigm from Experiment 3 was 
employed as the theory of mind test.  This paradigm was adapted for this 
experiment so that in addition to self and other mental and physical judgements, 
it also included mother judgements.  The independent and interdependent SCS 
were measured with the Singelis (1994)’s self-report scale. 
Cuba has been a communist country for over 50 years.  Communism 
encourages collectivist/ interdependent thinking.  Reliance on others and 
interpersonal relations are a necessity for everyday life and for success.  The 
Communist system deters individual thinking and behaviour that deviates from 
the communist ideas, deep rooted in the communities.  Such constraints in 
individual thinking are seen in the education system, the work place and the 
political system, which does not legally allow or recognise any other political 
affiliations than the communist party.  All this contrasts with the way of life in 
the UK, a society that emphasises personal achievement, independent thinking, 
creativity, competitiveness, all of which epitomises an independent SCS.  
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Therefore, it is expected that the SCS scores of Cuban and British participants 
would reveal these cultural differences, so that Cuban participants would 
affiliate to the interdependent SCS while British participants would favour the 
independent SCS.  If this pattern of results is found, the findings from the control 
of imitation and visual perspective taking are expected to replicate those from 
previous cross-cultural studies, (e.g., van Baaren et al., 2003; Wu & Keysar, 
2007).  Specifically, it is expected that Cuban participants, if indeed they are 
more interdependent than the British, would a) show a higher tendency to 
imitate, resulting in a larger imitation effect in the control of imitation task and 
b) be better able to adopt the Director’s perspective in the visual perspective-
taking task, than the British participants.  In terms of the self-referential task, the 
prediction (based on Zhu et al., 2007) is that self vs. other judgements would be 
different in both groups, but that self vs. mother judgements would not differ (in 
terms of RTs) in the Cuban group, but that they would differ in the British 
sample.  Since the Zhu & Han study did not include mental vs. physical 
judgements in their design, no predictions are made in relation to these trial 
types.   
5.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-five adults (29 M, 26 F) from both Cuban and British cultures 
participated in this study (Cuba: N = 27, UK: N = 28), age ranged between19-45 
years, (M= 26.5, SD = 6.7).  There were no age, F(1,54) = .69, p = .41, or 
gender,  χ2(1, N = 55)=.17, p = .79 differences between the groups. 
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Materials and Procedure 
The Cuban sample was tested in Cuba (in the city of Santiago de Cuba) 
and only included Cuban nationals.  To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
studies have been published concerning SCS in Cuba, but according to (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991), Latin American cultures are considered to favour the 
interdependent SCS.  Recruitment of the UK participants, who were tested in 
London, ensured that only British Caucasians, without a mixed-culture 
background, were invited to take part in the experiment, thus ensuring the 
absence of influence from interdependent cultures within the participants’ 
household in the UK sample. 
All participants performed three tasks: the control of imitation, visual 
perspective taking and the self-referential task (described in Chapter 2).  The 
visual perspective taking task was modified by replacing the picture of the 
British Director and his recorded voice with a Cuban Director (see Figure 5.4) 
who instructed participants (in Spanish) to move objects from the shelves array.  
This manipulation aimed to encourage participants to identify with the director 
as a member of their own cultural group.  The self-referential task, described in 
Experiment 2, was also modified, so this time participants were required to 
make mental and physical judgements of themselves, their mother and a 
culture-relevant famous person (UK: Lady Gaga, Cuba: Israel Rojas, lead singer 
of a popular Cuban band). RTs for each type of judgements were the dependent 
variable of this task.  The order of the tasks was counterbalanced between 
participants  





Figure 5.4. Example of the stimuli presented in the visual perspective-taking task 
to each cultural group (UK – panel A; Cuba – panel B). The images show an 
example of experimental trials for which the corresponding (auditory) 
instruction would be to ‘move the top balloon left’.  
5.3.2  Results and Discussion 
Self-Construal Scale 
Table 5.1 below shows the scores of the self-construal scale.  The 
reliability analysis of this scale indicates poor internal consistency of both types 
of SCS (Cronbach’s α independent= .45, interdependent= .51).   
An ANOVA was conducted with SCS (independent vs. interdependent) 
and Group as the within-subject and between-subject factors respectively. This 
analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > .29.   
Table 5.1. Mean (S.E.M.) for the independent and interdependent scores of the 
Self-Construal Scale for each Cultural Group.  
 Independent Interdependent 
Cuba (N = 27) 4.75 (0.11) 4.61 (0.10) 
UK (N = 28) 4.66 (0.10) 4.58 (0.10) 
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Control of imitation task 
As described in previous analysis, extreme within-subjects RT scores in 
the control of imitation task were removed from the analysis.  The RT and 
accuracy data were analysed using ANOVA with Cultural Group as the 
between-subjects factor (Cuba vs. UK) and Trial Type as the within-subject 
factor (congruent vs. incongruent).  
RT analysis.  Figure 5.5A shows the RT data for the Control of imitation 
task. There was a main effect of Trial Type, F(1,53) = 103.18, p < 0.001, η2p= 
.66; as expected, responses on congruent trials were executed faster than those 
on incongruent trials.  The main effect of Group was also significant, F(1,53) = 
4.08, p = .048, η2p = .07.  Pairwise comparisons showed that Cubans were 
slower overall than the British participants.  However, the Group × Trial Type 
interaction was not significant (F< 1, p = .70); Paired Samples T-test showed that 
the imitation effect (RT incongruent trials – RT congruent trials) was significant 
within each Group (Cuba: t(26) = 7.44, p < .001, d = .96; UK: t(27) = 6.93, p < 
.001, d = .40). As the lack of a significant interaction shows, the size of the 
imitation effect between the two Groups did not differ, (Cuba: M= 55.34, S.E.M. 
= 7.43; UK: M= 51.30, S.E.M. = 7.40p = .70).   
Error analysis. A similar pattern was observed in the error analysis (see 
Figure 5.5B). Overall, participants made a small number of errors (M total= 7.4, 
S.E.M. = .70).  The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(1,53) = 35.45, p 
< 0.001, η2p= 0.40; with participants making more errors in the incongruent (M 
= 5.30, S.E.M. = 0.50) than in the congruent (M = 2.10, S.E.M. = 0.30) trials.  
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The main effect of Group and the Group × Trial type interaction were not 
significant, (ps >.65), showing that the Groups did not differ on accuracy in this 
task.  
 
   A       B 
Figure 5.5. Mean RT (A) and error rate (B) for the control of imitation task. Error 
bars represent S.E.M. 
 
Perspective-taking task 
The accuracy and RT data were analysed using ANOVA with Cultural 
Group as a between-subject factor and Trial Type (experimental vs. C1 vs. C2) 
as the within-subjects factor.  
RT. A significant main effect of Trial Type was found, F(2,104) =179.20, 
p < 0.001, η2p = .78.  Overall, participants responded faster to the C1 (M = 
2.80s, S.E.M. = 66.36) trials than to the experimental (M = 3.30s, S.E.M. = 
82.66, p <.001) or the C2 trials (M = 3.28s, S.E.M. = 85.93, p <.001).  The main 
effect of Group was also significant, F(1,52) =7.48, p = .009, η2p = .78.  Overall, 
Cuban participants were slower at responding (M = 3.34 s, S.E.M. = 1.10 s) than 
the British participants (M = 2.92 s, S.E.M. = 1.06 s).  Slower RTs were also 
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observed in the control of imitation task; taken together, this could indicate a 
lack of practice of the Cuban participants at performing psychology experiments 
compared to the British participants, who were drawn from a psychology testing 
database and are therefore more adept at completing speeded tasks.  The Group 
× Trial Type interaction was not significant, (F <1, p = .59).  
Accuracy.  Since no differences were found in performance of the control 
trials, the C1 and C2 trials were collapsed; therefore, the analysis included 2 
Trial Types (experimental and control).  There was a main effect of Trial Type, 
F(1,52) = 14.46, p < 0.001, η2p = .22.  Overall, performance (proportion of 
correct responses) was lower on experimental trials1 (M = .83, S.E.M. = .04) 
than on control trials:  (M = 0.97, S.E.M. = .005).  Neither the main effect of 
Group, nor the Group × Trial Type interaction were significant, (ps >.57).  
Taken together, these results indicate that participants from both Cultural 
Groups show comparable ability at separating their own perspective from that 
of the Director’s when the perspectives were in conflict.  
Self-referential task 
An ANOVA was performed with Cultural Group as a between-subject 
factor and Target (self vs. mother vs. other) and Trial Type (mental vs. physical) 
as the within-subjects factors.  A preliminary analysis confirmed the longer RTs 
                                                
1 Notably, both groups scored higher than most neurotypical adults tested with this task in all 
the other experiments reported in this thesis (except in the conditions of training and anodal 
tDCS). No obvious explanation can account for this discrepancy.  It is possible that because the 
Cuban sample are less adept at experimental testing, they were more motivated and therefore 
paid more attention to the instructions.  The British sample, were carefully screened during 
recruitment so that only British Caucasians with no influence of another culture in their 
household were recruited.  The reasons for this screening were carefully explained to the 
participants prior to testing. It is also possible that they became motivated to perform well on 
this task. However, these motives are purely speculative. 
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for the Cuban Group found in the previous tasks.  Therefore, Mean Total RT was 
included in the analysis as a covariate (thereby accounting for the variance on 
overall RTs). The main effect of Target was significant, F(2,102) = 3.61; p < .03; 
η2p= .07.  Overall, responses were faster for mother (M = 3.28 s, S.E.M. = .03 s) 
than for self (M = 3.97 s, S.E.M. = .03 s; p < .001) or for other trials (M = 4.00 s, 
S.E.M. = .03 s; p <.001).  The main effect of Trial Type was not significant, (p = 
.66).  The Target × Trial Type interaction was significant, F(1,52) = 8.05; p = 
.006; η2p= .13.  Simple effects analysis revealed that while mental responses (M 
= 3.86 s, S.E.M. = .04 s) were faster than physical responses (M = 4.07 s, S.E.M. 
= .05 s; p =.001) for self-judgements, the opposite pattern was true for both 
mother (physical: M = 3.21 s, S.E.M. = .03 s; mental: M = 3.36 s, S.E.M. = .04s, 
p = .002) and for other judgements (physical: M = 3.82 s, S.E.M. = .04 s; 
mental: M = 4.17 s, S.E.M. = .04s, p < .001), where responding was faster for 
physical than for mental judgements.  Neither the main effect of Group, nor the 
2-way interactions involving Group were significant, (all ps >.09).  The 3-way, 
Group × Target × Trial Type, interaction approached significance (p = .063), 
and was therefore further explored.  Simple effects analysis showed that while 
the contrast self-mental vs. other-mental in the Cuban Group was not significant 
(p = .19), the same contrast was significant in the UK Group (p <.001), where 
responses to self-mental (M = 2.90 s, S.E.M. = .20) were significantly faster than 
other-mental judgements (M = 3.40 s, S.E.M. = .21).  In the physical trials, the 
contrast self-physical vs. other-physical was significant in the Cuban Group (p = 
.017) and showed a trend towards significance in the UK Group (p = .072).  
Although, this pattern of dissociation between mental and physical judgements 
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for self and other between the Cultural Groups lends itself to further 
interpretation, doing so in the absence of a significant 3-way interaction would 
be highly speculative.  It is possible that the 3-way interaction failed to reach 
significance due to lack of statistical power and therefore, these data would 
require replication with larger sample sizes before meaningful interpretations 
can be made.  
This study compared performance of Cuban and British adults in a range 
of social cognition tests.  The experimental design was conceived on the 
assumption that the two cultural groups would show differences in SCS, which 
in turn would predict the replication of previous findings in imitation (van 
Baaren et al., 2003), visual perspective taking (Wu & Keysar, 2007) and self-
referential judgements (Zhu et al., 2007)1.  However, no differences between the 
groups were found on any of the measures, including the Self-Construal Scale.   
As mentioned in the introduction, previous cross-cultural studies of 
independent vs. interdependent SCS have almost exclusively focused on 
differences between the East (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans) and West 
(Americans), with a few including both Western Europeans and Americans as 
representative of Western cultures.  One exception is a study by (Kitayama, 
Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009), in which they include three groups of 
participants, Americans, Japanese and Western Europeans (British and 
Germans).  Kitayama and colleagues used a battery of implicit measures to 
assess SCS.  For example, in a visual perception task, they measured wether 
                                                
1 Although the Zhu and Han study was a neuroimaging study, their behavioural data also show 
cross-cultural differences in the predicted direction of the SCS model. 
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participants attended to the stimuli in an analytic or holistic manner.  Previous 
studies (e.g., Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) have found 
that while individuals with interdependent SCS tend to process visual 
information in a holistic manner, by focusing on the relationship between the 
objects and the context in which it is placed, those with independent SCS show 
a more analytic processing style, by focusing attention on a salient object 
independent of its contextual setting.  In their study, Kitayama et al (2009) found 
that overall, although British and Germans show a more independent SCS than 
Japanese, they are less so than Americans, thus indicating the presence of 
systematic cross-cultural variations of SCS among cultures that affiliate to the 
independent SCS. 
In the context of the present study, the finding that British participants are 
neither more independent than interdependent in a within-group comparison, 
or more independent than the Cuban participants in a between-group 
comparison, and vice versa for the Cuban sample, would suggest that neither of 
these cultural groups are representative of the extreme dichotomy commonly 
associated with SCS.  
However, another – and perhaps more important – factor could explain 
the pattern of results in this experiment.  The poor internal consistency found in 
the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale, seriously challenge its suitability as a 
reliable SCS measure.  Although, probably the most popular self-construal scale 
in cross-cultural psychology (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011), it has been 
the subject of criticism by several researchers, who question the validity of this 
scale, (e.g., Cross et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2003).  Interestingly, Kitayama et 
 Chapter 5 
 162 
al., (2009) also used the Singelis (1994) scale as an explicit measure of SCS, in 
addition to their battery of implicit measures.  They describe the obtained 
pattern of results with the SCS measure as anomalous, since their British sample 
showed the lowest independent scores (compared to Americans, Germans and 
Japanese); while the Americans showed the highest interdependent scores from 
all groups.  Based on the unacceptable level of reliability of this scale in the 
present experiments, no further conclusions can be drawn regarding the SCS of 
either the British or Cuban participants in this study.   
Another potential limitation of this study, as discussed above in relation 
to the results from the self-referential task, is the relatively small sample size for 
cross-cultural comparisons using behavioural measures.  In the cultural 
psychology literature is not unusual to find studies with hundreds of 
participants.  However, in the study by van Baaren et al., (2003) the sample size 
in Experiment 3, which investigated automatic imitation of Japanese and 
American participants, was smaller (15 Japanese and 16 Americans) than the 
number of participants in the current sample.  Similarly, Wu & Keysar, (2007) 
tested 20 Chinese and 20 Americans using the Director task, and in the Zhu et 
al., (2007) study – which used the self-referential task – there were 13 Chinese 
and 13 Westerns.  The fact that these studies found significant cross-cultural 
differences in these three socio-cognitive domains1 with smaller number of 
                                                
1 It is worth pointing out that the actual tasks and dependent variables (DVs) used in the three 
studies(van Baaren et al., 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007; Zhu et al., 2007) were not exactly the ones 
used in the current experiment.  For example, (van Baaren et al., 2003) measured automatic 
imitation (mimicry) in the context of real-life interactions – with a confederate.  Similarly, (Wu & 
Keysar, 2007) used a real life version of the Director task and their DVs included eye-tracking 
measures.  Finally, in their behavioural assessment, (Zhu et al., 2007) looked at number of items 
remembered for either self, mother or other in a memory task related to the self-referential task.  
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participants, while the current study failed to find them, suggests that sample 
size might not explain the absence of cross-cultural differences observed here.  
Clearly, further replication of these data with larger sample sizes would be 
required to provide more conclusive evidence.  In the meantime, the argument 
that socio-cognitive abilities do not differ between Cuban and British cultures is 
one worthwhile considering.  
  
                                                                                                                                       
However, taking into account the results from Experiments 1-4, which employed the same 
measures as this experiment, it is unlikely that differences in DVs from the 3 cross-cultural 
studies can explain the absence of significant cross-cultural effects in the current study.   
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5.4  General Discussion 
 
The experiments described in this Chapter were deigned to explore the 
role of culture in processes of social cognition that rely on the control of self-
other representations such as imitation (Experiment 5 and 6), visual perspective 
taking and theory of mind (Experiment 6).  In Experiment 5 it was found that 
acculturation strategies of Polish migrants in the UK modulate imitative 
behaviour when they observe either a Polish or a British actor perform an 
action.  For example, those with an assimilation strategy would favour the host 
over the native culture, thereby showing increased imitation when observing 
the actions of a British actor than when observing the same actions performed 
by a Polish actor.  The opposite pattern was found for migrants who adopt a 
separation strategy.  Participants in this group showed less imitation-inhibition 
when they observed the actions of a Polish actor than those of a British actor.  
Consistent with these effects, Polish migrants who adopt either integration or 
marginalization strategies show no differences in imitation effects towards 
either the Polish or British actors.  However, the size of the imitation effects of 
these groups fits in with the adopted strategies, so that the integration group – 
who assimilates the two cultures – shows large imitation effects for both the 
Polish and British actors, whereas the marginalization group – who does not 
feel strong connections to either culture – show small imitation effects for both 
the Polish and British actors. 
The findings contribute to the increasingly expanding research on 
imitation by providing the first empirical evidence that acculturation strategies 
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are another situational/ motivational factor that affects automatic imitative 
behaviour.  However, it is worth noting that the sample size of each 
acculturation strategy is small and while the observed effect sizes are not small, 
these findings would benefit from future replication with larger samples.  
The results from the self-construal scale in Experiment 5 showed no 
evidence of a relationship with imitation.  As mentioned earlier, several 
potential explanations could account for this findings, ranging from lack of 
statistical power to detect effects, or the lack of variability on the two measures 
(independent vs. interdependent) due to the fact that the Polish migrants show a 
more independent than interdependent SCS.  The suitability of this scale as an 
appropriate measure of SCS (as discussed in Experiment 6) should also be 
considered as a potential explanation.   
Experiment 6 aimed to investigate if the way individuals see themselves 
in relation to others impacts performance in social cognition tasks requiring 
representations of the self and another individual.  Borrowing concepts from 
cultural psychology, this experiment aimed to find, first, differences in self-
construal styles between two seemingly different cultures such as Cuba and the 
UK and, second, if such differences would lead to differential performance in 
the three social cognition tasks from previous experiments.  However, the 
results do not provide support for either of the above assumptions.  Null results 
are difficult to interpret as many different factors endogenous and / or 
exogenous to the experimental design could account for them.  Therefore, 
future studies addressing the issues mentioned in the discussion of this 
experiment would be required before solid conclusions could be drawn. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
This chapter summarises the findings from the experiments reported in this 
thesis.  The three themes concerning each of the empirical chapters will be 
individually addressed.  The first section relates to the findings from Chapter 2, 
which investigated the effect of training self-other representations on socio-
cognitive abilities and the presence of atypical self-other representations in 
mirror-touch synaesthesia.  The second section addresses the role of the TPJ, a 
brain region commonly associated with self-other processing, in social cognition 
(Chapter 4).  Finally, the third section of this chapter relates to the influence of 
culture on socio-cognitive abilities that rely on the control of self-other 
representations (Chapter 5).  Within each of the sections, the main empirical 
findings will be summarised (subsection 1), the strengths and limitations of the 
studies will be discussed (subsection 2) and outstanding questions and future 
directions will be highlighted (subsection 3). 
 
6.1  Self-Other Representations: From Imitation to Theory of Mind 
6.1.1 TRAINING SOCIAL COGNITION 
Experiment 1 aimed to test two contrasting theories relating to self-other 
representations in social cognition.  The MNS theory, posits that imitation, and 
its neural substrate the MNS, is at the core of higher-order socio-cognitive 
processes such as mental state attributions (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998; 
Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  A 
recent alternative account, the self-other control theory (Brass et al., 2009), 
suggests that the control of shared representations (pertaining to self and others) 
underlie common processes in the control of imitation and mental state 
attributions.  In Experiment 1, a training paradigm allowed to test both theories.  
Three groups of participants received different types of training: imitation, 
imitation-inhibition, or general inhibitory control training prior to completing 
three social cognition tasks: control of imitation, visual perspective taking and 
theory of mind.    
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6.1.1.1 Summary and Interpretation of Main Findings 
The results showed that the group receiving imitation-inhibition training 
was better able to adopt the visual perspective of another person (whose 
viewpoint differed from that of the participants) than both the imitation and 
inhibitory control groups.  However, there was no effect of training on the 
theory of mind task.  Therefore, although no evidence was found in support of 
the MNS theory – there was no effect of imitation training on visual perspective 
taking or theory of mind –, the improved performance of the imitation-inhibition 
training group on the visual perspective taking task provides some support for 
the self-other control theory, advanced by (Brass et al., 2009).  Both, imitation-
inhibition and visual perspective taking abilities require the online control of co-
activated self-other representations.  Notably, the requirement of online control 
differs in both abilities.  Successful performance in the control of imitation 
depends on enhancing representations of the self (by focusing on the intended 
action) and inhibiting representations of the other (by ignoring the observed 
action of another agent); whereas the visual perspective taking paradigm 
requires inhibiting self representations (by ignoring the objects you can see) and 
enhancing representations of the other (by only choosing the objects the 
director can see).  The results of Experiment 1 suggest that regardless of the 
direction in which self-other control is needed, there appears to be a link 
between imitation-inhibition and visual perspective taking.  
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6.1.1.2 Strengths and Limitations 
This is the first empirical study to test the relationship between imitation, 
perspective taking and theory of mind.  The increased ability to adopt the 
perspective of others observed after imitation–inhibition training (but not after 
imitation or inhibitory control training) provides support for a novel theory of 
social cognition suggesting that the same self-other distinction process underlies 
imitation inhibition and perspective taking.  In addition to their implications 
regarding the interrelatedness of socio-cognitive processes, these findings 
provide positive evidence for the efficacy of socio-cognitive ‘brain training’.  
There is very little evidence that the beneficial effects of standard brain-training 
programmes extend beyond the particular tasks in which participants are trained 
(Owen et al., 2010; c.f. Klingberg, 2010).  Experiment 1 shows that training in 
one socio-cognitive task (the control of imitation), has a transferable effect on a 
very different socio-cognitive task (perspective taking).  Noticeably, imitation–
inhibition training had a positive effect, not only on manual responding in the 
perspective-taking task, but also on participants’ eye-movements.  After 
imitation–inhibition training, participants looked less at the self-referenced 
object than those who received imitation or inhibitory control training.  This 
suggests that the training had a deep effect – influencing, not only final choice 
behaviour, but also the way in which attentional resources were allocated when 
differing perspectives were to be resolved. 
A potential limitation of this study concerns the choice of theory of mind 
measure.  Accuracy scores in the Strange Stories task were very high.  It is 
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possible that a baseline ceiling effect would have prevented a differential effect 
of training being seen on this task, and that therefore the task was not 
sufficiently sensitive to detect improved theory of mind performance in the 
imitation–inhibition group.  Further investigation with alternative theory of mind 
tasks is therefore necessary to determine the selectivity of the effect of imitation–
inhibition training on theory of mind performance.  
6.1.1.3 Outstanding Questions and Future Directions 
The findings from Experiment 1 could be extended in several directions.  
For example, future research could test the impact of imitation and counter-
imitation training on other socio-cognitive abilities relying on self-other 
processes such as empathy.  They could also explore whether the same effects 
can be found with different processes thought to utilise theory of mind, such as 
understanding of false beliefs and irony, deception, or moral judgements.  These 
findings could contribute towards a deeper understanding of the construct 
known as theory of mind, which currently is used as an umbrella term for a 
range of socio-cognitive processes ranging from visual perspective taking to 
action understanding, attribution of mental states, and false belief 
understanding.  Future research could derive an empirically based, finer-grained 
taxonomy of theory of mind, improving our understanding of this essential 
social skill. 
Another direction for future research could explore the replicability of the 
current findings in clinical populations.  The ability to control self-other 
representations is impaired in individuals with autism (Spengler et al., 2010; 
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Williams & Happé, 2010; Williams 2008) and schizophrenia (Bailey & Henry, 
2010; Liepelt et al., 2012), with resultant impairments of social interaction.  
These impairments deprive affected individuals of social support and reduce 
opportunities for employment, exacerbating the effects of their primary illness.  
The current results raise the possibility that carefully designed training 
interventions could be used to enhance the control of self-other representations 
in these clinical populations.  
Finally, future studies could investigate whether the mechanisms 
underlying self-other processes are intrinsic to the social domain or whether 
they represent domain-general processes subserving a social function when 
required by task demands.  The design of Experiment 1 included a non-social 
control condition in which a group of participants received general inhibitory 
control training.  Performance on the visual perspective-taking task was poorer 
in the control group than in the imitation-inhibition training group.  This finding 
indicates that although general inhibitory control is required in the perspective-
taking task (Apperly et al., 2010), this alone is not sufficient for accurate 
performance on the task.  Results therefore provide evidence that common 
(social) domain-specific processes are shared between imitation-inhibition and 
visual perspective taking.  It should be noted however, that recent theoretical 
(Heyes, in press) and empirical work (Santiesteban, Catmur, Coughlan Hopkins, 
Bird, & Heyes, 2013); Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird, Heyes, under review) 
have started to question the domain specificity assumption in visual perspective 
taking tasks, and propose that domain general processing such as attentional 
orienting could explain some of the effects often attributed to third-person 
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perspective taking.  For example, a commonly used measure of visual 
perspective taking is the ‘dot’ task1 (McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & 
Apperly, 2011; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010), in which  participants are 
presented with a picture of a room with dots on the walls.  A human-like figure 
(avatar) stands in the middle of the room.  The dots could be placed on the wall 
in front of the avatar, on the wall behind the avatar, neither or both.  
Participants are required to make judgements about the number of dots they can 
see or the number of dots the avatar can see.  Sometimes the number of dots 
that participants can see is the same as the number of dots the avatar can see 
(consistent trials), but sometimes the number of dots is different for the 
participant and the avatar (inconsistent trials).   
A robust finding from studies using this task is that when making self-
inconsistent judgements, participants’ responses are slower than when making 
self-consistent judgements.  This self-consistency effect has been interpreted as 
evidence of implicit theory of mind since the mere presence of the avatar figure 
(representing another human being) slows participants’ responses during self-
inconsistent trials, suggesting that participants cannot help but adopt the avatar’s 
perspective, even when not required to do so (Samson et al., 2010).  However, 
(Santiesteban et al., 2013) found that the self-consistency effect is also present 
when the avatar is replaced by a non-social stimulus like an arrow.  The arrow 
in this study shared the same directional, but not the agentive, features of the 
                                                
1 None of the studies cited above refer to this task as the ‘dot’ task. This term is used by Heyes, 
(in press) and by Santiesteban et al., (2013). 
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avatar.  The self-consistency effect in the arrow condition is present when 
participants have not had prior experience with the avatar condition, ruling out 
potential transfer effects from the avatar to the arrow, and also when they are 
only required to make self-judgements, ruling out other-to-self transfer effects.  
Therefore, these findings challenge the implicit theory of mind interpretation in 
the dots task and suggest that domain general processes such as attentional 
orienting could explain the self-consistency effect.   
A separate study (Santiesteban et al, under review) tested the domain-
specificity of the Director task described in Chapter 2 and used in Experiments 
1-4 and 6.  Following an earlier study reporting that individuals with autism do 
not show impaired performance on the Director’s task (Begeer, Malle, 
Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010), this study showed that the same pattern of results 
is obtained, in typically developing adults and in adults with autism, when the 
director figure is replaced by an inanimate object, in this case a camera.  In light 
of these recent data, a prominent question for future research concerns the 
generalizability of the findings from Experiment 1 outside of the social domain.  
To what extent is the online control of self-other representations limited to 
social cognition?  Are mechanisms of self-other processing relying on domain 
general attentional processes?  Specifically, could the observed improved 
performance in the Director task after imitation-inhibition training also be 
obtained with the camera condition?    
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6.1.2 WHEN SELF-OTHER REPRESENTATIONS GO AWRY: THE 
CASE OF MIRROR-TOUCH SYNAESTHESIA 
Experiment 2 tested the socio-cognitive abilities of individuals with 
mirror-touch synaesthesia, a condition that has been related to atypical self-
other representations – (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Banissy et al., 2009).  This 
experiment aimed to expand on the findings from Experiment 1 by using the 
same measures of the control of imitation and visual perspective taking but with 
a different theory of mind task.  The performance of the mirror-touch 
synaesthetes was compared to a non-synaesthetic control group.  
6.1.2.1 Summary and Interpretation of Main Findings 
The mirror-touch synaesthesia group performed significantly worse in the 
control of imitation task compared to the control group.  This was evident not 
only with RT but also with accuracy measures, suggesting that the synaesthetes 
found it harder to separate their own intended actions from those performed by 
another agent.  This finding provides further evidence in support of the atypical 
self-other representations account of mirror-touch synaesthesia.  Performance of 
the synaesthetes on the visual perspective-taking task was comparable to that of 
the non-synaesthete control group, as no effects of groups were found on this 
task.  The fact that mirror-touch synaesthetes perform similarly to controls on 
perspective taking could indicate that the control of self-other representations is 
impaired in this type of synaesthesia, only in situations when representations of 
the ‘other’ should be inhibited (as in imitation-inhibition) but not when they 
should be enhanced (as in perspective taking).  However, since overall 
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performance on both groups was not very high, no firm conclusions can be 
made about the perspective taking abilities of mirror-touch synaesthetes until 
future evidence emerge corroborating or contradicting this view.  Finally, no 
differences were found between the groups in the theory of mind measure, 
performance was very high for both synaesthetes and controls.  Thus, suggesting 
that the ability to attribute mental states to others is not impaired in individuals 
with mirror-touch synaesthesia. 
6.1.2.2 Strengths and Limitations 
This is the first study investigating the extent of impairment of a range of 
socio-cognitive abilities in mirror-touch synaesthesia.  The contributions of 
these findings are twofold.  First, they facilitate further understanding and 
characterisation of this rare condition by providing an insight into which social 
cognition abilities appear to be impaired and which remain intact.  Second, 
they contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which the control of 
self-other representations typically functions and of the interrelatedness of these 
different socio-cognitive skills.   
In terms of limitations, the relatively small sample size and the choice of 
task could have precluded a differential effect been seen on the perspective 
taking measure.  Therefore, further replications, using different measures would 
improve the understanding of the visual perspective taking abilities in mirror-
touch synaesthesia. 
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6.1.2.3 Outstanding Questions and Future Directions 
Research in mirror-touch synaesthesia is a relatively new field.  
Therefore, a myriad of research avenues remain to be explored.  Future research 
could expand upon the present findings by testing other socio-cognitive 
abilities.  For example, it has been found that mirror-touch synaesthesia is 
related to empathy (Banissy & Ward, 2007).  Banissy & Ward used a self-report 
measure of empathy: the emotional reactivity subscale from the Empathy 
Quotient (EQ, (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 
2003)).  Future work employing an empirical (instead of self-report) measure of 
empathy could provide further evidence of this finding.   
Furthermore, based on the results from Experiments 3-4 and recent 
reports of atypical grey matter volume in the right TPJ in mirror-touch 
synaesthetes (Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013), it will be interesting to assess 
whether tDCS of TPJ results in enhanced performance on the control of 
imitation and perspective taking abilities of individuals with this condition.  
 
6.2 The Role of TPJ in Social Cognition 
6.2.1 Summary and Interpretation of Main Findings 
Experiments 3 and 4 (Chapter 4) aimed to investigate the role of the TPJ 
in social cognition, in particular, its involvement in the control of self-other 
representations required for imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking and 
theory of mind.  Two different tDCS protocols were employed.  In Experiment 3, 
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three groups of participants received anodal, cathodal or sham stimulation of 
right TPJ.  The results revealed that anodal stimulation (compared to cathodal 
and sham) significantly improved performance on the control of imitation and 
visual perspective taking task, whereas no differential effect of stimulation was 
found on the theory of mind measure.   
Experiment 4 aimed to replicate and extend these findings under a 
different tDCS procedure.  This time only anodal stimulation was delivered to 
right TPJ, left TPJ or the occipital cortex (Oz) to three groups of participants, 
prior to performing the control of imitation and perspective taking tests from 
Experiment 3 and a different theory of mind.  The choice of left TPJ was 
motivated by the contrasting evidence regarding lateralization of function of this 
brain region in social cognitive processes.   
The results were consistent with Experiment 3 as performance 
improvements were observed following anodal stimulation of right TPJ on the 
control of imitation and perspective-taking task; however, such improvements 
were also seen on participants who received left TPJ stimulation (but not on 
those in the Oz condition).  These data therefore provide evidence of bilateral 
TPJ involvement in these two socio-cognitive abilities.  Also compatible with 
Experiment 3, no effect of stimulation was found during performance of the 
(different) theory of mind task.  
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6.2.2 Strengths and Limitations 
Experiments 3 and 4 are the first tDCS studies to provide evidence of 
causal TPJ involvement in social cognition.  An important strength of these 
studies lies on the selected method for assessing the role of this brain region in 
socio-cognitive abilities.  For example, contrary to fMRI studies reporting 
selective right TPJ involvement in the control of imitation (Brass et al., 2005; 
Spengler et al., 2009), Experiment 4 shows that this involvement is found 
bilaterally.  Similarly, the findings from the visual perspective taking measure 
also reveals bilateral TPJ recruitment, challenging previous reports of selective 
left TPJ involvement during perspective taking (e.g., Schurz et al., 2013).  
Therefore, the results from these experiments highlight the potential of tDCS as a 
powerful methodological tool, which can provide evidence to complement and 
extend current knowledge from existing neuroimaging methods. 
A potential explanation for the failure to find a stimulation effect on the 
theory of mind measures could be the lack of spatial specificity of tDCS (Faria et 
al., 2011; Nitsche et al., 2007; Sparing & Mottaghy, 2008).  It is possible that 
the region of the TPJ where activation is found during theory of mind tasks in 
fMRI studies, differs from the area of TPJ stimulated in these tDCS experiments.  
To address this problem, future theory of mind research involving tDCS of TPJ 
could employ fMRI-guided neuronavigation (Moos, Vossel, Weidner, Sparing, & 
Fink, 2012; Weiss et al., 2013) to ensure precise positioning of the electrodes in 
the same region of TPJ.  
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An alternative interpretation of the results from Experiment 4, and 
therefore a potential limitation of the experimental design, concerns the 
likelihood of tDCS effects spreading across hemispheres.  if true, hemispheric 
transmission would challenge the interpretation of bilateral TPJ involvement in 
the control of imitation and perspective taking.  Evidence of interhemispheric 
tDCS effects from studies stimulating the motor cortex are somewhat mixed.  For 
example, (Lang et al., 2005) found increased regional cerebral blood flow 
(rCBF) in contralateral M1 following both cathodal and anodal tDCS.  They 
suggest that such contralateral cortical effects may represent a lasting reduction 
in left-to-right transcallosal inhibition between the two cortices (Lang et al., 
2005); similar effects have been found in TMS studies, (e.g., Schambra, Sawaki, 
& Cohen, 2003).  However, the contralateral cortical effects do not necessarily 
lead to measurable behavioural effects.  For example, Lang, Nitsche, Paulus, 
Rothwell, & Lemon, (2004) delivered tDCS to the left M1 and measured motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs) from both right and left hands.  They found no 
contralateral effect, as there was no change in MEPs evoked from the right hand 
after anodal or cathodal tDCS.  Yet other studies suggest that the contralateral 
behavioural effects following tDCS of M1 are dependent on the dominance of 
the stimulated hemisphere.  Vines, Nair, & Schlaug, (2008) found that 
stimulating the dominant (left M1) hemisphere had an effect on both 
contralateral and ipsilateral hands (anodal: right hand > left hand; cathodal: left 
hand > right hand); whereas when stimulating the non-dominant (right M1) 
hemisphere, anodal stimulation had an effect on the contralateral hand but no 
effect was seen with either type of stimulation on the ipsilateral hand.  Similar 
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findings have been reported earlier with TMS (Netz, Ziemann, & Hömberg, 
1995), suggesting that hemispheric dominance plays an important role in the 
complex relationship between interhemispheric inhibition of the motor cortices.  
However, given the regional restrictions of the tDCS effects even within the 
motor cortex (.e.g., Nitsche et al., 2007) and taking into account the electrode 
positioning used in this experiments, it is unlikely that the observed bilateral 
effects are due to current spread.  One could still argue that there might be 
connectional effects between the homologous TPJ sites, however, given that 
interhemispheric connections between the stimulated TPJ areas are inhibitory 
(Koch et al., 2011) these effects should be antagonistically directed (Michael 
Nitsche, march 2014, via personal communication).  Furthermore, two recent 
rTMS studies (Heinisch, Dinse, Tegenthoff, Juckel, & Brüne, 2011; Uddin, 
Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007) stimulated both right and left TPJ and found 
selective rTPJ involvement in self (vs. other) face recognition tasks, while no 
effect was seen on the lTPJ.  The findings from these studies do not support the 
alternative hypotheses that current spread or connectional effects caused the 
bilateral effects observed in Experiment 4.  
6.2.3 Outstanding Questions and Future Directions 
Similarly to the training paradigm, the effects of tDCS could be studied in 
clinical populations known to show impairment in the control of self-other 
representations such as autism and schizophrenia.  In the non-social domain, 
recent studies looking at the therapeutic effects of tDCS in neuropsychiatric 
conditions show encouraging results in the treatment of depression (Kalu, 
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Sexton, Loo, & Ebmeier, 2012; Nitsche et al., 2009).  The effect of tDCS on 
impaired cognitive function (visuospatial attention) has been recently explored 
in patients with schizophrenia (Ribolsi et al., 2013), and there is currently one 
study listed on ClinicalTrials.gov that will investigate the effect of tDCS on 
language and memory impairment in autism.  Although cognitive neuroscience 
research is beginning to tap into the potential therapeutic effects of tDCS in the 
cognitive domain, to date, no research has explored the potential benefits of 
tDCS in social cognition.  Therefore, carefully designed protocols could explore 
the potential effects of tDCS as a tool to enhance self-other representations in 
autistic and schizophrenic patients. 
Along with the TPJ, neuroimaging studies have consistently reported 
activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) during social cognition tasks 
requiring mental representations of the self and other agents (e.g., Denny, 
Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Gilbert et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Van 
Overwalle 2011).  A recent meta-analysis ( Van Overwalle 2009) advocates 
dissociable roles for these two regions, so that the TPJ is recruited for temporal 
goals and intentionality inferences at a perceptual level whereas the MPFC 
serves as a “module that integrates social information across time and allows 
reflection and representation of traits and norms, and presumably also of 
intentionality, at a more abstract cognitive level” (Van Overwalle 2009, pp. 
829).  Such presumed dissociation between the TPJ and MPFC presents an 
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interesting line for future research using either tDCS1 protocols or a combination 
of tDCS and fMRI.  
The findings from Experiments 3 and 4 could also be extended to address 
the on-going debate concerning the role of TPJ in social cognition and 
attentional re-orienting (Corbetta et al., 2008; Mitchell 2008; Saxe 2010).  For 
example, HD-tDCS (using smaller size electrodes) to maximise focality of 
stimulation or a combined tDCS-fMRI design could be employed to further 
investigate causal TPJ involvement in the social vs. non-social domains.   
6.3  The Role of Culture in Self-Other Processes 
6.3.1 Summary and Interpretation of Main Findings 
Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapter 5) were designed to investigate the role of 
culture in socio-cognitive processes that rely on the control of self-other 
representations.  Experiment 5 explored whether the acculturation attitudes 
(Berry et al., 1989) of Polish migrants in the UK modulates their automatic 
imitative behaviour towards a member of their heritage culture vs. a member of 
the host culture.  Based on participants’ answers to a cultural preference 
questionnaire, the four acculturation attitudes were identified in Polish migrants: 
                                                
1 The extant tDCS literature suggests that stimulating a subcortical region such as MPFC could 
pose a few challenges.  For example, it has been estimated that approximately 45% of the total 
current applied to the scalp passes through the cranial cavity, therefore the peak current density 
is found on the cortices directly under the electrode (Lang et al., 2005a; Rush & Driscoll, 1968).  
Although Lang et al. (2005) reported widespread rCBF changes in remote brain areas following 
anodal tDCS, it should be taken into account that the current density reaching deeper structures 
would be reduced compared to the areas directly under the electrode.  Furthermore, although a 
small number of studies have reportedly delivered tDCS of MPFC, the exact positioning of the 
electrodes is not consistent in these studies.  For example, Antal et al. (2013) positioned the 
stimulating electrode between F2 and Fpz (10-20 EEG system); whereas Bellaïche, Asthana, 
Ehlis, Polak, & Herrmann, (2013) placed it horizontally over Fpz.   
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integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization.  The behavioural 
measure of automatic imitation was adapted from the control of imitation task 
(Brass et al., 2000). The results showed that, as predicted by the acculturation 
model, Polish migrants adopting the assimilation strategy showed more imitative 
behaviour towards the British than towards the Polish actor, whereas the 
opposite pattern was found in those with a separation strategy, who imitated 
more the Polish than the British actor.  Although no differences in the 
magnitude of imitation effects for either the Polish or the British actor were 
found in the integration and marginalization groups, their pattern of imitative 
behaviour matched the prediction from the acculturation model.  Thereby, 
those adopting the integration strategy showed larger imitation effects towards 
both the British and Polish actors, whereas the marginalized migrants displayed 
small imitative behaviour towards both nationalities.  
Experiment 6 compared performance of two cultures (Cuban vs. British) 
in a range of social cognition tests.  It was expected that these two cultures 
would show different self-construal styles (SCS) as assessed by the Self-Construal 
Scale (Singelis 1994), whereby Cubans would show preference for the 
interdependent SCS and British would prefer the independent SCS.  Based on 
this initial assumption, the data from this experiment were expected to replicate 
previous findings of cross-cultural differences in automatic imitation (van 
Baaren et al., 2003), visual perspective taking (Wu & Keysar, 2007) and self-
referential judgements (Zhu et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, contrary to 
expectations, no differences were found in any of these measures, including the 
Self-Construal Scale. 
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6.3.2 Strengths and Limitations 
The findings from Experiment 5 bring together two separate areas of 
research in the fields of cultural and cognitive psychology by providing the first 
empirical evidence in support of a modulatory role of acculturation strategies on 
automatic imitation.  Additionally, this study also shows that under the 
appropriate experimental manipulations, as suggested by Heyes (2011), 
automatic imitation tasks normally used in a laboratory setting can be 
successfully employed to investigate mimicry in a social context. 
The data from Experiment 5, however, are unable to disentangle the 
specific cognitive mechanisms mediating the relationship between acculturation 
strategies and automatic imitative behaviour.  Future work in this area could 
include variables to investigate, for example, the allocation of attentional 
resources to each stimuli type, or the priming effects from the videos presented 
prior to the testing session (e.g., whether the same results would be found in the 
absence of the familiarisation phase – including actors and news from the 
heritage and the host culture).  Another limitation of this study is the small 
sample size in each of the acculturation strategies. A larger sample would add 
more statistical power and allow for more reliable statistical analysis to be 
performed, which in turn would make the evidence presented here more robust.  
Furthermore, self-report measures could be combined with empirically based 
paradigms to obtain objective and more reliable measures of cultural attitudes.  
For example by using RT and or physiological measures (e.g., GSR – galvanic 
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skin response) while migrants are exposed to images / videos representing the 
heritage and the host culture.   
Experiment 6 aimed to expand previous cross-cultural studies, which 
have mostly focused on North American and East Asian cultures, by contrasting 
socio-cognitive abilities from two cultures that have not been compared before, 
Cuba and the UK.  Although the experimental design employed tried and tested 
paradigms in the three measures of social cognition, no cultural effects were 
found on any of the measures.  A considerable weakness of this experiment is 
the poor internal consistency of the Self-Construal Scale found with this sample.  
6.3.3 Outstanding Questions and Future Directions 
The modulatory role of acculturation strategies on socio-cognitive 
abilities provides an interesting avenue for future research. The findings from 
Experiment 5 could be extended to other social cognition domains such as 
perspective taking, empathy and pro-social behaviour.  For example, would 
those with an assimilation strategy find it easier to adopt the perspective of/ 
empathise with/ be more generous or altruistic towards others from a host vs. 
heritage culture and would the opposite be true for those who adopt a 
separation strategy?  Similarly, what are the benefits of adopting an integration 
strategy?  Does it result in more flexible socio-cognitive processing of self and 
others, thereby, allowing them to equally adopt the perspective of/ empathise 
with/ be altruistic towards others regardless of their cultural background (i.e. 
heritage vs. host)? It would also be of interest to investigate whether the 
adoption of a certain acculturation strategy remains stable over time or changes 
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as a function of factors such as the amount of time spent living in the host 
culture, or the extent of contact with members of the host culture.  For example, 
is there a linear progression between the different strategies - so that those who 
adopt a separation or marginalization strategy at first become more assimilative 
and ultimately become integrated?  If so, does the imitative behaviour towards a 
member of the heritage vs. host culture change as migrants adopt different 
strategies? 
In spite of the null results from Experiment 6, its aims are worthwhile 
pursuing. Future research should endeavour to widen the focus of cross-cultural 
studies beyond the established North American vs. East Asian boundaries by 
adopting a more inclusive attitude towards other cultures.  However, should no 
significant effects be found between those cultures, researchers are faced with 




The set of studies presented in this thesis provide an insight into self-other 
processes in social cognition.  Previous research has studied these processes as 
a single class of representation (e.g., mental states, motor plans, emotional 
states) ‘bound’ to the socio-cognitive ability under investigation (theory of mind, 
imitation, empathy).  Experiments 1-4 and 6 explored whether shared 
underlying mechanisms of self-other representations can be found in three 
different social domains, the control of imitation, visual perspective taking and 
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theory of mind; and Experiment 5 investigated whether different acculturation 
strategies of migrants to a new culture modulate self-other representations in the 
control of imitation.   
The results from Experiments 1-4 reveal a relationship between the 
control of imitation and visual perspective taking.  Furthermore, these data 
suggest that the underlying mechanism of this relationship may relate to the 
online control of co-activated self-other representations, which at the neural 
level is supported by the TPJ (Experiments 3-4), an area of the brain that has 
been consistently identified as part of a wider network of regions playing an 
essential role in social cognition.  Although much work still needs to be done to 
determine the specific role of each component of this network, the findings from 
these experiments make some contribution towards achieving that goal.  Based 
on these findings, a number of interesting areas for future research have been 
identified, some of which include the potential for carefully designed 
behavioural training and brain stimulation protocols to be used in clinical 
populations known to show impairment of self-other representations such as 
individuals with autism and schizophrenia.  
Future research could also address the failure to find a relationship 
between theory of mind and the control of imitation or between theory of mind 
and visual perspective taking.  Performance on all of the theory of mind tasks 
was very high, therefore this null result could be due to the lack of performance 
variability when using these tasks with neurotypical adults.  Although all the 
three tasks employed in these experiments have been successfully used in 
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clinical settings and neuroimaging research, it is possible that neurotypical 
adults are so competent at the attribution of mental states to others that 
capturing performance variability at the behavioural level poses a considerable 
challenge.  A combination of brain stimulation and neuroimaging methods 
could be used in the future to address this challenge.  
Finally, the results from Experiment 5 revealed that in the context of 
imitation, the control of self-other representations within a migrant population 
could be modulated by the adopted acculturation strategy.  If the preferred 
strategy is to assimilate the host culture, then there is an imitation bias towards a 
member of the host culture, whereas the imitation bias in a separation strategy is 
towards a member of the heritage culture.  These findings have implications in 
the field of social cognition research, specifically within the imitation literature, 
by revealing that yet another factor can modulate self-other representations, 
with resulting impact on the quality of social interactions.
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